Gods and Square Circles
PREAMBLE
In March 2006, a fellow named Sonny contacted me through Gene Cook’s
“Unchained Radio” debate forum where I am subscribed under the moniker “Sortion.” Sonny identified himself as a Christian from the
First of all, I want to know your Faith in God and know on How
are you doing in that Faith.
I responded, writing the following:
To answer your question, I do not
have faith in any gods or claims about any gods to begin with. And I'm doing
quite fine in not having any faith.
I also made it clear that I was open to answering more of
Sonny’s questions. After all, he was coming to me, so I considered the
possibility that Sonny was open to learning something from me. I’m always happy
to share the Philosophy of Reason with those who have embraced a worldview of
faith.
A little while later Sonny did come back to me, and he had
more questions for me. He asked:
1. Why is it that you have not faith
in God?
2. Why you have said that your are fine of having no faith?
And I responded as follows:
1. Why is it that you have not faith
in God?
This is like asking me "Why is
it that you have no faith in square circles?" I don't have faith in square
circles, and yet Christians typically do not have a problem with this. In my
view, however, having faith in what theists call a god is philosophically
analogous to having faith in square circles. The traditional notion of
"God" is internally incoherent, just as is the notion of a
two-dimensional shape that is both square and circular at the same time.
2. Why you have said that you are
fine of having no faith?
The simple answer is: I don't need
faith. So, just as I am fine not having my arm amputated, I am fine not lending
my mind out to the hazards of a faith-based worldview.
I hope my statements help answer
your questions. If you have others, please ask them, I will try to respond
promptly.
Here I did a big no-no: I compared belief in a god to belief
in square circles. This is utterly scandalous, at least in circles where
god-belief is taken seriously. How dare I make such a comparison!
A little more than a month later, Sonny wrote back asking
the following question:
Please consider this follow up
questions.
1. You mentioned "faith in
square circles". Why are you
comparing the belief in God in a square circles? Could you please show to me how.
2. Your response shows to me that
Christianity is not true for you, Am I right?
Apparently I was hitting a raw nerve, but this did not keep
Sonny from coming back to me again. (He must really want my input!) So on July
4, I replied to Sonny with a more developed response:
Hello Sonny,
It is nice to hear from you again.
I am doing great!
You asked me two more questions.
1. You mentioned "faith in
square circles". Why are you
comparing the belief in God in a square circles? Could you please show to me how.
I compare belief in something like
what the Christians call 'god' to square circles, because they are most
comparable. As I mentioned, both ideas are internally incoherent. I take it
that you agree that the idea of a square circle is internally incoherent, so I
shall focus on why the Christian idea of god is likewise internally incoherent.
The Christian idea of god assumes
the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, but even to contemplate the idea one
must be standing on the primacy of existence metaphysics. These are mutually
opposed metaphysical platforms. Thus the statement "God exists" is a
literal self-contradiction, for such a statement affirms two contradictory
metaphysical bases.
A. The concept of truth assumes the
metaphysical primacy of existence: Every time you make a truth claim, you are
implicitly assuming that what you are calling true is true independent of the
particular operations of your consciousness. E.g., you wouldn't say that
B. The idea of god assumes the
primacy of consciousness metaphysics: However, the Christian idea of a god
assumes precisely the opposite view, namely that the objects of consciousness
ultimately depend on consciousness. In the case of Christianity's god, the
objects are said to depend on the consciousness of their god for their very
existence as well as for their identity, their relationship to other objects,
their activity, etc. According to this view, everything that exists in the
universe depends on some form of consciousness. Since the objects are said to
depend on consciousness, so likewise the content of truth consequently depends
on consciousness. And yet, just in declaring this as a truth, the Christian makes
use of a metaphysical foundation which contradicts this outright. Thus, the
Christian idea of god is internally incoherent. Q.E.D.
I think the best way to illustrate
this is through what I call the cartoon universe analogy. Concepts like truth,
reason, rationality, etc., assume a non-cartoon universe. That is, it assumes a
universe which is not being controlled by an all-controlling, all-determining
agent which can create any object it wants and revise their nature whenever it
wants. But the Christian conception of the universe is analogous to the
fictional realm of a cartoon. This realm is controlled by an all-controlling,
all-determining agent which can create any object it
wants and revise their nature whenever it wants. In such a universe, one could
not say, for instance, that animals cannot speak human language, for the cosmic
cartoonist could make a liar of anyone who makes such a statement at any time
by creating animals which speak human language (such as a serpent which cons a
woman in a garden, or a donkey which talks back to his owner). In such a
universe, one could not say, for instance, that it is not possible to walk on
unfrozen water, for again the cosmic cartoonist could make a liar of him at any
time by having men walk on unfrozen water, such as on an inland sea. In such a
universe, "truth" is whatever the cosmic cartoonist happens to will
at that moment. But when Christians speak of 'truth', they talk about it as if
it were absolute. But obviously there could be no absolute truths if the universe
were as they described it. In other words, truth assumes the non-cartoon
universe of atheism, not the cartoon universe of theism, and thus when
Christians speak of truth as if it were absolute and unyielding to conscious preferences, they are in effect borrowing from a worldview
which contradicts their own.
2. Your response shows to me that
Christianity is not true for you, Am I right?
My response is that Christianity is
not true, period. Our individual minds reside in the same realm of existence. What
is true in this realm is true in this realm, since A is A. It's not a question
of Christianity being true for one person, and yet untrue for another. You
wouldn't say that it is true that
Got any more questions? I have
answers.
Best regards,
Six days later, I heard back from Sonny again. He had asked
me for a deeper explanation for comparing Christian god-belief to belief in
square circles, and when I provided him with it, it apparently
exceeded his command of English. So he requested my consent to forward my
explanation to a fellow Christian believer. Sonny wrote:
I'm glad of hearing you again. could I refer
you to my friend? I am planning to
forward you ideas of the subject (Christianity) to my friend and let him
continue this matter (talk). As you
may know, I am not very fluent in english
language and I see a hard time in digesting on the taughts. I love to learn more on this. I enjoy in
asking you and I want to learn more deeper as this
subject be discused and hope it ended up into more
profitable for us all. So your conversation with my friend whom who may
explains the truth of Christianity could help me understand much the idea.
I hope you agree. Thanks.
In His Love,
Sonny
Sonny gives no indication of what he may have understood so far in the
explanation that I had provided him. Nonetheless, I was happy to grant him my
consent to forward the messages that I had sent to him to anyone of his
choosing. I consented to this in my 11 July response to Sonny. Then silence.
Then two and a half months later, I received a message from
a Christian named Jason Dulle. He runs a blog called Theosophical
Ruminations. Jason’s response to me continued the same subject line as my
conversation with Sonny, and trailing Jason’s message were the exchanges
between Sonny and me that Sonny had forwarded to Jason.
Jason was eager to take me to task for comparing belief in
the Christian god with belief in square circles, charging that the two are not
comparable. His reasoning for this seems to be that the idea of a square circle
is prima facie absurd, while the idea of god is not. But even if this were the
case, there could still be similarities which make both beliefs comparable to
each other. Moreover, I disagree that the idea of god is not prima facie absurd,
but I do accept that this is a matter to be judged by the context that one
brings to such assessments. The context which provides the backdrop of my
evaluation is different from the context that Jason has. On his context, the
idea of god is not prima facie absurd, but on my context it most definitely is.
Therefore much of my response to Jason was focused on developing the context
which supports my comparison in contradiction to the charge that Jason sought
to level against it. In addition, I was careful to explain that my context is
not in fact alien to his own thinking, but rather that he implicitly grants
validity to the foundations of my context just by trying to interact with my
points.
Jason’s response to me can be found here.
Below is my response to Jason Dulle.
RESPONSE TO JASON
Hello Jason,
You wrote:
Sonny Binayao
forwarded me your email correspondence and asked me to respond to your
arguments against theism. I see you
agreed to this. I apologize for the
delayed response, but everything in my life that could change has been
changing, and I have had no time for email.
Welcome, Jason. Thanks for your message. I remember my
correspondence with Sonny and it is true, I did give him my consent to share my
message with someone of his choosing. I’m glad he forwarded my reply to another
Christian. I always relish the opportunity to share my position with believers.
It is particularly gratifying to see how well it stands up to what detractors
of my position try to bring against it. It is also gratifying to introduce to
believers a truly rational worldview. It’s my way of trying to make this a
better world.
Jason:
Let me respond to your arguments.
Okay, please proceed.
Jason:
1. You assert that the notion of God is
internally incoherent on the same level as square circles. Few would dispute the fact that the
notion of God could be false, but equally few would argue that the notion of
God is internally incoherent. I was
surprised to see you try to argue along that line.
Yes, I compare the idea of a god to the idea of a square
circle because, as I pointed out to Sonny, they are most comparable. You say
that “few would argue that the notion of God is internally incoherent,” and
even though I have not performed a survey on this, I’ll take your word for it
and will also state that I am proud to number among that few. Regardless, the
truth or falsity of a claim is not determined by the number of its proponents.
Nevertheless, your statement and surprise to find that I argue along this line
only suggest that you have not encountered many who argue as I do, and that
alone would not surprise me. There aren’t many like me out there. Not yet
anyhow.
Jason:
But before I begin to engage your
argument for the internally incoherent nature of theism, I would like to
address your comparison of theism to square circles.
Okay.
Jason:
For the sake of argument let's
assume theism is in fact internally incoherent.
If we assume this as an opener, then why proceed discussing
the notion of a god any further? While I am happy in resting on the conclusion
that the notion of god is internally coherent, I doubt you are, since you seem
quite eager to defend your god-belief from that charge. So your “for the sake
of argument” here seems rather baiting. That’s fine. I’ll bite.
Jason:
Even then, is comparing the
internally incoherent notion of God truly comparable to square circles?
If two ideas are both found (or “assumed”) to be internally
incoherent, there is prima facie a basis for comparison on this point alone,
for they are comparable by the simple fact that both are internally incoherent.
So I would say yes in response to this question. However, you disagreed:
Jason:
I don't think so. This comparison seems more like a
rhetorical device than an appropriate comparison. Square circles are a prima facie logical
absurdity while the notion of God is not.
You seem to be begging the question here, and indeed,
against one who has already presented a case for the conclusion that the notion
of god is internally incoherent. If my case is correct, then the notion of a
god is just as logically absurd as – if not even more so fundamentally than -
the notion of a square circle. And if that is the case, then
certain comparisons become available.
Jason:
A square circle cannot exist by
definition.
I would not put it this way, for “cannot exist” is not in
the definition of “square circle” as I would phrase it. Rather, I would say that
a square circle cannot exist by virtue of contradiction. Similarly, I would say
that what Christians describe as “God” cannot exist by virtue of contradiction.
Jason:
Squares and circles are mutually
exclusive. Their properties are not compatible.
Agreed. Similarly, the primacy of existence
and the primacy of consciousness are mutually exclusive. Their properties are
not compatible. Just as the notion of a square circle attempts to integrate two
sets of mutually exclusive properties, so does the notion of a god. Hence the comparability of the two notions.
Jason:
We cannot imagine, yet alone
conceive of a square circle, and thus we can reject the notion out-of-hand.
But whether or not we can imagine something or not, is
ultimately irrelevant to the truth of a claim. Imagination is not the final
arbiter of truth, at least it’s not in my worldview.
Truth rests on facts which obtain independent of the mind, not on the fantasies
that the mind can produce. But if we apply your standard (imagination) to the
notion of a god, we find that it too does not hold up. For I cannot imagine a
consciousness which exists outside the universe, for universe is the sum total
of what exists. I cannot imagine something existing outside the realm of
existence. Moreover, I cannot imagine a universe which presupposes the primacy
of consciousness. I could try, but any time I wanted to affirm something as a
truth within that universe, the consciousness which holds primacy over that
universe could make me a liar at any time by wishing an opposite state of
affairs. Indeed, nothing in that universe could constrain that consciousness
from doing so if it wanted to, for its wants would be the final court of appeal
in such a universe. The closest I could come to conceiving that would be akin
to what I see in some cartoons. But even these borrow from the metaphysics of a
universe in which consciousness does not hold metaphysical primacy in order to
keep from becoming completely incoherent. So even given your measure
(imagination), there is an element of comparability here.
Jason:
We can, however, conceive of and
imagine the existence of God.
Well, in one sense I agree with you: it is only in the
imagination that we can entertain the notion of a god, for we do not find such
a thing in reality. But this is not the same thing as imagining that god per
se. But similarly, it is only in the imagination that we can entertain the
notion of a square circle. But this is not the same thing as imagining that
square circle per se. See the similarity here? I cannot imagine the realm of
existence being created by a conscious being, for the conscious being would
have to exist in order to create, and yet the reason for postulating it to
begin with is to explain the realm of existence in the first place. So it double-backs and defeats itself. Why not simply start
with reality, which we know exists, and move from there? That would keep things
reasonable. Christians would not stand for this, for it would allow for
independence of thought and life. And if men lived independent lives, they
would not be sacrificing them to others, and unavailable for others to control.
Jason:
The notion is not a prima facie
logical absurdity.
Hold on. You mean, the notion of a
consciousness which holds metaphysical primacy over all its objects is not a
logical absurdity? On what basis would you make this assessment? On the basis of the orientation that your consciousness actually
has with its objects? Does your consciousness have the power to wish
objects into existence? Can you alter the nature of the objects you perceive by
wishing? Can you make your dining room table levitate off the floor by wishing?
Can your god make your dining room table levitate off the floor by wishing? Can
you make it a fact that copper melts at 400 F instead of 1984 F by wishing? Can
your god do this by wishing? My supposition is that you will claim for your
god’s consciousness powers which your consciousness does not possess. Moreover,
you will likely claim for your god’s consciousness powers which no
consciousness found in nature possesses. It’s easy to imagine a being that has
these powers. But can you produce evidence that any consciousness possesses
such powers? Furthermore, can you integrate such ideas into the broader sum of
your knowledge of the world, particularly the knowledge which remains implicit
in your day-to-day functions, without contradiction? Obviously
not. Indeed, it is because you are not integrating that you can make
claims such as “the notion [of god] is not a prima facie logical absurdity.”
Similarly, if we do not attempt to integrate square and circle into one shape,
we can say that there is no prima facie logical absurdity here either. After
all, we see squares and circles all the time. But once we start integrating,
which is a necessity of our consciousness, we run into problems. Look at the
history of philosophy and see where it has lead thinkers who were reluctant to
deal with their minds’ need to integrate. Look at the state of religious
thought throughout history, and observe how disconnected from reality it is.
Let’s look at truth and see how absolute it is on your
worldview. Can you make it true that
Once one grants metaphysical primacy to the subject, what
could the term “logical absurdity” possibly mean? Logic is a set of principles
that are only valid on the basis of the primacy of the object metaphysics. The
term “logical absurdity” could only have meaning on the basis of a metaphysical
orientation which theism rejects. And yet here you claim that the notion of a
god “is not a prima facie logical absurdity.” This of course depends on which
metaphysical orientation you’re standing on. If you’re like me, you’re standing
on the metaphysical primacy of existence. (In fact, we have no choice about
this.) But if you are knowingly standing on the metaphysical primacy of
existence, then you’d see that any view that affirms its contradiction (i.e., the
primacy of consciousness) is itself absurd and cannot be true. On the other
hand, if you pretend to be standing on the primacy of consciousness view, then
what in the world could be considered “logically absurd”? By standing on the
primacy of consciousness, you’ve abandoned the metaphysical foothold you’d need
in order to invoke the term in a meaningful manner.
Jason:
It's one thing to say there is no good
evidence for believing in God (an assertion I would dispute), but it wholly
another to say the notion of God is internally incoherent on the level of
square circles.
Maybe so. Of course, it could be the case
that both claims are true. That is to say, there’s no contradiction in
affirming both a) there is no good evidence the existence of a god, and b) the
notion of god is internally incoherent. I think both are true not only of
god-belief claims, but also of the notion of square circles. So again, we see
there’s a strong aspect of comparability here.
Jason:
One is logically absurd on its face
and cannot possibly be true, while the other is a logical possibility that
could be shown false due to internal contradictions in the notion itself.
Hold your horses, Jason. The very idea “logical possibility”
itself assumes the metaphysical primacy of existence. But you’re using the term
to refer to a notion that reduces to the primacy of consciousness. To say that
a view is logically possible when the view in question entails a contradiction
to the metaphysical basis needed for the very ida of logical possibility as such to be meaningful,
is clearly absurd. Meanwhile, notice that you’re merely asserting the “logical
possibility” of your god’s existence while not presenting any specific,
positive reasons why one should accept such a claim.
I think what’s happening, Jason, is that the logical
absurdity of the notion of a square circle is simply more readily detectable
than the logical absurdity inherent in the notion of a god. The ready detectability of logical absurdity in the notion of a
square circle is afforded by the salience of the discordance of the shapes
being combined in the idea. There is similar ideational discordance in the
notion of a god, only it may not be as readily detectable to those who are not
accustomed to thinking in terms of essentials. The idea of god has historically
been so seductive for many thinkers simply because this discordance is easy to
miss if one has no explicit understanding of the subject-object relationship.
The authors of the bible nowhere demonstrate an informed understanding of this
crucial relationship, even though there is no escape from it. The notion of god
seeks to obscure the proper relationship between subject and object, which is
why it comes as no surprise that Christian doctrine has nothing explicit to say
about this inescapable relationship. When we dig into the notion of god and
find that its metaphysical implications are contrary to what reality tells us
in each waking moment of our lives, then we have uncovered the same kind of
logical absurdity we readily detected in the notion of a square circle. And once the mirage is broken, the
logical absurdity of the notion of a god is just as prima facie as the logical
absurdity of the notion of a square circle. So, again, we have a strong point
of comparability between the two.
Jason:
We are prima facie justified in
rejecting the notion of square circles, but we are not prima facie justified in
rejecting the notion of God.
I disagree entirely, and I do so on a basis that you have to
assume even to deny or dispute it. You do not even seem to recognize the real
issue of the debate at this point. Merely asserting that X is possible does not
in fact make X possible. The concept ‘possibility’ assumes many things, among
them a proper orientation between consciousness and its objects, between
subject and object. Perhaps you need to think this through a little better
before you attempt to battle it? Zeal will not overcome ignorance, Jason.
Jason:
Think of the Hindu belief of
salvation. Hindu's claim all
reality is one. You and I do not
exist as distinct individuals (atman).
We are all part of Brahman.
The idea that we are distinct persons from each other, and distinct from
the rest of the universe is an illusion (maya).
Salvation is obtained only when we finally come to recognize our
connection to the Brahman, understanding that we do not exist. But wait...how can I come to recognize
that I do not exist if there is no I in the first place to recognize such a
truth? The Hindu religion is
inherently incoherent in this regard.
But I would not dare say belief in Hinduism is like belief in a square
circle. The two are not
comparable. There is an internal
self-contradiction involved, but not on the level of a logical absurdity such
as a square circle. Likewise concerning the notion of God.
Perhaps you’re just more timid in this respect than I am.
When I find that an idea is logically absurd, I do not hold back in pointing it
out. If two ideas are logically absurd, why wouldn’t they be comparable on this
point? They share this point in common, so there’s a basis for comparison. I
think you just don’t like the implications of comparing your god-belief to
belief in square circles, principally because you have an emotional investment
in your god-belief that you do not have in square circles. This emotional
investment looms larger in your mind than the logical absurdity in that notion
that I have identified, prompting you to resist my identification. But it will
not go away because it hurts your feelings. All god-belief is irrational. But
few believers are willing to admit it. Once they do admit it, they often walk
away from “the faith,” as I did. I know where you are, Jason. I know because I
was there once myself. It was very difficult at first. But facing the truth when
you’ve been conned into believing a lie is often very difficult emotionally. No
one likes the feeling of being betrayed, especially when the traitor turns out
to be yourself.
Metaphysical
Primacy and the Notion of a god
Jason:
Now let me address your attempt to
prove that theism is internally incoherent.
Okay.
Jason:
A. I agree. Whether one is a theist or atheist, most
everyone agrees that ontology precedes epistemology. Objective reality (what you call
"existence metaphysics") is the truth maker, not our subjective
beliefs (what you call "consciousness metaphysics") about
reality. Truth is obtained when
beliefs/propositions just so happen to correspond to reality (a corresponding
relation). Without conscious knowers present to contemplate the existant
reality there could be no truth--only bare reality. No one except a few crazy postmodern
epistemologists dispute this.
I think you’ve misunderstood something here, Jason. Primacy
of existence over consciousness does not mean primacy of ontology over
epistemology. The two are not equivalent statements. After all, one can affirm
that “ontology precedes epistemology” (an expression that I nowhere used) and
still hold an ontology which affirms that the subject of consciousness holds
metaphysical primacy over its objects (in fact, this is what Christians who
affirm that “ontology precedes epistemology” in fact hold, whether they realize
it or not). Also, I do not contrast “existence metaphysics” from “consciousness
metaphysics,” but the primacy of existence from the primacy of
consciousness. This distinction has to do with the relationship between
consciousness and its objects, that is, the subject-object relationship. This
is what theists tend to miss most readily when attempting to grapple with this
issue.
Moreover, your statement that “truth is obtained when beliefs/propositions just
so happen to correspond to reality” tells me more about what you’ve probably
been ingesting in the place of rational philosophy than about the nature of
truth per se. Throughout the history of philosophy, one thing that opposing
schools of universals agreed on was that if consciousness took any active role
in discovering and forming truths, whatever the result was could not be true
knowledge. Thus both the realist and the nominalist
schools of universals held that consciousness needs to be passive in order to
have true knowledge. But while the realists believed that consciousness must be
passive because we obviously have knowledge, the nominalists
believed that we could not have knowledge because obviously our consciousness
is active. The dichotomies simply multiply from this point of mutual departure
as a result of unchecked half-truths and half-lies. Truth isn’t something that
is achieved when some mysterious set of conditions “just so happens” to fall
into place. On the contrary, truth is achieved when our consciousness obeys the
primacy of existence, observing the severe constraints of the nature and needs
of our consciousness as much as we observe the severe constraints of the nature
of the objects we take into consideration. The primacy of existence is
axiomatic; it cannot be evaded. Even to doubt it, you have to assume it.
There’s no alternative here, but this does not keep thinkers from trying to
find one.
Jason:
B. You contrasted the above view with
Christianity, claiming that ‘the idea of god assumes the primacy of
consciousness metaphysics.’ I have
had a difficult time understanding what you mean here.
It’s good that you admit this, Jason. I’d say you have some
work yet to do here before you have cleared the weeds that have been growing in
your mind. Already on point A above, there was some major untangling that had
to take place before proceeding. I was in the same
boat some 15 or so years ago. I didn’t realize then how far I had to go before
I finally grasped the fullness of these points. But now that I have, they’re so
obvious that it’s amazing to me that I even ever questioned them. Indeed, they
had to be true in order for me to question them in the first place. So I’d
suggest some patience as well as an uncompromising demand for honesty on your
part if you really want to understand my case. Otherwise, if you do not take
the time needed to grasp and integrate what I present, and if you are not
honest to yourself, you’re going to continue to be lost.
Jason:
You say the Christian worldview is ‘precisely
the opposite view’ of A, but I don't see how that is.
A gentle correction here, Jason. What I wrote was that “the
Christian idea of a god assumes precisely the opposite view, namely that the
objects of consciousness ultimately depend on consciousness.” Above your
attempt to grasp my point A was botchy at best, and needed some important
corrections before you could move on to B. I’m hoping it’s starting to be
clearer now. But you’ll have to determine this for yourself. Ask more questions
if you’re not certain.
Jason:
In A you made the simple point that
ontology precedes epistemology, and that reality is what it is independent of
conscious knowers.
I did not make the point that “ontology precedes
epistemology.” I reviewed my message to Sonny and do not see that I ever made
this statement. And yet twice now you have inserted it into my argument. Please
be more careful here. But yes, I did affirm that reality is what it is
independent of consciousness. The house I live in has two stories, whether I am
willing to affirm this or not. My denial of this would not alter reality. Why? Because existence holds metaphysical primacy over consciousness.
This is the simple recognition that the objects of consciousness do not conform
to the subject of consciousness. This is not the same as saying that “ontology
precedes epistemology,” for as I pointed out above, one can affirm that
“ontology precedes epistemology” and yet affirm the ontological primacy of
consciousness in the subject-object relationship. Indeed, Christians do
precisely this in their god-belief claims.
Jason:
For the Christian worldview to be
precisely the opposite would require that Christianity advance the notion that
epistemology precedes ontology, or that reality is (human) mind-dependent.
Ah, look at that, Jason. You found it necessary to insert
the modifier “human” into parentheses here. Why did you do that? I know why.
It’s because you are willing to concede my point only so far, not as an
absolute principle because that would endanger your god-belief. Why didn’t you
put “canine” here? You do recognize that dogs are conscious too, do you not?
Would you say that the metaphysical primacy of existence applies to human
consciousness, but not to canine consciousness? I wouldn’t. No, it’s consistent
across the board: all instances of consciousness that we encounter in nature
are consciousnesses enjoying precisely the same essential relationship to their
objects: the objects hold metaphysical primacy. You found it necessary to
insert “human” into parentheses because you don’t want this principle to apply
when it comes to the god you imagine. You want it to be exempt from the primacy
of existence principle, because you want its consciousness to hold metaphysical
primacy over everything. Notice the epistemological implications of this: it’s
your wants - not facts that are obtained from nature and objectively
validated – that lead you to making this reservation. You just gave away the
game, Jason. Don’t tell me you didn’t hesitate when you added this.
Jason:
Clearly that is not the Christian
worldview.
No, not the Christian worldview per
se, because the Christian worldview is far from consistent, and it’s pretty
difficult to be consistent with one position or another when it is never
explicitly identified and understood. Also, if no position is ever explicitly affirmed, one can
always claim that he never affirmed it, even though what he does affirm reduces
to that view in terms of fundamentals. Moreover, no worldview which affirms the
primacy of consciousness can be consistent in affirming it. It always has to
allow for exceptions either way, for reality simply will not yield. What’s
important to recognize at this point is that Christianity nowhere deals with
the issue of metaphysical primacy in any clear and intelligible manner. Even
Jason:
So if you mean to say Christianity
advances the primacy of epistemology over ontology you are mistaken.
I never found that Christianity explicitly affirms either
ontology over epistemology or epistemology over ontology. Where does the bible
weigh in on this matter? I don’t find it in any of my bibles, so it’s hard to
see how you can say one view or the other is mistaken or correct. Again, this
is not the issue that I raised. It would be quite unfathomable, however, if you
denied the fact that Christianity affirms the metaphysical primacy of its god’s
consciousness over the objects it allegedly created (!) and over which it
allegedly rules (!). That is the issue that I have raised, but my experience is
pretty uniform in that Christians have a very difficult time with it. Often
they complicate the matter well beyond necessity, and this is due in part to a
persisting failure to think in terms of fundamentals as well as an urgency to
protect their god-belief, and this can be motivated by a variety of factors,
more psychological than philosophical. Philosophy is typically after the fact
for Christian believers. Their faith in an invisible magic being holds primacy
over reason and rationality. For a child who is immersed in companionship with
an imaginary friend, it’s pretty hard to persuade him that his imaginary friend
is a fiction. He does not believe his imaginary friend is real because of
philosophical reasoning. Rather, if he gets to the point of trying to assemble
a philosophy, a worldview if you will, he’s going to build it on the basis that
his imaginary friend is real. Notice the similarity to Christianity here. Take
Cornelius Van Til for example. In his paper “Why I Believe in God,” Van Til
makes it very clear that he was raised from his earliest days as a toddler to
believe in the Christian god. He was schooled in institutions which further
instilled this belief and reinforced it against any questions and doubts that
might be raised against it. When he entered the seminary, he was even more
immersed in his god-belief. With all the reinforcement and the desire to
believe his god-belief claims are true, how would one be able to correct him?
It’s very difficult to do this, and non-believers typically do not care enough
to sustain a dialogue with stubborn believers. Non-Christians tend to be more
live and let live, and do not presume a level of authority over other minds.
This is unlike many Christians, as they adhere to a mind-control religion. Many
Christians simply cannot stand it when non-believers are vocally open about
their atheism. This prompts many to seek ways of vilifying atheists and atheism
as such.
Jason:
If that is not what you meant to say
(and it appears from your context that it is not) then you cannot claim the
supposed Christian view you expound on in B is the opposite of the view
expounded on in A.
I’ll recap briefly in answer to this: 1) I do not (and did
not) argue that Christianity affirms either that “ontology precedes
epistemology” or that “epistemology precedes ontology.” The early Christians,
for instance, never seem even to have awareness for these terms, let alone the
relationship either position implies. 2) I do hold that the Christian notion of
god assumes the metaphysical primacy of consciousness, and I find it amazing to
see Christians ever denying this while at the same time they claim that their
god’s dictates hold “sovereignty” over the universe which it allegedly
“created” ex nihilo by an act of will and whose
contents obey its wishes without exception. 3) I do hold that the nature of
truth assumes the metaphysical primacy of existence (i.e., that existence
exists independent of any consciousness) and consequently 4) that the claim
that Christianity is true therefore affirms two mutually opposing and
contradictory metaphysics by implication. In that way 5) the notion of the
Christian god is, like the notion of a square circle, internally incoherent.
Are you starting to get the picture now?
Let’s see what else you had stated.
Jason:
After reading and re-reading your
email several times I think you might have been applying the ‘opposite view’ of
A, not to Christians themselves, but to the God they claim to serve.
That’s more like it. After all, I had stated that “the
Christian idea of a god assumes precisely the opposite view, namely that the
objects of consciousness ultimately depend on consciousness.” This should not
be taken to mean that I think the average Christian walks around thinking that
the $10 bill in his wallet will turn into a $100 bill if he wishes hard enough
(in a manner like the water in the water pots at the wedding at Cana turning into wine because Jesus wanted it to). On the
contrary, I’m quite adamant about the fact that Christians do not consistently
apply the metaphysical implications of Christian doctrine to their daily
activities as a matter of general principle. Many Christian believers seem to
be hungry for principles, but are so malnourished because of Christianity’s
failure to deliver rational principles that they compartmentalize their stated
beliefs and implicitly held assumptions to an extreme degree. This is why it is
never surprising to see Christians turning on each other on the most arbitrary
points and waging futile debates for century after century.
Jason:
If I am
understanding you correctly, you recognize Christians assume the primacy
of ontology over epistemology in the same manner as you, but argue that the God
they believe in assumes the opposite.
Again, it’s unclear where you got this “primacy of ontology
over epistemology” conception of my position. I do not at all think it is an
accurate characterization of what I have affirmed for it is not at all the
relationship I was isolating. I think Christians are like everyone else in that
they have no choice about the fact that reality exists
independent of consciousness, and they have to govern themselves according to
this implicit recognition whether they consciously realize it or not in order
to get anything done. Even to tie your shoes, you’re not going to expect them
to tie themselves just by wishing them to be tied, even though your worldview’s
stated affirmations entail that such is within the realm of possibility (I can
hear the little kid protesting “my God can do that!”). No, you have to do just as
I do, and bend down, grasp each shoe lace in your right and left hands and tie
them together. It is very much a physical activity and it will not be
accomplished by mere wishing. The same with getting your butt
out the door and into your car. You’re not going to wish yourself into
your car any more than you’re going to wish yourself over to your work place.
We have no choice about this. Why? Because existence holds
metaphysical primacy over consciousness (not because “ontology precedes
epistemology”). We can wish all we want, but we’re not going to be able
to turn water into wine, still stormy seas and weather, walk on the water,
raise the dead, feed 4,000 with five loaves and two fishes, or cast mountains
into the sea. Deep down Christians sense that these ideas are pure fantasy. But
they’re so caught up into the trappings of Christianity’s devotional program
which they’ve been duped into affirming and defending, that they claim they’re
willing to die for these beliefs, as if those beliefs could somehow benefit
from their deaths. Think of it: worshipping a set of ideas that you believe can
benefit as a result of your willing demise. As I pointed out in prior writings
of mine, there is a profound similarity between the Jesus of the gospels and
the Jihadist suicide bombers of Islam: both willingly
embrace a premature death. This is what we can expect from an anti-man,
anti-reason, anti-reality and anti-life worldview.
Jason:
While Christian's believe the mind
is subject to reality, when it comes to God they claim reality is subject to
the mind (of God).
Right. They affirm two opposing and
contradictory metaphysical orientations. Some Christians are more ready to
admit this than others. For instance, see my following blog:
Confessions
of a Vantillian Subjectivist
Jason:
Since the epistemological priority
of Christian believers is the opposite of the God they serve, there is a
contradiction. Am
I understanding your argument correctly?
Not because of “epistemological priority of Christians.”
Again, that is not at all the issue I raised. Rather, the metaphysical
orientation assumed by the concept ‘truth’ (namely the primacy of existence
principle) vs. the metaphysical orientation that Christians claim their god has
over the universe (namely the primacy of consciousness view). The two are in
diametric conflict at the most fundamental level, and nothing can reconcile
them. It’s like trying to season your food (truth) with poison (a false
worldview). There are potentially lethal consequences to this. To apply the
concept ‘truth’ to Christian claims denies the metaphysical basis of truth.
This is the fallacy known as the stolen concept. A stolen concept occurs when one makes use of a concept (e.g., “true”) while
ignoring or denying its genetic roots (e.g., the metaphysical primacy of
existence). This occurs when one applies the concept ‘truth’ (which assumes the
metaphysical primacy of existence) to an idea which presupposes the
metaphysical primacy of consciousness (such as the notion of a god).
Consequently, god-belief is inherently and systematically fallacious.
Jason:
Assuming I am
understanding your argument correctly let me offer a rebuttal. First, if God exists and is causally
prior to the universe, of necessity we would have a situation in which mind has
primacy over (physical) reality.
But where is the contradiction in this?
The contradiction occurs when such a statement is affirmed
as a truth, since truth as such assumes the primacy of existence while the view
that is being affirmed as a truth assumes the primacy of consciousness. You
wouldn’t say that the claim “God exists” is only true if you want it to be
true, right? In other words, you wouldn’t say that the claim “God exists” is
true on the basis of the primacy of consciousness. And yet, the content of this
claim explicitly affirms the primacy of consciousness, as you freely
acknowledge. So you’re straddling two opposite and contradictory metaphysical
orientations between subject and object. Hence, you have no choice but to
engage a contradiction when affirming the claim “God exists.”
Meanwhile, only a false understanding of concepts could lead
one to affirm the view that something “exists and is causally prior to the
universe.” The universe is the sum totality of existence. If something exists,
it is a member of the universe by definition. There is nothing “outside” the
universe. To affirm this is to ignore the definition of ‘universe’. Webster’s
agrees on this: ‘universe’ = “the whole body of things and phenomena observed
or postulated.” (http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/universe) So already I would
reject the idea of something existing outside the universe. Also, the concept
‘causality’ presupposes existence, and thus can only be meaningfully affirmed
in the context of what does exist, and what exists is the universe. I
completely and emphatically reject the idea that the universe is a creation of
consciousness. You can’t get more subjective than this. It is utterly
irrational and philosophically untenable. It’s noteworthy to see Christian
apologists attempt to defend the so-called “cosmological argument” for the
existence of their god, and yet in deploying this argument they speak about the
universe, but they seem unaware of its definition. Definitions are the
guardians of rationality, so it’s not hard to figure out why apologists need to
ignore them in order to make their case.
Jason:
There is nothing contradictory about
believing a great mind created physical reality, and at the same time recognize
that our minds do not have the same capability.
Actually, there is, since such a belief attempts a
compromise between two opposite and contradictory metaphysical viewpoints. It’s
apparent even in your own attempt to phrase the debate by distinguishing
between human consciousness and some invisible magic consciousness which enjoys
a metaphysical orientation completely opposite to human consciousness. My point
is that, even before you get to speculations about what your god can or cannot
do, you have already assumed, at the very least performatively,
an orientation between subject and object which your god-belief requires you to
jettison in order to affirm it. You only end up short-circuiting your own mind
when you do this. On what basis would you believe that “a great mind created
physical reality”? On the basis of an orientation which
contradicts this, or on the basis of an orientation that is nowhere evidenced
in nature?
Jason:
While the existence and nature of
reality is subject to the mind who created it, reality
is not subject to other created minds within it.
I take this as your agreement that I have accurately
conceptualized the matter. It also confirms that the cartoon universe analogy
fittingly applies to Christianity (I’ll discuss this further below). You affirm
two completely different metaphysical orientations, one between your god and
its objects, and another between man’s consciousness and his objects. Only one
of these orientations is compatible with the concept of truth, and it’s not the
one that you affirm in your god-belief. But notice the dichotomy your
god-belief puts you in: on the one hand, reality is subjective (since it
conforms to the dictates of a conscious subject); on the other hand, reality is
objective (since it does not conform to the dictates of a conscious subject).
You’re trying to have your cake, and eat it, too. By definition, this is an
issue of metaphysical schizophrenia.
Artificial
Intelligence Thought Experiment
Jason:
A simple thought experience
demonstrates this to be true. Humans are creative beings. We use our minds to create things all
the time. Let's say one day the
minds of men are able to create artificial intelligence. What was once a piece of metal and wires
will be transformed into a conscious and intelligent being. Would it be a
contradiction for these newly created conscious beings to acknowledge that
their minds are subject to the reality created for them by their human
creators, and yet recognize that the same is not true of their creators? Of course not. One mind created the reality of another
mind, but only the created mind is subject to the reality created for it by its
creator. The mind who created their reality is not. In the same way it is not a
contradiction for Christians to acknowledge that their minds are subject to
reality, all the while recognizing that the reality to which their minds are
subject is itself subject to the mind who created it.
Apparently your thought experiment here attempts to put
human consciousness in an analogous position to that which theism claims on
behalf of its god. To do this, you seize on the idea of creativity. Man is
creative, and so is god, according to theism. Human beings use their
consciousness in creating things all the time, and so does god, according to
theism. Objectivism does not deny the fact that man is able to create things by
using his consciousness. However, the thought experiment your offering here
trades on an insidious equivocation on the term ‘create’.
Moreover, your thought experiment involves a scenario which
depends on the actuality of artificial intelligence, which so far as I know has
not yet been achieved. So on this point, it is at best speculative, but this
speculation is vital to the efficacy of your thought experiment. It boils down
to a “what if?” scenario, which is not very compelling even on its own terms. And for what? Just to draw an analogy which trades on an
equivocation? I’m sure you would do better if you could, Jason. But that’s just
the problem: the terms of theism will not allow any better than this. Why? Because in the end theism retails in stolen concepts.
Even your characterization of the achievement of artificial
intelligence blurs the matter at hand (probably because you still have not
isolated it explicitly, as we found above to be the case when you mistakenly
construed the primacy of existence as the “ontology precedes epistemology”).
Notice this statement of yours:
What was once a piece of metal and
wires will be transformed into a conscious and intelligent being.
Whatever it is that was “transformed into a conscious and
intelligent being” would still be metal and wire if metal and wire were used in
the construction of such a being. It would simply have acquired the faculty of
consciousness, if in fact that was what was achieved. Similarly, the physical
tissue which develops beyond the embryonic stage into a human baby and at some
point acquires self-awareness, is still physical
tissue. The physical tissue did not become “something else” – i.e., other than
physical tissue. Human babies and adults both have physical tissue as well as
the faculty of consciousness.
Observe how you proceeded from this point:
Would it be a contradiction for
these newly created conscious beings to acknowledge that their minds are
subject to the reality created for them by their human creators, and yet
recognize that the same is not true of their creators? Of
course not. One mind created the reality of another mind, but only the
created mind is subject to the reality created for it by its creator. The mind who
created their reality is not.
But even in the context of your thought experiment, you’re
not suggesting that the human beings who assembled their artificial intelligence
“created” the reality in which it was possible for
them to construct such a thing, are you? I strongly doubt it. That reality
already exists, and it exists independent of the minds who undertook the
project of developing artificial intelligence. The materials they used in
developing that artificial intelligence already existed, they already had their
specific natures which the developers had to consider in their development
efforts, and the reality of the interaction between those materials when combined
exists independent of their consciousness as well. The developers did not wish
a new reality into existence ex nihilo. And the
reality of their final product is not something which conforms to their wishing
either. On the contrary, the human beings who participated in the endeavor
exist in a reality that they did not create. Reality exists independent of
their wishes, feelings, ignorance, affections, etc. And in their creative
endeavors, they had to deal with reality on its own terms, and this took a lot
of trial and error before success could be achieved. And even after initial
successes were achieved, further improvements would become possible as
additional relevant knowledge is acquired and validated.
But the equivocation here should be obvious. The human
designers could only create with materials that already exist. They did not
wish those materials into existence “ex nihilo.” On
an objective metaphysics, consciousness does not create its objects, nor does
consciousness assign objects their nature. This is the meaning of objective
metaphysics: the objects of consciousness hold metaphysical primacy over the
conscious activity of the subject. Creation for man is not what creation is
claimed to be on behalf of a god, according to theism. There’s a fundamental
dissimilarity here which the analogy in your thought experiment ignores.
In other words, for both the human beings as well as for the
artificial intelligence they created, both are held to the same metaphysical
orientation between their consciousness and any object(s) they perceive and/or
consider. The human beings do not possess a consciousness which holds
metaphysical primacy over their objects, and neither do the artificially
intelligent products they manufactured. Both are subject to reality; neither
enjoys an orientation between subject and object that the other does not also
enjoy. There may be differences in ability, such as the human consciousness
having the knowledge needed to construct an artificially intelligent product,
while the artificially intelligent product itself lacks this knowledge;
similarly human consciousness has certain abilities that feline consciousness
lacks, but both have the same fundamental orientation between subject and
object. Such distinctions are not differences in fundamental orientation. On
the theistic meaning of the term, no new reality was “created,” for on the
theistic meaning of the term nothing was created “ex nihilo”
by a direct act of will. The human designers had no choice about the fact that,
if they wanted to create something, they had to build from pre-existing
materials, and in building with those materials they had to work in conformity
with their nature.
You tried to draw from this dubious and speculative thought
experiment the following conclusion:
In the same way it is not a
contradiction for Christians to acknowledge that their minds are subject to
reality, all the while recognizing that the reality to which their minds are
subject is itself subject to the mind who created it.
Notice that the thought experiment, even in spite of its
internal problems, does not deal with the point that I have raised against
theism. My point against theism is that the theist has no choice, given the
nature of theism as such, but to affirm two fundamentally contradictory
orientations between subject and object. The thought experiment that you
present does not give any proof, even hypothetically (which are its own terms), of the kind of orientation that theism claims its god
enjoys. Theists never provide any evidence of such an orientation because there
is no evidence of such an orientation. All they can do is CLAIM that some being
(which just happens to be invisible and beyond the reach of all of man’s
senses) enjoys such a capacity. There’s no collateral to back it up. It remains
a perpetually unsubstantiated claim, and it’s been around a lot longer than
Christianity has been. The problem originated with primitive human beings who
simply did not understand the nature of their own consciousness, and thus had
no explicit understanding about the relationship their consciousness has to the
things they perceive and/or consider even though that relationship is constant
and unchanging. Thus they did not have any reliable way to distinguish between
what they called “the supernatural” and what they were merely imagining.
Today’s theists find themselves in the very same predicament, and that’s
because they’ve inherited the very same confusion and lack of understanding as
their primitive forebears. Your misconstrual of the
primacy of existence as a statement affirming that “ontology precedes
epistemology” is merely a symptom of this confusion.
Now consider: On the basis of which metaphysical orientation
between subject and object would one claim that there exists a subject which
holds metaphysical primacy over its objects? Would you claim this on the basis
of the metaphysical orientation that your consciousness holds between itself
and any objects it comes in contact with? Or, would you claim it on the basis
of an orientation that your consciousness does not have with respect to any of
its objects? If you make the claim that such a subject exists on the basis of
an orientation which is contrary to the one which your claim says that subject
has, you’re defeating yourself. Performatively,
you’re presuming that truth requires the metaphysical orientation that you have
denied to the subject you claim exists. Now that’s not a formula for a very
compelling case, and if it turns out that theism has no alternative to this, as
I have argued in many papers on the topic, then I don’t think one needs any
more compelling case against theism than this. After all, no one has an
obligation to prove that the non-existent does not exist, so if there are no
gods, no one needs to prove that they don’t exist. So this is a problem that
the theist needs to overcome. And given what you have stated in your response
to me, I’d say you’re doomed to failure on this matter. Of course, nothing will
prevent you from CLAIMING that your supernatural conscious being exists. But
that’s hardly a point in your favor, for one can CLAIM anything. But is that
claim true? Well, we have to look at what the nature of truth entails and
requires. My point is that truth necessarily entails the primacy of existence
metaphysics and that it requires one to be consistent with this orientation.
Theism contradicts the primacy of existence metaphysics in its god-belief
claims. Hence, there’s a contradiction any time the theist claims that his
god-belief claims are true, for the metaphysical basis of truth is contradicted
by the content of those claims. There’s no rational way out of this conundrum
but to renounce god-belief altogether and fully embrace an objective
metaphysics.
The
Cartoon Universe Premise of Theism
Jason:
While Christians believe reality is
subject to the divine mind (consciousness), the nature of that subjection is
not as you have portrayed it.
It’s not? Christians typically claim that their god has
“sovereign authority” over the universe it allegedly created. In fact, from
what I have seen Christians claim, it appears that they think their god holds
greater power over the universe than a cartoonist has over the fictional realm
he creates in his cartoons. Oddly, your statement here suggests that you think
human cartoonists have more power over the fictional realms that they create in
their cartoons than you allow your god to have over the universe it allegedly
created. This is quite an astounding admission, though you may not be aware
that you are making it. Theists (particularly Christian theists) claim that
their god is “omnipotent.” But if the Christian god has less power over its
creation than human cartoonists have over the realms they create in their
cartoons, then how can this claim hold up?
Let’s proceed to the content of your rebuttal.
Jason:
I am referring to your cartoon
universe analogy. Your
understanding of God as a cartoon-maker is not true to the Christian
worldview. Christians do not
believe, nor does the Bible proclaim, that God will change the world at a
whim. In fact, on the Christian
view God has given us His word that He will not do so. Having said that,
clearly God could change reality if He wanted to. In fact, on the Christian worldview He
does so on a small scale on various occasions. We call these miracles. A miracle is when God does something in
a way that differs from the way He normally does it. Frankly I don't see how miracles argue
against absolute truth, but I'll say more about that in a bit.
You say that my “understanding of God as a cartoon-maker is
not true to the Christian worldview.” But it’s not at all clear how this
conclusion follows from what you present. In fact, I have never affirmed an
“understanding of God as a cartoon-maker,” for the only cartoon-makers I know
of are human beings, not divine beings. Rather, my cartoon universe analogy
simply points out that the relationship claimed by theists on behalf of their
god to the universe it allegedly created, is analogous to the relationship a
cartoonist enjoys between himself and the fictional realm he creates in his
cartoons. I have defended this at length in a series of entries on my blog.
See for instance the following posts:
The
Cartoon Universe of Theism
The
“God’s Good Pleasure” Principle and the Cartoon Universe of Theism
Omnipotence
and Sovereignty in the Cartoon Universe
Hays
on the Cartoon Universe Premise of Theism
Steve’s
Hays-ty Reaction to the Cartoon Universe Premise of
His Worldview
The
Strengths of the Cartoon Universe Analogy
Metaphysical
Subjectivism and Christianity’s Cartoon Universe, Part 1
Metaphysical
Subjectivism and Christianity’s Cartoon Universe, Part 2
Moreover, many theists themselves have explicitly admitted
this to be the case.
For instance, Christian apologist John Frame makes the
following admission in speaking on the very topic of the causal relationship
between his god and the world it allegedly created:
Perhaps the best illustration... is
this: In a well-crafted novel, the author creates a world in which events take
place in meaningful causal relationships to one another. Each event has an
intelligible cause within the world of the novel. But of course each event also
has a higher cause, in the author's mind. Normally, such an author will try to
maintain the orderly causal structure of his created universe. He may, of
course, also work "without, above, and against" that causal order
when he is pleased to do so. Usually, however, when an author disrupts the
causal order of his novel, the narrative becomes less satisfying. Critics accuse
such an author of bringing things about by a deus ex machina. (Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought,
p. 82)
Here Frame likens his god to the author of a novel, that is,
to a creator of a fictional realm who dictates all aspects and details of every
setting and who manipulates every character’s choices and actions and
determines all events, both their causes as well as their outcomes, including
who participates in those events and who is affected by them. This is just one
minor step away from the cartoon universe analogy. And making that one step,
namely animation, brings the illustration much closer what the Christian
worldview actually affirms than Frame’s novel author analogy. For Christianity
affirms not only a relationship that is analogous to an author of novels and
his fictional realm, but also that the events its god is said to preside over
actually happen in time, not merely in the imagination of the reader.
Frame’s mentor, Cornelius Van Til, wrote the following:
God may at any time take one fact
and set it into a new relation to created law. That is, there is no inherent
reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done. It is this
sort of conception of the relation of facts and laws, of the temporal one and
many, imbedded as it is in that idea of God in which we profess to believe,
that we need in order to make room for miracles. And miracles are at the heart
of the Christian position. (The Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed., p. 27)
Notice how Van Til provides the optimal formula for a most
bizarre understanding of the universe, one which is in no way confirmed by what
we experience in the world. (Again, lack of evidence in support of a view in no
way prevents a person who wants to affirming from
claiming that view is true.) On the view that Van Til gives here (namely that
“there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should
not be done...”), can only be taken to mean (on the basis of an objective
philosophy, that is) that the objects of consciousness do NOT exist independent
of the subject, that the subject of consciousness has final say over what those
objects are and whether or not they conform to some law or another or to no law
in particular. They can be revised at will by the ruling subject. This is pure,
undiluted subjectivism. Van Til makes it clear that his express concern here is
“to make room for miracles,” for “miracles are at the heart of the Christian
position.” His concern is not for reason, rationality, objectivity, truth,
honesty or any other virtue man needs in order to exist. Rather, his concern is
to give shelter to a fantasy, an imaginary realm which serves as a playland for consciousness. I’m reminded of the question,
“why be born again when you can just grow up?” Indeed, I found that I had to
leave Christianity in order to grow up and be honest to myself.
Similar to what the Frame quote gave us above, apologist
Vern Poythress also makes a key admission. He writes:
Dorothy Sayers acutely observes that
the experience of a human author writing a book contains profound analogies to
the Trinitarian character of God. An author’s act of creation in writing imitates
the action of God in creating the world. (Why
Scientists Must Believe in God: Divine Attributes of Scientific Law)
If “an author’s act of creation in writing imitates the action of God in
creating the world,” why is the cartoon universe analogy off? Blank out.
Meanwhile, commenting in reaction to my cartoon universe
analogy, Christian apologist Travis White made the following statement:
I never understood how Bethrick's assertion was supposed to be an argument in the
first place. So the allegation is that in some ways the Christian worldview's
world is similar to a cartoon. First, does anyone deny this? Second,
so what? And third, as Steve pointed out, the same goes for his
worldview too. So why are we supposed to care, Mr. Bethrick? (combox of Cartoon
Cosmology)
Contrary to your own protestations, Jason, White makes it
clear from his statement that Christians should NOT deny the accuracy of the
cartoon universe analogy. He asks “does anyone deny this?” Well, actually, yes,
many Christians have denied it. But White seems to think that believers should
be happy to affirm it. He asks “why are [Christian believers] supposed to
care?” suggesting that they shouldn’t care. But my response to this is
partially supplied already by White’s initial statement, which is an expression
of his own ignorance. He writes: “I never understood how Bethrick’s
assertion was supposed to be an argument in the first place.” But where do I
say that the cartoon universe analogy is an argument? It’s an analogy,
not an argument. When White asks whether or not he or other believers should
care, I’m not about to tell other people why they should care one way or
another about what they put into their heads. What a person cares for is up to
that individual; it’s not up to me to tell others what they should care for. If
a person does not care that his conception of the universe is analogous to a
cartoon, then I highly doubt anything I say will compel him to care, for
anything I could offer will only be meaningful on the basis of the recognition
that the universe is not analogous to a cartoon. He needs to make a decision
for himself. If he doesn’t care about what he believes, then why would I care
what he believes? I’m simply pointing something out, and White’s response to
this is essentially “So what?” He offers no reason to suppose that my point is
wrong or mistaken. I take this as the theist saying he doesn’t really care
about his own mind. Indeed, so what?
Unfortunately for the theist, however, by admitting that his worldview
conceives of the universe in a manner analogous to a cartoon, he concedes his
presuppositionalist ploys to the atheist whose worldview does not conceive of
the universe in a manner analogous to a cartoon. After all, in an atheistic
worldview like mine, there’s no counterpart to theism’s god, and thus nothing
analogous to a master cartoonist manipulating the objects of the universe at
will. Moreover, on my worldview reality is not the creation of a conscious
being; since reality exists independent of consciousness, there’s no need to
posit a consciousness which manages its content and internal affairs. So
White’s claim that “the same goes for [my] worldview” is clearly mistaken, for
my worldview does not affirm the existence of anything analogous to a master
cartoonist which created the universe and sovereignly
presides over it as if it were some fake environment, like a cartoon. The
problem is even doubly worse for presuppositionalists, for reason, logic,
science, moral absolutes and all the other tokens to which they seek to hijack,
assume the non-cartoon universe of atheism (where the task of consciousness is
not to create and manipulate its objects, but to perceive and identify them),
not the cartoon universe of theism (where anything the magic subject wishes
goes). So presuppositionalism essentially impales itself by its own
presuppositional commitments, thus collapsing in on itself.
It seems that your reaction against the cartoon universe
analogy pivots on whether or not “God will change the world at a whim.” But the
discussion of such a question is in fact premature to the question of the
cartoon universe analogy’s relevance and applicability to Christianity. After
all, we never see the Roadrunner protesting that the Coyote’s ability to emerge
from beneath a boulder that has just dropped on him to be an instance of
whimsicalness or absurdity. Indeed, the inability to judge something as
whimsical is one of the outcomes we would expect in a cartoon universe. So in
fact just by raising this concern as you have, you’re playing into criticism
I’ve raised. But as I’ve said, this is premature, so let’s set it on a
back-burner for the moment and see whether or not the cartoon universe analogy
applies to Christianity.
The cartoon universe analogy holds that the relationship
between the Christian god and its creation is analogous to the relationship
between a cartoonist and the fictional realms he creates in his cartoons. A
cartoonist determines what appears in his cartoons, just as the Christian god
is said to determine what exists in the universe it allegedly created.
Similarly, just as a cartoonist determines what takes place in his cartoons,
the Christian god is said to determine what takes place in the universe it
allegedly created. From beginning to end, the cartoonist is in control of what
appears and happens in his cartoons. Similarly, Christianity affirms that its
god is in control from the beginning of the universe to the end of the world.
The similarities between a cartoonist and the cartoons he creates and the
Christian god and the universe its worshippers claim it created,
are unmistakable. So as Christian Travis White admits, the cartoon universe
analogy definitely applies to the Christian worldview, for it conceives of the
universe in a manner analogous to a cartoon in the hands of a cartoonist. To
deny this is to deny the sovereignty and authority that Christianity claims on
behalf of its god.
If it is true that Christians do not think their god’s
actions in the so-called “created realm” are absurd or arbitrary, then they
must think that stories such as the creation of Eve from one of Adam’s ribs,
the Noachian flood, the tower of Babel, the virgin birth of Jesus, Jesus
walking on water, Jesus turning water into wine, the raising of Lazarus, the
feeding of the 4,000 (or was it 5,000?), the stories of healing the blind, lame
and leprous, etc., even the resurrection of Jesus itself, are not absurd or
arbitrary. Is that right? What then, in the universe as Christianity conceives
of it, could be said to be absurd or arbitrary? If these bizarre things can be
rationalized as being neither absurd nor arbitrary, what could? See, that’s the
problem: once you’ve accepted the cartoon universe
premise, you’ve abandoned the very foundation you would need to judge something
either absurd or arbitrary. In a cartoon universe, nothing can be rightly
judged as either arbitrary or absurd, for there’s nothing that is neither
arbitrary nor absurd to serve as a contrast. That is, in a cartoon universe,
everything is absurd and arbitrary. A human being with 22 arms is no more or
less absurd or arbitrary than a human being with only 2 arms, since both are
created by the same ruling subject. In the Christian worldview, that ruling
subject is the Christian god.
Jason:
Christians do not believe, nor does
the Bible proclaim, that God will change the world at a whim.
It’s important to keep in mind what the bible does in
fact say. Psalm 115:3 makes it explicitly clear when it says “our God is in the
heavens: he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased.” Now, according to the
teaching, the Christian god is not constrained by any external limitation,
requirement, obligation, need or barrier which constrains what it can or cannot
do. And according to this verse, its only guide to action is its own pleasure.
Mind you, it does not say that this god has done merely “what he hath
pleased,” but “whatsoever he hath pleased,” which is much stronger and
more open-ended. This suggests that the choices it makes on the basis of its
pleasure are not impeded by any external constraints. Its wishes, i.e., its whims,
are in no way held in check by anything. It does whatever it wants and only
whatever it wants. And yet, here you say that “Christians do not believe, nor
does the Bible proclaim, that God will change the world at a whim.” Well, if it
changes the world (and there’s no evidence that it exists in the first place,
let alone evidence that it is changing something in the world), it does so, not
according to some objective constraint that has involuntarily been placed upon
it, but according to its unbridled pleasure. If that’s not whim, then what is?
What’s happening here is that you want to affirm what the bible says, you just don’t like its explicit affirmations being
characterized according to their implications.
Jason:
In fact, on the Christian view God
has given us His word that He will not do so.
Well, I’m not sure where Christians think the bible says
that its god will not change the world at whim, but if Christians believe this,
well, what does that matter? Believing something does not make it the case, nor
does disbelieving something alleviate problems associated with what has been
affirmed. Again, what constitutes whim on the Christian worldview? I have no
idea, since Christianity jettisons the foundations needed to distinguish whim
from non-whim. On my view, turning water into wine, walking on unfrozen water,
commanding storms to subside, feeding thousands with just a few loaves of bread
and fish, etc., are all examples of a whim-based state of affairs, especially
if they were brought about by an invisible magic being who
made them happen at will. Clearly on the Christian view, if being born of a
woman who has not been inseminated by a male is not an instance of whim, then
what is? Given theism’s allegiance to the cartoon universe premise, anything
could be rationalized as non-whim. Since there’s no objective standard to go
by, there’s no way to reliably judge individual cases. It’s just a matter of
what the theist is willing to accept or reject, and this determination itself
is based on his whims, since in the end all he really has to go on is his
imagination. This is where the subjective metaphysics of Christianity inform a
subjective epistemology for the believer. Facts are simply a creation,
according to the Christian worldview, subject to revision without prior notice.
The Van Til quote above makes this crystal clear. Why wouldn’t Christians be
consistent with this presupposition in their epistemology? The only reason why
they wouldn’t be, is the fact that it is an untrue
presupposition. Try living in a reality while denying that reality’s own terms.
What do you get?
Jason:
Having said that,
clearly God could change reality if He wanted to.
Indeed, that’s the teaching: nothing will stop the Christian
god from creating human beings with bat wings if it wanted to. And if the Christian
god chose to create human beings with bat wings, what Christian would call that
creation arbitrary? What Christian would say his god acted on whim? For that
matter, how does the individual believer know that his god’s future plans do
not involve the distribution of bat wings to select human beings? If he claims
to know this, what evidences does he appeal to? Does he appeal to vague
incantations in the bible that can be read any which way? Primitive poetry is a
miserable substitute for rational epistemological principles. Running to the
bible’s alleged promises is simply an attempt to barricade oneself in the dark
shell of his beliefs without making any serious contribution to the realm of
knowledge. From the evidence available to Mary prior to the angel Gabriel’s
visitation to her, would she have been able to infer that she had been chosen
by the Christian god to carry the baby Jesus? If so, would she really need a
visit from the angel Gabriel to inform her of something she could have inferred
by herself? Then again, who would say that she could have inferred this, and
from what evidence available to her would she have assembled such an inference?
Could Lazarus have inferred, prior to his death, that Jesus was going to raise
him from the grave at some point, after he had already begun to stinketh? Christians say that
there god could change the world, but that the decision to do so would not be
whimsical, and yet what can be inferred about what their god might do from the
available facts? They simply don’t want critics to call a spade a spade.
Jason:
In fact, on the Christian worldview
He does so on a small scale on various occasions. We call these miracles. A miracle is when God does something in
a way that differs from the way He normally does it. Frankly I don't see how miracles argue
against absolute truth, but I'll say more about that in a bit.
This characterization of miracles is intended to downplay
the philosophical ramifications of miracle-belief. Enabling Jesus and Peter to
walk on unfrozen water is just the Christian god doing something in a way
that’s “different” from its normal way of doing things. Of course, doing things
in a whimsical way is simply doing them in a way that’s different from the
normal way. Here we have defense by retreat to semantics, in order to avoid the
connotations, and more importantly the philosophical implications, of
uncomfortable terms that are suitable to the arbitrary positions Christians confessionally affirm. You say that you “don’t see how
miracles argue against absolute truth,” but your present inability to see
something does not mean it’s not there. Indeed, miracles do not “argue” for or
against anything, since there are no miracles to begin with. But belief in
miracles does in fact cause a problem for anyone who wants to claim that any
truths are absolute. That goes back to the point that I had elucidated earlier,
namely that the idea of truth assumes a metaphysical orientation that the idea
of miracles does not accept. The two cannot be integrated without contradiction
because they assume contradictory metaphysical orientations.
Jason:
When I speak of God changing, or to
use your word, ‘revising’ reality, I am thinking of large scale, permanent
changes such as changing the physics that undergird
our universe.
Yeah, like this happens every day, right? Can you identify
any actual examples of this that can be scientifically verified? Or, are they
just something in a primitive book of stories that you believe for no clear
reason? I see that you kept your examples theoretical, so perhaps you have
nothing actual to point to here?
Jason:
For example, theoretically speaking
God could decide He wants to slow the speed of light to 1/2 its current speed,
or cause hydrogen to repel oxygen, thus eliminating the existence of
water. What if He did?
If your god did this, I highly doubt you would say it was
arbitrary, simply because your worldview compels you to assume an obsequious
disposition to your god’s whims. After all, you wouldn’t want to piss it off,
right?
Jason:
Would that be evidence against His
existence?
Your question here requires one to grant validity to a fake
environment that one can only imagine to be the case.
But that which is fake cannot serve as a standard for
reality-based judgments. All you’re doing is asking a question which
essentially boils down to “What if the primacy of consciousness were true?
Would that be evidence against the primacy of consciousness?” My question to
you should be clear now: Where did you get the concept ‘true’? And what
orientation between subject and object does that concept assume?
Jason:
What if God went on a creative spurt
so that every day you woke up you woke up to a radically different type of
universe? Would that be evidence
against His existence. Clearly not!
More question-begging “what ifs,”
Jason. Hardly compelling to someone who does not grant theism’s
fundamental premise in the first place.
Jason:
Creators have the sovereign ability
to change what they created whenever they want without consulting the thing
they created. Human creators
exercise this prerogative all the time. For example, every year human
creators revise the motor vehicles they created the previous year. It is absurd to think a creator cannot
exist if he possesses, yet alone exercises his ability to modify his
creation. Why hold a divine creator
to a standard you won't apply to human creators?
This is the same insidious equivocation we saw above, namely
on the term ‘create’. I do not hold “a divine creator” to any standards,
because there are no divine creators to begin with. Should I hold unicorns to
the standard I would apply in calculating the galloping speed of Arabian
horses? Why would I do that if unicorns don’t exist in the first place?
Truth in a Cartoon Universe?
You claimed that “truth would still be truth in a cartoon
universe,” which can only suggest that you are now in agreement with me that
the cartoon universe suitably applies to theism. This agreement is probably
motivated in part to anaesthetize the cartoon universe analogy (so as to say
that, if it applies, you can say “So what? It doesn’t matter after all” as we
saw with Travis White’s admission above), and also in part because you probably
recognize now, after thinking about it a little bit, as did Travis White, that
the cartoon universe analogy in fact does apply to Christian theism.
Jason:
Let's continue with this idea of God
revising reality on a daily basis.
Okay.
Jason:
Such a world would be entirely
unpredictable just like your cartoon universe.
Right. We would not be able to make
inductive inferences with any reliability whatsoever, since the constants that
inductive inference requires would not be available. As I’ve pointed out
before, contrary to presuppositionalism, the so-called “problem of induction”
does not find its solution in theism. On the contrary, theism will only disable
induction completely.
Jason:
Would that change the nature of
truth as you claim (You said, "In such a universe, 'truth' is whatever the
cosmic cartoonist happens to will at that moment. But when Christians speak of
'truth', they talk about it as if it were absolute. But obviously there could
be no absolute truths if the universe were as they described it")? No.
It would only change what is true.
Actually, it would be much worse than this. It would make
truth completely unattainable, even to the ruling consciousness. Self-control
requires the constancy of the law of identity, and the metaphysical
precondition of the law of identity is the metaphysical primacy of existence.
But a cartoon universe is a universe in which existence does not hold
metaphysical primacy, so the law of identity could not apply. Thus even the
ruling consciousness would have no bearing by which to control itself. So it would have no way of knowing what course the
reality it creates would take from moment to moment. For human beings, it would
be even more disparaging, for, as you admitted, “such a world would be entirely
unpredictable.” So no human being could ever claim to have acquired something
he could confidently call “true knowledge.” Meanwhile, you seem oblivious to
the fact that your point of reference in interacting with my position in fact
assumes that the universe is not cartoon-like, an assumption which in fact is
true, but for reasons which your worldview cannot explain (since they are not
available to the Christian worldview given what it affirms).
Jason:
Remember, truth is a corresponding
relation between a belief/proposition and the objective world (the way the
world really is in itself independent of mental knowers).
See my point on this above.
Jason:
If reality (the objective world) was
constantly changing, a belief that was true one day could be false the next,
but the nature of truth would remain the same.
Again, you’re borrowing your conception of truth from a
non-cartoon universe worldview in order to make this statement. Even when you
indicate that reality is objective, as you do in your statement here, you’re
ignoring the premises of the cartoon universe you’re trying to defend. You’re
flopping like a herring that just got reeled onto the deck of a fishing boat.
Jesus, the master fisher of men himself, would be proud.
Jason: If
the sun appeared yellow yesterday, and I believed it was yellow, to say
"the sun is yellow" would be true yesterday.
But where did you get the concept ‘yesterday’, and to what
would it refer in a cartoon universe? Again, you’re making use of a constancy
that is available only in the non-cartoon universe of atheism to make your
point in defense of theism.
Jason:
If the sun appears green today, and
I believe it is yellow, to say "the sun is yellow" would now be
false.
False for whom? You could say “false for me,” but
this smacks of acute relativism, and just by
distinguishing yourself from anything or anyone else, you’re again borrowing a
constancy that is not available in a cartoon universe. So what is true at this
point? Even to contemplate the position you want to defend against mine, mine
has to be true to lend you a hand. Otherwise you’ll sink in quicksand and not
even know it, for knowing requires an objective orientation between subject and
object, and that’s not reliably available in a cartoon universe.
Jason:
I would have to believe the sun is
green to know the truth today.
Actually, as a creature in a god’s universe, you would be
analogous to a character in a cartoon, and you could not do anything that the
sovereign cartoonist didn’t want you to do. You wouldn’t even be able to
distinguish between today and yesterday or green and yellow unless the ruling
subject allowed it. And even then, you wouldn’t know this, for that’s
not how knowledge works. You’d simply be programmed to reiterate certain
patterns which, on the basis of a non-cartoon universe, may or may not resemble
the visual-audio coding of language that is available in the non-cartoon
universe of atheism.
Jason:
While that kind of a world would be
very difficult to navigate in, the nature of truth would remain the same.
“...remain the same...” as what? As truth
in the non-cartoon universe? Not at all. For in
the non-cartoon universe of atheism, truth reflects a state of affairs that
obtains independent of consciousness, while in the cartoon universe that theism
imagines truth refers to a shifting flux that does not benefit from any
objective constants.
Jason:
What was objectively true, or absolutely true yesterday was objectively and
absolutely true at that time. What is objectively and absolutely true today is
objectively and absolutely true at this time.
Again, you’re borrowing from a different worldview to make
this statement. Concepts of time assume an objective standard, such as the
motion of the earth around the sun. What would provide this standard in a
cartoon universe? Blank out.
Jason:
While the content of truth would
change, the nature of truth would remain the same: objective.
Not at all, because truth in a cartoon universe would be
subjective, that is, dependent on the whims of the ruling subject. Since in a
cartoon universe there are no states of affairs which obtain independent of
consciousness, there’s nothing at all to serve as an objective standard to
begin with.
See, Jason, without my worldview, you cannot even understand
the problems that the theistic worldview would create, if you attempted to
govern your mind according to its metaphysical implications consistently. You’d
be lost without the truths that you are constantly borrowing from my worldview
to provide you the equilibrium you need while affirming a subjective worldview.
Jason:
Even in a stable world like our own
this is true.
In “a world like our own,” truth is possible because of the
primacy of existence, the very principle which the cartoon universe of theism
rejects. Again, you’re borrowing from my worldview here to defend yours.
Jason:
What was true one day may not be
true the next. Consider tensed
truths. If I am scheduled to
lecture on Christianity September 30th the following proposition would be true:
"I will lecture on Christianity September 30th." However, on October 1st that proposition
would be false. Now the
proposition, "I lectured on Christianity September 30th" is
true. While this is not a change in
physical reality, the principle remains the same: propositional beliefs about
reality have changed their truth value.
No one would consider these sorts of changes in what is true to mean the
nature of truth has changed. We
simply adjust our beliefs to fit the new tensed reality. If we can do so on a micro-level, why
couldn't we do so on a macro-level?
There is no principled reason we couldn't. So truth does not assume reality is
unchanging (non-cartoony) as you assert. Truth assumes that our beliefs about
reality correspond to reality, whatever that reality may be, whenever it
happens to be it. It is false to
think God cannot change reality without sacrificing the nature of truth.
All your points here implicitly assume the primacy of
existence principle to provide them with the foothold you intend them to have.
Truth assumes the constancy of the objective orientation between subject and
object, and this constancy is what theism derails by its assertion of a being
that enjoys a subjective orientation between subject and object. My analysis of
truth does not affirm that facts cannot change. Rather, it recognizes that
facts obtain independent of consciousness, and my worldview can be consistent
with this recognition because it makes this recognition explicit and refuses to
depart from it.
I had written:
But when Christians speak of
'truth', they talk about it as if it were absolute. But obviously there could
be no absolute truths if the universe were as they described it.
Jason:
I think part of the problem may be
your conception of ‘absolute’.
Absolute does not necessarily mean ‘unchanging’. It simply means it is part of the
objective world; i.e. its truth value is not subject to mental subjects.
Granted, absolute carries the connotation of unchanging because many of the
truths we label "absolute" do not change over time, but the fact remains
that "unchanging" is not essential to its denotative meaning. If God wanted to turn water different
colors every day, it would be absolutely true that water changes colors on a
daily basis. If God turned the
water purple on Tuesday, it would be absolutely true that the water is purple
on Wednesday. If God turned the
water red on Wednesday, it would be absolutely true that the water was red on
Thursday.
By ‘absolute’ in this context, I do not mean unchanging per
se, but obtaining independent of wishes, feelings, preferences, ignorance or
other dispositions of consciousness. Since the universe as Christianity
describes it would be a universe in which consciousness holds metaphysical
primacy, absolute truth as I have described it would not be possible. A Christian
universe would be a subjective world, since it would be the creation of
consciousness. The essential to absolute truth is not unchangingness
alone, for truth is also contextual. For instance the statement “The population
of
How
is Reality Subject to the Divine Mind?
Jason:
Earlier I affirmed the Christian
belief that reality is subject to the divine mind, but said the nature of that
subjection is not as you have portrayed it.
Yes, you did say this.
Jason:
At the time I merely argued against
your conception of this subjection as a cartoon universe.
Yes, you did try to. But I see that my position has
prevailed in spite of what you tried to raise against it.
Jason:
Now I would like to positively and
briefly explain the manner in which Christians believe reality is subject to
the divine mind.
So, you’re speaking for all Christians? On
whose consent? It’s interesting how many Christians assume a uniformity
in Christian thought and then when we look a little closer, we find all kinds
of infighting, suggesting that there really is no such uniformity after all.
Anyway, go on.
Jason:
Reality is subject to the divine
mind in the fact that the existence of the universe is contingent on a
conscious agent who willed it into existence.
I’m with you so far. This does not go against the cartoon
universe analogy in anyway. Observe: The fictional realm of a cartoon is
subject to the cartoonist’s mind in the fact that the fictional realm of the
cartoon is contingent on a conscious agent (namely the cartoonist) who chose to
illustrate it.
Go on.
Jason:
And as I acknowledged earlier, while
God possesses full authority to shape, change, or improve His creation, He does
not do so except in isolated, minute ways.
Such reservations are intended to downplay the implications
of the position affirmed here, but, as we saw earlier when you tried to do
this, they’re ultimately irrelevant. The fact is that you still affirm the
primacy of consciousness. You’re essentially saying “Yeah, consciousness holds
metaphysical primacy, but the ruling subject only invokes this privilege once
in a while,” suggesting a universe of alternating current in terms of the
subject-object relationship. I urge you to continue along these lines, Jason,
for it only compromises the intensity of your god-belief.
Ad
hoc
Jason:
Now let me address some specific
comments you made.
Okay.
I had written:
In such a universe, one could not
say, for instance, that it is not possible to walk on unfrozen water, for again
the cosmic cartoonist could make a liar of him at any time by having men walk
on unfrozen water, such as on an inland sea. In such a universe, ‘truth’ is
whatever the cosmic cartoonist happens to will at that moment.
Jason:
The same could be said of the
atheistic, evolutionary world you claim to live in.
How so? The world that I live in is not controlled by a
supernatural consciousness. Why is it that, when Christian apologists get
pinned on an issue, they always reach for the tu quoque (as if that alleviates the problem in their
worldview) when in fact there are no mystical counterparts to their worldview
in the worldview of their non-believing critics? This is juicy!
Jason:
Evolution in its most basic sense
means change over time.
If the term is unqualified by a specific context, this may
be the case. Of course, I did not affirm an “evolutionary world” as you seem to
think. Moreover, if there is change in the world (such as the climates, the
shifting of tectonic plates, the water level of lakes and rivers, the
distribution of elements in silt beds, etc.), these changes occur on the basis
of causal laws which obtain independent of wishing, preferences, ignorance,
temper tantrums, etc. Again, the primacy of existence is in operation here. I’m
simply being consistent with my worldview’s explicit affirmations.
Jason:
What was true of the universe at one
point in time may/will not be true of the universe at another.
If the contextual analysis of truth that my worldview
endorses is in fact valid, then this is not a problem in my worldview.
Jason:
The only difference is the amount of
time it takes to change the universe.
You mean the difference between my worldview’s conception of
changes and the theistic worldview’s conception of changes? You mean, this difference is restricted only to time scales? No, I
don’t think so. According to the theistic worldview, a ruling subject is
directing and managing these changes on the basis of its “good pleasure” (cf.
Ps. 115:3), while on my worldview they occur on the
basis of objective law. Why would a Christian discount his worldview so
readily, unless he sensed a problem? Indeed, why should we be surprised to see
the Christian running out of a burning house?
Jason:
A divine creator can change the
world instantly, whereas evolution can only do so slowly over time.
The difference is not in the rapidity of the change, but in
its causation. According to the theistic worldview, the cause of such changes
is the ruling subject’s whims, not the mind-independent natures of the entities
involved. On the theistic conception of the world, there are no mind-independent
entities to begin with, since it holds that they were all created by an act of
will by the ruling subject. Indeed, the difference is not in how quickly our
respective positions propose these changes take place, but the metaphysical
orientation between subject and object that roots our
respective conceptions of those changes.
Jason:
But the fact remains that in both
worlds what was true of reality at one point in time will not be true in
another because evolution (rather than God) has changed reality.
Not because of “evolution,” but because of causality
(according to my worldview). Evolution is not some cosmic force which
determines the course of nature by some internal intent. That’s more along the
lines of theism.
Jason:
Are you prepared to say evolution
could make a liar out of you?
To make me a liar, evolution would have to produce a
consciousness which holds metaphysical primacy over existence. I have no
evidence to suppose that this will ever happen.
Jason:
And you can't appeal to physical
laws to guarantee a static universe.
I don’t need to, for it is not up to me to “guarantee a
static universe.” Any effort on my part to appeal to anything will not
guarantee something that the universe has already taken care of, so to speak.
The fact that existence exists does not change. The fact that there is a
universe is a point of constancy that I cannot deny. The existence of reality
is a precondition to any laws, including the law of causality.
Jason:
For one, physical laws have been in
place since the beginning of time, and yet the world as it existed billions of
years ago is radically different than the world we live in today. More importantly, physical laws really
aren't even laws. They are
descriptions of the way things normally work.
My view of “laws” in this regard is really that they are
general principles, i.e., general truths upon which subsequent truths logically
depend. The law of identity is axiomatic; it is the fact that existence exists
understood from a specific perspective, namely from the perspective of an
entity’s relation to itself. A thing is itself. The law of causality is the law
of identity applied to action: a thing acts according to its nature. No, I did
not discover these principles by reading the bible. I certainly would not look
to the bible if I wanted to understand the world in which I exist.
Jason:
There is nothing to which matter
must conform on an atheistic worldview.
Well, if that’s the case, then obviously your statement
above, namely that “the same could be said of the atheistic, evolutionary world
you claim to live in,” was off the mark, especially if the question is whether
or not matter conforms to the whims of an invisible magic being, for atheistic
worldviews typically do not imagine such beings.
Jason:
It's just matter in motion.
Actually, on my view, matter is itself, for to exist is to
be something, and a thing is itself. If it moves, it moves according to its
nature. I cannot think of any actual thing that could qualify as an exception
to this.
Jason:
It's not subject to anything. It is whatever it is.
More accurately, a thing is itself, independent of
consciousness.
Jason:
There is no reason to think the way
physical reality behaves today, it must do so tomorrow as well.
Why would you think this? The reason you’re ignoring is the
constancy of the relationship between a thing and itself, i.e., the law of
identity.
Jason:
They could change tomorrow, or over
the next eon.
They could? In what way, and on what
basis? Are you claiming that, according to my worldview, they “could
change” without causation? My view does not affirm that, for change is the
identity of causation.
Jason:
So how can you be assured that
physical laws (rather than God) won't make a liar out of you?
On specifically which position that I have affirmed am I
supposed to “be assured that physical laws... won’t make a liar out of [me]”?
Do you think I need some kind of assurance that “tomorrow” A will still be A?
To what does the term ‘tomorrow’ refer? Does it refer to something that has an
identity distinct from something else? If so, then the assurance you’re looking
for is built into your conception of the problem as such. Again, the law of
identity is axiomatic. ‘Assurance’? As
opposed to what? As opposed to something other than
assurance? Well, you’re assuming that what you’re calling “assurance” is
something distinct from something other than itself, which means: you’re
assuming the law of identity. So you’re looking for something to guarantee the
law of identity? All I need for this is to point to the fact that existence
exists, i.e., that there is a reality. This fact alone is the metaphysical
pretext for as well as the guarantor of all distinction. Do you think you need
to assert the existence of an invisible magic being to guarantee the law of
identity? To do this, you have to assume the very thing you’re hoping to
guarantee. So how is asserting an invisible magic being at all productive in
this endeavor? Meanwhile, notice how my worldview’s axioms have to be true in
order for you to even muse on the idea of an invisible magic being.
Jason:
On an atheistic worldview you have
no assurance that the laws of physics will remain the same.
Which laws of physics are you talking about? If we cannot
identify them specifically, how can you know that I have affirmed that those
laws “will remain the same”? Of course, if there are no invisible magic beings
to mess with those laws of physics, then that eliminates
one source that would theoretically pose a menace to them. Moreover, if the law
of identity obtains, then that would eliminate causeless action (so-called
“chance”) from the list of would-be menaces. So I’m not sure what you’re point
is here. Or maybe I’m just seeing through it.
Jason:
All you can say is that this is the
way things have been up to this point, and it's likely they'll remain this way
in the future.
Well, even if that were the case, what would be wrong with
that? It’s true, I do not know what will happen
tomorrow. Tomorrow a truck could run off the road and wind up in my living
room. Am I supposed to “know” that this won’t happen for some reason?
Jason:
That's all the inductive nature of
the scientific discipline will allow you to say.
It’s not clear how you came to this assessment of my
position. On my view, induction is the application of the law of causality to
entity classes, and as such it is an extension of concept-formation. I have a
lot to say on this point, but I’ll reserve it for later if you’re interested to
learn more about it. (Hint: It’s another thing I didn’t go to the bible to
learn.)
Jason:
Anything else is pure speculation.
Can you be specific here?
Jason:
Theism actually provides a
foundation for the belief that the universe will (not "might")
continue as it has, because it is being directed by an intelligent being who
has willed that it do so, and we can be assured of that because He has
communicated it to us via revelation.
Induction is not a matter of belief, but of extending the
integration that takes place in concept-formation. Christians continually
demonstrate to me that they do not have a conceptual understanding of
induction, and this is fallout from the fact that their worldview has no native
theory of concepts. The belief that an invisible magic being pushes and pulls
the universe in whatsoever direction it pleases, is hardly a guarantee that
“the universe will... continue as it has.” Indeed, the whole notion that you
need this verbally communicated to you in the first place tells me that you
couldn’t figure it out on your own, which itself constitutes a tacit admission
that you gave up on your own mind. Consider: you worship a “perfect creator”
which allegedly created your mind, and yet that mind cannot figure out things
as simple as this on its own, while atheist thinkers come along and point you
in the direction of the light at the end of the tunnel while spinning circles
around you intellectually. That’s pretty humorous!
Jason:
Whether theism is true or false
aside, theoretically speaking theism provides a better foundation for believing
in the stability of reality as we know it.
It does? Where did you get the idea of “reality”? And in
affirming this position, are you supposing that it is true because you believe
it (i.e., on the basis of the primacy of consciousness), or because the
relevant facts substantiate it (i.e., on the basis of the primacy of
existence)?
Jason:
How are we borrowing from a
worldview that contradicts our own when we ‘speak of
truth as if it were absolute and unyielding to conscious preferences’?
Because your worldview affirms a metaphysical basis which
does not support truth, so to affirm truths you have no choice but to borrow
from a worldview which supplies the metaphysical basis that truth requires.
That’s how. I explained this at length above.
Jason:
Whether God exists or not it doesn't take a genius to figure out that we are subject to
reality, and not reality to us.
It’s true, recognizing the fact that reality exists
independent of consciousness does not require a genius. But what’s interesting
is that the history of philosophy went on for centuries before a thinker came
along and made this recognition explicit and constructed a worldview that is
consistent with it. Meanwhile, notice how your own statement here renders the
existence of your god irrelevant to the matter. I have pointed this out to
Christians before: if their god actually did exist, it would be irrelevant.
Jason:
All it takes is one time of running
into a wall when you're a kid. Ha!
You’re right: reality has a way of defying our irrational
expectations.
Jason:
It's typically non-theists who speak
of truth in a subjectival and relativistic
sense. Why? Because the best
foundation of absolutism is theism, and they know it.
No, that’s not the reason why non-theists might “speak of
truth in a subjectival and relativistic sense.” They
do so (to the extent that they do), as Van Til himself had put it, because
they’re borrowing from a theistic worldview. As we have seen, theism affirms a
ruling subject to which all the objects of consciousness conform. If truth
consists of contextual correspondence to those objects (such that truth is
dependent on the objects of consciousness), and yet the objects of
consciousness depend on a ruling subject (as Christianity affirms), then truth
in the end is ultimately subjective on the Christian worldview. Any non-theist
who affirms a subjective conception of truth is certainly not borrowing from my
worldview. Chance are he’s borrowing from yours, and
he may not even know it (for even your worldview does not make the recognition
of these points explicit).
Jason:
2. I completely agree with you. There is no such thing as ‘true for you’
vs. ‘true for me’. What determines
truth is reality, not our personal feelings, likes, or dislikes.
And my worldview explains why this is the case explicitly in
terms of fundamental essentials, and my entire worldview is consistent with
that explanation. Since the concept ‘truth’ requires the primacy of existence
principle, the idea that something is true on the basis of someone’s wishing,
feelings, pleasure, displeasure, etc., is self-contradictory. Why? Because such
a position attempts to seek a compromise between two opposite and mutually
contradictory metaphysical orientations, as I have explained. Christianity,
however, cannot explain why this is the case, nor can Christians consistently
affirm that truth identifies states of affairs that obtain independently of
consciousness, for Christianity clearly affirms that there are no states of affairs
which obtain independently of consciousness. Hence to say that Christianity is
true simply commits the fallacy of the stolen concept. That is, it affirms a
concept while denying its metaphysical roots. It’s akin to saying that geometry
helps to make the building of skyscrapers possible while denying the validity
of basic mathematics. Why would anyone do this?
Jason:
You are right. You probably won't persuade me to walk
away from my belief in God, but not for the reasons you would expect. At the end of the day I am a theist, not
because it gives me personal comfort to believe in God despite the evidence,
but rather because I find the Christian worldview to be the most rational among
competitors.
I have no idea what a Christian could mean by “rational” if
he applies it to what Christianity affirms. It makes no sense to me whatsoever
to claim that a worldview which affirms invisible magic beings, universes
created ex nihilo, talking snakes, men walking on
water, virgins giving birth to savior-gods, the dead raising at the instigation
of wishing, mountains casting themselves into the sea at the command of a
faith-driven fanatic, or men being cured of congenital blindness as a result of
saliva being smeared into their eyes, is in any way “rational.” I can only
suspect that such claims are made in utter ignorance of how the mind works and
what rationality really is. Regardless, if the Christian says that Christianity
is “rational,” he clearly means something completely different by this term
than what I take it to mean. By ‘rational’ I mean a volitional commitment to
reason as one’s only means of knowledge and one’s only guide to action. On the
other hand, Christians accept Christianity’s claims on the basis of faith,
and guide their actions according to the dictates of an invisible magic being.
None of this is rational. Nor can it be.
Jason:
The existence of God is the best
explanation for what we know about our world.
Really? How do you figure? If we accept the
metaphysical underpinnings of Christianity, namely the primacy of consciousness
metaphysics, what makes the Christian god any better as an “explanation” than,
say, Geusha, the supreme being of the Lahu tribe? Once we grant metaphysical primacy to any
consciousness, the choice of the identity of which supernatural consciousness
holds metaphysical primacy over the universe becomes completely arbitrary.
That’s simply a result of placing choice prior to identity in the first place,
which of course is self-contradictory, since A would have to be A in order to
identify something as a choice to begin with. The primacy of consciousness
simply undercuts itself. That is why believers need to abandon it and seek
refuge in worldviews which contradict their own. It’s like a house that’s
burning down: it is completely inhospitable to human life.
But consider: I exist and have a specific nature, namely a
biological nature, and the objects which I encounter in the world do not obey
my wishes. My consciousness did not create them, so why would I suppose that another
consciousness did? And why would I suppose that a worldview which affirms that
objects of consciousness find their source in consciousness – a view that is
diametrically opposed to my everyday experience – provides “the best
explanation for what we know about our world”? How does a worldview which
portrays a world that I have never existed in serve as “the best explanation”
for the world I know and exist in? Do you hear yourself, man?
I do not observe any conscious entity in nature enjoying
subjective primacy over its objects, so on what basis would I suppose that
there is an invisible conscious being existing beyond
everything I do see and sense that does enjoy subjective primacy over the
objects that I do observe? Would I suppose this on the basis of an orientation
that my consciousness does not have with its objects? That would entail denying
what I know to be the case firsthand. If someone told me that I have four arms
instead of the two that I can verify firsthand, why would I accept his claim? If
his claim contradicts what I can verify firsthand, what motivation would I have
to deny what I can verify firsthand in order to accept what I cannot verify
firsthand? Blank out. How does “the existence of God” explain any of this?
Indeed, it does not explain it, unless I think an explanation needs to be found
in a story-filled worldview which discards what I know on a firsthand basis to
be real in order to explain the real. But that amounts to appealing to the
unreal in order to explain the real, and that does not make any sense to me.
Indeed, the notion of a god is explicitly nonsensical, by the theist’s own
confession: he alleges that there is a supernatural subject beyond the reach of
all my senses, i.e., nonsensical, and he expects me to accept this allegation
as knowledge. But knowledge is knowledge of reality, and knowledge of reality
requires an objective process. I.e., a process that is consistent with the
nature of man’s consciousness, and the nature of man’s
consciousness is that the objects of his consciousness neither depend on nor
conform to consciousness, either for their reality or for their nature. The
only means which theists offer me in “knowing” their god is an imaginative
means. That is, the most I can do is imagine the being that theists tell me is
real but beyond the reach of my senses. But imagination is not a means of
validating knowledge, nor is it a means of discovering facts of reality.
Moreover, I am in control of my imagination, as it is a faculty of my conscious
experience. I can imagine, for instance, a four-headed god just as easily as I
can imagine Christianity’s three-headed god. What makes my imagination “false”
but the Christian’s imagination “true”? Again, what is truth? Truth is the
identification of fact(s) of reality in accordance with those facts and by an
objective process which guides our conscious functions. An objective process
keeps us anchored to the fact that the objects of consciousness hold
metaphysical primacy over our consciousness. So we can already see that an
objective process, if it is applied according to its built-in constraints, will
not lead to the subjectivism assumed by Christian god-belief. Christian excuses
do not overcome these hurdles, because they’re not merely hurdles. They’re
facts, and wishing does not overturn facts in the non-cartoon universe of
atheism. Thus even to make the claim that Christianity is true, the Christian
has no choice but to borrow from a worldview which he has confessionally
rejected, perhaps even ridiculed.
Jason:
His existence best explains the
existence of the universe, the finely-tuned properties of our universe, the
origin of life, consciousness, our moral experience, and the reliability of our
cognitive faculties.
The Lahu tell me that the
existence of their Geusha “best explains the
existence of the universe,” etc. So now what? Meanwhile, I have already
explained why the need to “explain” the universe by appealing to something
beyond it is conceptually absurd.
Jason:
Atheism is simply an explanatorily
inferior worldview, rationally speaking.
Atheism is nothing more than the absence of god-belief. It
is not a worldview, it is not an attempt to explain anything, it has no obligation to explain anything. It’s simply the
state of not believing in any gods. By treating atheism as a worldview,
Christian apologists seek to alleviate themselves of the task of dealing with
specific philosophies which are not theistic in nature, such as Objectivism.
Nothing you’ve presented in your message suggests to me that you are either
familiar with Objectivism or capable of launching an informed critique of its
positions. So you prefer to treat atheism as if it were a monolithic worldview
which is uniformly adopted by all non-theists. This is quite naïve, Jason.
What’s noteworthy is that we find that Objectivism’s foundations would have to
be true in order for you to make even a half-hearted (let alone serious and
robust) attempt to disparage it. As I have pointed out to many Christians, even
considering what the Christian worldview says would not be possible if
Objectivism’s basis were not true. If Objectivism’s founding truths were not
true, there’d be no reality, no identity and no consciousness. Meanwhile,
Christians unwittingly affirm the truth of Objectivism any time they affirm any
truth, even when they claim that their worldview’s false teachings are true,
for any claim to truth implicitly assumes the primacy of existence, which
Objectivism alone affirms explicitly and integrates consistently.
Jason:
I would be more than happy to offer
some of the reasons I believe in God if you are willing to consider them.
You’re free to present whatever you wish. But I think it
would be a more productive and profitable use of your time if you explored the
points I have presented here and in the sources I linked above a little deeper
so that you don’t waste your time.
Best regards,