"Just because you have seen, or heard, or
felt, or tasted, or smelled something does not make that something a real
Then what is the "something" which
"you have seen, or heard, or felt, or tasted or smelled"? And by
what means would one go about identifying whether "that something [is]
a real existent object" or not? Peter does not say. Apparently, he
wants his axioms without a means of awareness. We must ask: Why? We already
know the answer: Peter doesn't want to deal with the facts of reality;
rather, he wants to pick and choose what he will believe, and incorporate
only what is propagandistically expedient into his "arguments."
Good luck persuading anyone with that tactic!
"As to the means, I
could simply say that it is a means of awareness, like CV has stated."
I have identified the means
by which I am aware of that which exists. Thus, I give metaphysical context
to my axioms. Peter, on the other hand, has not identified the means by
which he is aware (in fact, he has repeatedly stated that identifying what
they are is irrelevant). Thus, Peter gives no metaphysical context to any
axioms he wants to hijack in service of his ever-evolving god-beliefs (for
which he has yet to provide any legitimate argument).
"CV seems to say would
be the mind examining sensory data and coming to a conclusion about what it
is--a process that in no way demands a physical existence as consciousness
alone can do that, which is my argument back."
Peter is still stuck on the
notion of consciousness without an object. He speaks of "consciousness
alone." There is no such thing, and nowhere has Peter established that
consciousness can exist in the vacuum which he imagines. Thus, he here falls
prey to the fallacy of pure self-reference, which I've pointed out before.
On top of that, we've already seen him commit himself to the fallacy of
context-dropping (not to mention his acceptance of a long string
of stolen concepts). Both errors alone are sufficient to invalidate his
overall argument, but I suppose (as we've seen before) he will protest and
simply move on without dealing with the errors of his ways. Typical of
theists, Peter is always looking for a backdoor through which he can slip
his illicit premises. Won't work.
"Physical existence is
not necessary to determine the axioms of existence, consciousness, and
How does Peter establish
this? In fact, he has nowhere argued for it. In fact, it is built on a false
view of consciousness. Where did he get this view of consciousness? From his
primitive philosophy, or worse, from modern academics who have set before
themselves the task of trying to validate primitive philosophy. Does Peter
at any point deal with the issue of metaphysical primacy? No, not at all, at
least not in any self-conscious manner. Rather, Peter seems quite aloof of
"The world is not necessarily
physical in nature."
How does Peter establish this? Again, we have
another unargued assertion presented as an axiom. So we must ask: Does the
world exist? Is the world physical? What do we mean by 'physical'? Peter
does not say. Are the things in the world physical? Do you think there needs
to be a form of consciousness which created the world and or the things
which are in it? If you think a god exists, then obviously, to be consistent
with that belief, you would have to think so (cf. "doctrine of
creation"). This tells us what your position on the issue of
metaphysical primacy is, and it is self-negating (as are all such
expressions of subjectivism).
"It is not demanded from those axioms."
Axioms do not make "demands." This is a reversal. More expressions
of Peter's invalid premises.
"In fact, my entire argument that preceeded this discussion was what
the logical conclusions of accepting the axioms of existence, consciousness,
and identity would end up being."
I would like to see your "argument" presented as a formal
syllogism. Can you do this? Please begin by identifying your initial
starting point, and the means by which you are aware of it (assuming you
have awareness of it). Keep in mind: products of imagination do not count,
since they cannot logically serve as starting points (since they are not
irreducible). That rules out any notion of a 'god'.
Peter provided a number of "axioms" of
his own, numbered first through eighth. Where he got these, he does not say.
Apparently he made them up. (I cannot find them in any of my Bibles, in
fact, none of my Bibles even includes the word 'axiom' to begin with, so
apparently the primitives who wrote it were unaware of the idea of axioms as
such, and any modern Christians who invoke the term cannot have taken it
from the Bible. Thus, Peter shows his already infamous habit of borrowing
from extra-biblical sources [which he is reluctant to identify] in order to
give his primitive god-beliefs more credibility.) While these 'axioms'
remain contextless so long as Peter refuses to identify the means by which
he is aware of them, I would like to focus only on the last two, since they
seem to be the most incredible and outlandish. (This is not to imply that
the previous six "axioms" which Peter provides are not without
their share of problems as well, but that will have to wait for another
data (the data of observation of the physical world) is not necessary for
consciousness' Consciousness exists regardless of whether or not the
physical world exists."
How does Peter establish the claim that
"empirical data... is not necessary for consciosuness"? I see no
argument for this. And since this statement is not identifying a
perceptually self-evident truth, it must be argued for. But does Peter
provide an argument in order to defend it? No, he does not. He simply
asserts it, as if it did not require any support. Additionally, given the
fact that Peter has been reluctant to identify the means by which he is
aware of the facts which his "axioms" supposedly identify,
everything he asserts on this subject is at best intellectually suspect.
When he states "Consciousness exists
regardless of whether or not the physical world exists," does he state
how he came to this conclusion? No, he does not. Does he think that this is
true without support? If so, then clearly it is completely arbitrary and
must be rejected. Otherwise, he must present an argument for its supposed
truth. What are the premises which supposedly lead to this conclusion?
Nothing Peter states establishes this position. Indeed, I think he takes
much for granted!
Peter also wrote:
"Eighth: 'existence is
not dependent upon the physical world for existence.' Therefore,
existence itself is immaterial because it is necessary regardless of whether
or not physical data is valid."