The whole notion that "the senses are inaccurate" is so flimsy an error (and so transparent a ploy) that it amazes me that anyone uses it any more. The senses do not make "mistakes." We make mistakes in identifying what our senses tell us. There is a huge difference here, and the notion that "the senses are inaccurate" drops this distinction in order to promote intellectual fraud. The senses do not "make decisions"; they simply respond automatically to things which impinge on them. If I feel pain, is that a "mistake"? Is it really pleasure that I'm feeling and cannot tell the difference because the senses are suddenly "playing tricks" on me?
 
Peter mentioned the scenario in which someone hears a voice which wasn't really there. But if he heard something and thought what he was hearing was a voice, then this is not an error of the senses, but in his identification of what his senses sensed (perhaps he misidentified the squeeking of a door closing as the sound of a voice; that's not an "inaccurate perception" but an inaccurate identification of what he sensed - i.e., an error of judgment or inference, not an "error of sensation"). And if he really didn't hear anything to begin with, then still he cannot blame his senses, since he didn't sense anything (since he really didn't hear anything after all); he has simply confused his imagination with objective phenomena (or perhaps his mind is simply looping one of its theistic wormholes again -- or whatever psychotic episode may have seized him) . Perhaps this is what happened to Abraham in the case of the voices he supposedly heard?
 
Some like to point to the tired old example of the pencil stuck in a glass half full of water. The pencil "appears" bent. "See!" they shout, "the senses are misguided! For we know the pencil is really straight!" Well, how did they know the pencil was straight????
 
All this points to the fact that our perceptual faculties are astonishingly accurate, for they don't just deliver isolated sensations which have no objective reference in reality or relation to each other. Instead, they deliver an entire context of information, integrated automatically (by our neural nets) in the form of percepts which we must identify by means of reason (i.e., a means of integrating the perceptual into the conceptual). Remember, reason is the faculty which identifies and integrates what the senses provide us. Perception integrates individual sensations into percepts so that what we see are not isolated, contextless attributes (e.g., "black, red, glaze, shine, shape, round, straight," etc.) but entities (e.g., a car with its many attributes, or a table with many individual objects on top of it). In this sense, our perceptual level of consciousness "pre-integrates" what our senses sense in the world around us, but it is up to us to name what the senses tell us by means of concept-formation. Without this whole process functioning as well as it does, we couldn't compose a single e-mail, let alone drive an automobile down to the grocery store and back.
 
Look again at the case of the pencil dunked in a glass half full of water. It "appears" bent because of light refraction: light travels faster through air than it does through water, and our perceptual faculty responds to this fact. A set of "inaccurate senses" would have us see a pencil which appears straight when it is dunked in a glass half full of water, for it would drop the factual context of the different speeds at which light travels through the two media in question. But that is impossible. The senses do not have a will of their own, thus the notion that the senses "deceive" us relies on a stolen concept that has been retired to the pasture or irrational philosophy long ago, thanks to rational philosophy. Peter and other careless thinkers need to figure this out, and start using their minds like rational human beings.
 
CertainVerdict