Bahnsen,
Greg
Van Til’s Apologetic:
Readings & Analysis
7.4:
“The Transcendental Nature of Presuppositional Argument”
pp.
496-529
Bahnsen,
VTA:R&A
Transcribed
February 2006
p. 496:
7.4
The Transcendental Nature of Presuppositional Argument
To understand
the character of Van Til’s presuppositional apologetical argument for the truth
of Christianity, it will be instructive to review a short segment of the
history of philosophy: the beginning of the “modern period” (the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries) in Europe and
p. 497:
claims to
knowledge? Prior to the arrival of Kant’s critical approach to such
question (especially, how are
synthetic a priori judgments possible?), tow major schools of
epistemological thought competed with each other. There was the “rationalist”
approach to learning, knowing, and proof, advocated by the “Continental
rationalists” René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz. The
competing school of thought took an “empiricist” approach to epistemology and
was represented by John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Both
rationalism and empiricism adopted the autonomous point of reference that was
assumed by Descartes’ attempt to escape skepticism or doubt, namely, man’s
intellectual self-sufficiency as his own starting point for philosophical
reasoning. (According to Descartes, the first clear and indisputable truth is
that the individual man who is thinking or doubting must exist in order to
think or doubt).
How do we
know what we know, and how can we prove our beliefs to be true? The autonomous
rationalists maintained that there are self-evident truths from which we can
deduce substantial conclusions about the nature of reality. The wildly
different conclusions about reality at which they arrived made it rather incredible
that their premises were genuinely self-evident and that their deductions were
genuinely necessary. The autonomous empiricists rejected all innate ideas,
maintained that only particulars exist, and said that we know and prove things
by common sense and observation of the world. This too led to philosophical
embarrassment, in that the empirical demand for verification (or the tracing of
our particular ideas back to their origin) was not itself a truth that could be
empirically verified, and the nature of the particulars that were acknowledged
to exist was hotly disputed. Was their a particular substance underlying the
particular attributes of things (Locke), or did material substance exist only
as a mental idea or internal experience (Berkeley), or – empirically speaking –
must we not also reject the existence of a mental substance (the mind being
only a bundle of perceptions), as well as enduring extramental
objects (made up of isolated, experienced traits) and any causal relation
between them (Hume)? Enlightenment epistemology was in shambles in both Europe
(the rationalists) and
p. 498:
no
intellectual basis for confidence in man’s ability to gain objective knowledge
of the real and orderly world outside (or inside) the mind.
Thus, as
the story runs, Immanuel Kant was “awakened from dogmatic slumbers” by the
shocking skepticism to which Hume was driven, and he pursued a “Copernican Revolution”
in the way we should view the mind and its reasoning. The memorable opening
line of the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason,
stated: “Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its
knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature
of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its
powers, it is also not able to answer.” (55) It was scandalous, said Kant, to
philosophy and human reason that “if anyone thinks good to doubt” the existence
and nature of things outside us, “we are unable to counter his doubts by any
satisfactory proof” and must accept those things “merely on faith.” (56) The
rationalist and empiricist conceptions and methods of “proof” were obviously
inadequate to counter the skeptic, but Kant felt that a different program of
philosophical analysis could very well “save science” (as well as leave room
for mystical and moralistic religious faith). Kant’s particular
recommendation for doing this was philosophically (and religiously) abhorrent
to Van Til (cf. chap. 5 above), (57) but the general kind of program (or
approach to the proof of fundamental beliefs) that Kant recom-
55. Immanuel
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (German
original, 1781; English translation, 1929; reprint, New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1965), A vii.
56. Ibid., B
xl.
57. Kant did
not depart from the man-centered and autonomous standpoint of Descartes, but
actually intensified its inwardness, making the mind of man the source of order
or law in the world of experience. The mind, previously viewed as passive in
the knowing process, is actually active in the acquisition of knowledge, held
Kant; it imposes order (that is, the forms of time and space, and categories
such as substance and causality) on the chaotic raw data of sensations. Against
the rationalists, Kant taught that nothing could be known apart from experience
or observation; against the empiricists, he held that the mind is not a blank
tablet, but constructive of its objects knowledge. Kant’s scheme was arbitrary,
offering no proof that the structure of the mind is universally the same or
that our physical cognitive faculties do not change from time to time in a
contingent world. It also capitulated to subjectivism and skepticism, since the
mind “knows” objects only as they appear in experience, not as they are in
themselves. Kant’s metaphysical agnosticism with respect to extramental
things of “this world” (the noumenal realm) and
things “beyond this world” (nonempirical ideas such
as God) renders his autonomous philosophy thoroughly unacceptable, both
philosophically and rigorously.
p. 499:
mended to
improve upon rationalism and empiricism was convincing and effective, according
to Van Til. Kant proposed to engage in “transcendental” analysis, which asks
what the preconditions are for the intelligibility of human experience. Under
what conditions is it possible, or what would also need to be true in order for
it to be possible, to make sense of one’s experience of the world? To seek the
transcendental conditions for knowing is to ask what is presupposed by any
intelligible experience whatsoever. This kind of analysis takes us beyond the
methods of rationalism and empiricism to see what is presupposed by them both.
Kant wrote, “I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied...
with the mod of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mod of knowledge is
to be possible a priori.” (58) Beliefs that are genuinely
transcendental, then, cannot be false, and their certainty is ascertainable
apart from specific empirical experiences that suggest or confirm them. Kant
explained that the conclusion of a transcendental argument (or an analysis of
some item of experience) “has the peculiar character that it makes possible the
very experience which is its own ground of proof, and that in this experience
it must always itself be presupposed.” (59)
The
transcendental method of knowing one’s fundamental beliefs or proving one’s
presuppositions, in which Van Til took a keen interest and advocated for
apologetics in the late 1920s (when there was, as yet, a background of
continuing appreciation for idealism in philosophical circles), has again come
somewhat into vogue as a matter of some fascination (both positive and
negative) among philosophers. (60)
58. Critique
of Pure Reason, A 12.
59. Ibid., B
765. Note well that not all claims that a belief or idea is transcendental are
in fact true. Saying so does not make it so. For instance, a dedicated opponent
of the Christian faith might allege that his empiricism is a “transcendental”
truth. But the principle “All knowledge is based on observational experience”
is hardly one that could not possibly be false. Furthermore, it does not make
possible its own ground of proof! Far from being self-authorizing or
self-attesting, the empirical principle actually testifies against itself and
betrays its own lack of authority. That is, we do not empirically know that all
knowledge is based on observational experience.
60. The
contemporary catalyst has been the analysis offered by P. F. Strawson in books such as Individuals (London:
Methuen, 1959) and The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen, 1965), but one
could also consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s argument against the impossibility of
a private language (Philosophical Investigations) and his argument for
the possibility of knowledge (On Certainty; cf. Greg L. Bahnsen,
“Pragmatism, Prejudice, and Presuppositionalism,” in Foundations of
Christian Scholarship, ed. North, 258-71). Other important contributions to
the discussion of transcendental arguments are A. C. Grayling, The
Refutation of Scep-
p. 500:
They
disagree over the proper scope of transcendental arguments (how broad or
ambitious should be their aim?) and the metaphysical character of what they
prove (does it exist objectively or is it simply necessary to our conceptual
scheme?). But others have been critical of the very notion of a transcendental
kind of analysis or argument that is distinct from the methods of rationalism
or empiricism (or their more refined modern counterparts). Similarly, John
Frame has taken a critical position regarding this type of argument, holding
that “there is probably not a distinctively ‘transcendental argument’ which
rules out all other kinds of arguments.” He questions whether they are “really
distinct from direct arguments,” and suggests that only rhetorical form or
phrasing (the order in which things are mentioned) makes them different from
deductive or inductive arguments that move “directly” from some observation or
principle to what can be inferred from it. (61) In my judgment, however, Frame
is mistaken about this.
The
difference between the kind of philosophical analysis and argument that was
engaged in and advanced by Kant and the kind of analysis or argument set forth
by Descartes or Locke cannot credibly be reduced to a matter of rhetorical
phrasing. The same holds for the difference between the kind of apologetical
argumentation offered by Van Til and that which has been proposed by
rationalistic and evidentialist apologists. The
rationalist and empiricist philosophers se-
ticism (London: Duckworth, 1985) and R. Harrison, On What There
Must Be (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). There have been numerous relevant
articles in the journals, some supportive and some critical of the notion of
transcendental proof. They include Barry Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” Journal
of Philosophy 65 (1968): 241-56; John Kekes,
“Transcendental Arguments and the Sceptical
Challenge,” Philosophical Forum 4 (1973-74): 422-31; A. Phillips
Griffiths and J. J. MacIntosh, “Transcendental
Arguments,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. Vol. 43
(1969): 165-93; T. E. Wilkerson, “Transcendental Arguments,” Philosophical
Quarterly 20 (1970): 200-212; Stephen W. Arndt, “Transcendental Method and
Transcendental Arguments,” International Philosophical Quarterly 27
(1987): 43-58; Charles Crittenden, “Transcendental Arguments Revived,” Philosophical
Investigations 8 (1985): 229-51; Moltke S. Gram,
“Transcendental Arguments,” Nous 5 (1971):
15-26; Jaakko Hintikka,
“Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious,” Nous
6 (1972): 274-80; Charles Taylor, “The Validity of Transcendental Arguments,” Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, n. s. 79 (1978-79): 151-65. A convenient
competent overview of the contemporary discussion can be found in A
Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy
and Ernst Sosa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992).
61. Apologetics
to the Glory of God, (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1994),
73, 76.
p. 501:
lected a
starting point (for Descartes, self-evident or clear ideas; for Locke, simple
ideas caused by sensation), (62) whereas Kant’s analysis encourages one to
start with any idea or fact whatsoever. The earlier philosophers also employed
methods of reasoning different from Kant’s: Descartes connected and unpacked
concepts, and Locke connected ideas by inductive generalization and analyzed
complex ideas into their simple components. Kant, however, did not take items
of phenomenal experience (whether conceptual or perceptual) themselves and
connect them to others or break them down (unpack them); rather, he asked about
something distinct from them, namely, the conditions (additional beliefs) that
are necessary for them to be intelligible. Kant’s argument about the
“necessity” of a causal understanding of our experience is not at all a
rhetorical variation on the kind of analysis and argumentation we find in the
work of Descartes or Locke (or especially Hume); they are concerned with
different types of issues and appeal to different kinds of support for the
positions they take on those issues.
But we
realize even more clearly and definitively the distinctiveness of
transcendental arguments when we contrast their logical character (that is, the
truth-functional relation of their conclusions to their premises) with that of
rational and empirical arguments. A deductive demonstration takes particular
premises and draws a necessary conclusion from them; but if, in this rational
argument, one of the relevant premises were negated, the conclusion would no
longer follow or be established. Likewise, in an inductive or empirical
argument, the premises include particular claims (or instances) of a definite
sort; from them the conclusion draws a generalization with probability.
However, if a competent or relevant premise (or sets of instances) were to be
negated, the general conclusion would no longer be the same as before (or would
no longer be drawn with the same degree of probability). To put it simply, in
the case of “direct” arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of
one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But
this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the
other kinds of proof or analysis. A transcendental argument
62.
Likewise, rational proofs for God’s existence do not start with just any truth,
principle, or concept at all, but with an especially important one – like cause
or purpose or perfection. Evidential proofs do not start with just any fact
whatsoever, but with an especially important one – like Christ’s resurrection
or fulfilled prophecy.
p. 502:
begins with
any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical
analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true
in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful,
or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the
statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the
transcendental analysis (if original cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach
the very same conclusion. (63) Clearly then, transcendental demonstration has a
very distinct kind of argument over against rational and empirical proofs. (64)
A number of
features of transcendental argumentation commended themselves to Van Til as an
apologist. In the first place, it is a forceful, all-or-nothing intellectual
challenge to unbelief in all of its
63. Van
Til’s stunning application of this feature of transcendental argumentation to
apologetics is that the truth of the Christian worldview is established not
only by theistic premises and opinions, but also by antitheistic beliefs and
opinions. As Van Til said, “Antitheism presupposes theism” (Survey of
Christian Epistemology, xii). Even if the unbeliever wants to start with
the assertion that “God does not exist,” a transcendental analysis of it would
show that the possibility of its coherence or meaningfulness assumes the
existence of the very God that it denies.
64. In
passing, it should be noted that there is no transcendental argument that
“rules out all other kinds of arguments,” as Frame puts it (Apologetics to
the Glory of God, 73) – either in general philosophy and scholarship or
particularly in apologetics (cf. chap. 8.3, 4 below).
However,
when Frame says that transcendental arguments “require supplementation” – the
help of other, “subsidiary” arguments – because he does “not think that the
whole of Christian theism can be established by a single argument” (pp. 71, 72,
73), he fails to grasp that at stake in the transcendental argument is nothing
less than the whole of the Christian worldview as revealed in Scripture.
Frame criticizes Van Til by saying, “We must prove more than that God is the
author of meaning, we must... prove that God is personal, sovereign, ... just,
loving, omnipotent, omnipresent, etc.” (p. 73). Or again: “There is no single
argument that will prove the entire biblical doctrine of God” (p. 73). Remarks
like these misconstrue the transcendental argument, as if it were one part of
an atomistic or “blockhouse” apologetic, in which the defender of the faith
proves the various features of the Christian worldview one by one. Rather, Van
Til taught that when we engage in the internal critique of worldviews (the
indirect argument with the unbeliever), we set forth for comparison the entire
biblical worldview with all its features and details. In the dialogue with the
unbeliever, we cannot speak of everything simultaneously (and it is convenient
and polemically effective to get into issues of meaning and rationality from
the start), but the position for which we are arguing is nothing less than all
of Christianity. The Christian apologist may choose to focus on meaningfulness
with one opponent, but turn to considerations of justice or love with a
different opponent. These are simply “illustrations” of the broader project
laid out by the transcendental approach. The illustration that is used in a
particular circumstance is “person variable” (cf. Frame, p. 72).
p. 503:
manifestations.
Our method of apologetics should not be concessive or compromising. As Van Til
put it:
The natural man must be blasted out of his hideouts, his
caves, his last lurking places...
Calvinism makes no compromise with the natural man either on
his views of the autonomy of the human mind or on his views of the nature of
existence as not controlled by the plan of God. Therefore Calvinism cannot find
a direct point of contact in any of the accepted concepts of the natural man...
He disagrees with the basic immanentistic assumption
of the natural man. For it is this basic assumption that colors all his
statements about individual teachings. It is therefore this basic assumption of
the natural man that meets its first major challenge when it is confronted by
the statement of full-fledged Christianity.
The Reformed apologist throws down the gauntlet and
challenges his opponent to a duel of life and death from the start. (65)
Secondly,
this form of argumentation covers the entire field. The transcendental,
presuppositional argument does not allow that the unbeliever “can interpret any
aspect of experience in terms of his principles without destroying the very
idea of intelligibility.” To put it another way, Van Til maintained “that the
philosophy of the non-Christian cannot account for the intelligibility of human
experience in any sense.” (66)
And thus,
thirdly, the transcendental argument upholds the exclusivity or singularity of
Christianity as the answer to man’s woes:
Thus the Christian-theistic position must be shown to be not
as defensible as some other position; it must rather be shown to be the
position which alone does not annihilate intelligent human experience... He
must therefore present the facts... as proving Christian theism because they
are intelligible as facts in terms of it and in terms of it alone. (67)
Transcendental
apologetics need not yield to the competing virtues of other worldviews: “We as
Christians alone have a position that is philo-
65. Defense
of the Faith, 122, 129-30.
66. Ibid.,
198, 354 (emphasis added).
67. Ibid.,
197, 264 (emphasis original).
p. 504:
sophically
defensible... We are [certain] that Christianity is objectively valid and that
it is the only rational position for man to hold.” (68)
In that
case, fourthly, the transcendental form of defending the faith can deal with
anything that the unbeliever brings up as an objection or challenge.
One shows that on his [the unbeliever’s] assumptions all
things are meaningless. Science would be impossible; knowledge of anything in
any field would be impossible. No fact could be distinguished from any other
fact. No law could be said to be law with respect to facts... Thus every fact -
not some facts - every fact clearly and not probably proves the
truth of Christian theism. If Christian theism is not true then nothing is
true. (69)
Indeed,
given the force of the transcendental argument, the apologist is justified in
rejecting in advance any hypothesis whose assumptions contradict the Christian
outlook. (70)
A fifth
virtue that commends transcendental apologetics is, accordingly, that it is not
forced to agree to anything in the unbeliever's position or argument - as
though future research might affect its validity, or as though Christianity is
merely more probably correct than its competition. The argument for it is
"objectively valid," regardless of the attitude of the attitude of
the person to whom it comes. "Christianity is the only reasonable position
to hold. It is not merely as reasonable as other positions, or a bit more
reasonable as other positions; it alone is the natural and reasonable position
for man to take." (72) If the transcendental project is properly pursued,
the position of those who do not believe in the self-authenticating Christ
"is reducible to absurdity." (73) "Our argument, then, is that
those who... stop short of maintaining the fundamental conceptions of an
absolute Christ, an absolute Scripture, and regeneration, reduce experience to
an absurdity." (74)
Finally,
then, in light of the foregoing features that make tran-
68. Common
Grace, 8, 82.
69. Defense
of the Faith, 266-67. The last sentence is elliptical; to put it more
precisely, substitute "nothing is known to be true" for "nothing
is true."
70. Ibid.,
116.
71. Common
Grace, 50.
72. Defense
of the Faith, 256; cf. The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought
(Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 98.
73. The
Case for Calvinism (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1963), 144.
74. Survey
of Christian Epistemology, 221.
p. 505:
scendental
reasoning so attractive to a Christian apologist, Van Til considered it to have
great personal and spiritual strength. "By stating the argument as clearly
as we can, we may be the agents of the Holy Spirit in pressing the claims of
God upon men," for a transcendental analysis of man's interpretive
activity "is no doubt the most penetrating means by which the Holy Spirit
presses the claims of God upon men." Indeed, although it may be couched in
academic terms and be part of an intellectual dialogue, the transcendental
argument for the truth of Christianity is an avenue by which "God calls
men to conversion." (75)
It is easy
to understand why Van Til and others have found the transcendental approach to
defending the faith compelling and attractive. To understand how Van Til
utilized it, however, it is important to see that his version of transcendental
argumentation was unique. Van Til point out that he was applying the method of
Kant or of the logic of idealism, but in a way which they could not. (76) In
investigating the preconditions of intelligibility of man's experience, Van Til
introduced significant changes in the method employed by unbelieving
philosophers when pursuing a similar aim:
Again, we may speak of our method as being transcendental,
but if we do, we should once more observe that our meaning of that word is
different from the Kantian, or modern, meaning. Kantian thought does not really
find its final reference point in God. It seeks to interpret reality by a
combination of eternal and temporal categories... It is only the Christian who
really interprets reality in exclusively eternal categories because only he
believes in God as self-sufficient and not dependent upon temporal reality.
(77)
Van Til
held that Valentine Hepp was wrong to say "that
Kant sought the solution of the question of certainty in the same direction
in which a Christian should seek it." And the reason why Van Til made a
point of insisting on this and distinguishing transcendental apologetics from
75. Defense
of the Faith, 256, 257, 285 (in the first two citations, Van Til was
quoting from Common Grace, 62).
76. An
Introduction to Systematic Theology, In Defense of the Faith, vol. 5 (Philadelphia:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1974), 9.
77. Ibid.,
14. The significance of the remarks about introducing temporal categories into
one's point of reference is that they are, as such, contingent and subject to
change, thereby excluding their conceptual necessity.
p. 506
Kant was
that "Kant's foundation of reasoning is wrong inasmuch as it is based upon
the assumption of the ultimacy of the human mind, and
inasmuch as it has assumed the existence of brute fact." (78)
Van Til's kind
of transcendental critique was not a philosophical neutral or autonomous,
abstract intellectual analysis, in which any unbeliever could participate
without objection. It was not a project that started with no definite
assumptions and reflected on immanent factors to discover the general
foundations of thought in a way that any philosophers might do in formal
cooperation with each other. "We do not first set out without God to find
our highest philosophical concept in terms of which we think we can interpret
reality and then call this highest concept divine." (79) God does not come
in at the end of the process, having earned the intellectual right to a place
in our thinking. The very process of transcendental thinking or analysis must
itself begin with the belief in the living and true God. Advocates of
autonomous transcendental critique consider transcendental apologetics
distasteful, because Van Til's transcendental reasoning has a transcendent and
concrete starting point in the presupposition of the truth of Scripture. "It
is not enough for a Christian to point to the mere fact of the necessity of an a
priori element in science. He must also show that unless that a priori
be given the Christian-theistic basis, it is no true a priori."
(80) This is considerably too religious, too personal, and too specific for
autonomous philosophers and thinkers - as Van Til knew very well. He stated:
We accept this God upon Scriptural authority. In the Bible
alone do we hear of such a God. Such a God, to be known at all, cannot be known
otherwise than by virtue of His own voluntary revelation...
The frank acceptance of our position on authority, which at
first blush, because of our inveterate tendency to think along non-Christian
lines, seems to involve the immediate and total rejection of all philosophy -
this frank acceptance of authority is, philosophically, our very salvation.
(81)
The
would-be autonomous man openly disdains bringing the Scriptures into a
philosophical dialogue. He likewise derides any effort to give seirous consideration to a complex, general worldview,
insisting
78. Ibid.,
55.
79. Common
Grace, 8.
80. Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 45.
81. Common
Grace, 8.
p. 507:
That
limited analytical details are the only proper subject for philosophical
discussion. The kind of transcendental comparison or indirect argument that is
encouraged by the Christian apologist is odious to him. He may ridicule it, but
by the demands of philosophy itself, he cannot ignore it.
So, as we
can see, in Van Til's conception and use of transcendental argumentation, his
own position rests upon authority (not upon autonomous analysis, starting from
scratch). Further, the reasoning is concrete, rather than formal or abstract.
That is why Van Til was critical of Kuyper for
attempting to counter skepticism with the notion of mere "formal
faith." Kuyper had argued that "general
faith" - firm conviction "previous to investigation" or
"prior to all proof" - was inherent in a human being and necessary to
maintain one's own existence, the reliability of observation by our senses (as
a bridge from the phenomenal to the noumenal), the
truth of the laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, and the unity of all
truth. Without this faith, a person would land in subjectivism and be
overwhelmed by skepticism. (82) Van Til's trenchant critique was right on
target:
Kuyper insists that the concept of faith
that he here speaks of is without content. It is inherent in the subject,
therefore, not because the subject is unavoidably confronted with God,
but simply as such. By means of this purely formal faith the human
subject is first to become conscious of his own existence. Then by means of
this formal faith a bridge is to be laid to the external world. The laws of
thought by which the environment of man is to be manipulated also rest on this
formal faith...
To be sure, all men have faith. Unbelievers have faith as
well as believers. But that is due to the fact that they too are creatures of
God. Faith therefore always has content. It is against the concept of
faith as belief in God that man has become an unbeliever. As such he tries
to suppress the content of his original faith. He tries to reduce it
to something formal. (83) Then its content can take any form
82. Defense
of the Faith, 384.
83. For
instance, instead of saying "Jehovah is the Creator and controller of the
world, of me as His image and responsible servant, and of my cognitive
faculties so that I can reliably know His world and serve Him there," the
unbeliever wants to reduce this to something less definite and theological - to
the more "formal" belief that "there must be a 'me' who exists,
with reliable cognitive faculties to know some kind of external world." The
latter belief does not entail responsibility to acknowledge, thank, and glorify
God for one's existence and abilities or to think of oneself as God's
responsible servant.
p. 508:
he wants it to have. Then its content is actually
indeterminate. And thus there is [to be philosophically honest] no foundation
for man's knowledge of himself or of the world at all...
Kuyper speaks as though the merely formal
idea of faith is a dam against skepticism... But how can this be? For this very
formal idea of faith says nothing about the content or object of faith.
Or rather, by its formality [an "unsaturated" function without
defining value or subject] it allows for and even demands the correlative
notion of pure non-rational factuality and of logic as an abstract system that
includes both God and man. Thus the formal idea of faith is the very source
of skepticism itself. (84)
The
apologist commends to the unbeliever a very specific philosophical outlook or
theory, with definite content - not simply abstract and formal ideas - for
internal analysis and contrast to the concrete position of the unbeliever.
Hence, Van
Til wrote that "the process of transcendental reasoning as employed by
Christian theism is of necessity and inherently concrete." (85) Thus, the
argument is that "the intelligibility of anything, for man, presuppose the
existence of God - the God whose nature and character are delineated in God's
revelation" (86) - not simply a god of some indeterminate character
who (or which) might be transcendentally necessary. To simply posit a god about
whom (or which) theoretical reason says nothing more (as with Kant) leaves the
mind of man free to exercise his presumed autonomy by filling in the details.
(87) the whole issue in apologetics is over the specific kind of God we
are seeking to prove. "We must first ask what kind of a God Christianity
believes in before we can really ask with intelligence whether such a God
exists. The what precedes the that." (88) Likewise, the
presuppositional argument does not first debate the formal possibility of a
book from God, but rather begins the argument from the outset with the
actuality of the Bible - whose worldview is offered for internal comparison
with any other contrary viewpoint:
84. Defense
of the Faith, 384-85.
85. Survey
of Christian Epistemology, 33.
86. Reformed
Pastor and Modern Thought, 12.
87. "Particularism and Common Grace," in Common Grace
and the Gospel (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1972), 104.
88. Defense
of the Faith, 25; cf. pp. 25-29.
p. 509:
We must begin with the actuality of the book. We must not
pretend to have established the possibility of the book and the necessity of it
in terms of a philosophy that we did not get from the book. We have as
Christians indeed learned with Calvin to interpret ourselves in terms of the
book, and that on the authority of the book, and then we have looked to the
book for the interpretation of the meaning of the facts... We know nothing but
such facts as are what the book, the authoritative revelation of God, says they
are. And we challenge unbelievers by saying that unless the facts are what
the Bible says they are, they have no meaning at all. (89)
So then,
the extraordinary use of the transcendental project in Van Til's
presuppositional apologetic includes beginning with a position that is based on
transcendental authority (and is presented as such) and which is concrete in
content (and not merely formal or abstract).
A further
unique feature of Van Til's version of transcendental argumentation is that it
is much broader in scope than what most philosophers today want to discuss. Van
Til was not simply analyzing and arguing about the contours, formal features,
or isolated and broad kinds of beliefs that are necessary as the preconditions
for intelligible experience and reasoning - that is, not simply narrow issues
or aspects of one's conceptual scheme or detached prerequisite assumptions. For
him, a truly transcendental argument must be about an extensive network of
concrete and systematic beliefs. To put it simply, the argument is over
entire worldviews. Accordingly, the "cogito" argument of
Descartes ("I think, therefore I am" - because I cannot argue to the
contrary without existing to think) is too limited and not adequate as a truly
transcendental justification:
89. Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 190-91 (emphasis added). Note well that the
transcendental challenge begins with the Bible as a written, complete
expression of a philosophical point of view - and then calls for any other
philosophical outlook to be set next to it for comparison, so that it will be
evident that without that finished product with which we began, the
facts could have no meaning at all. The apologist does not start his reasoning
outside the context of the Scriptures in order to somehow prove, first, that it
is possible that there might be a book revealed by God, for the only
"place to stand" where facts could be meaningful in proving that
possibility is within the position revealed by the Bible. (Those who are
without the written oracles of God still know God by natural revelation, which
is the cognitive context in which they receive and are convinced that God also
speaks to them in Scripture.)
p. 510:
[Those who seek to flee the voice of God] start with the
"cogito" as though it were a rock in a bottomless ocean. They cannot
individuate. They cannot show how one fact, if it could be found, can be
related to another fact. They cannot account for the uniformity of nature. They
cannot use the law of contradiction except they abuse it, making it destroy
individuality as it succeeds in its reduction to abstract unity. They cannot
find intelligible meaning in the words "cause," "substance,"
or "purpose"; there is no coherence in all their thought. (90)
Thus,
because of its limited range, Descartes' transcendental proof does not show his
existence to be intelligible after all. Isolated from a broader theory, his
conclusion is useless and meaningless. (91) By contrast, Van Til challenged the
unbelieving world with the broad and detailed theory or system of thought
revealed by the Christian Scriptures as that which is transcendentally
necessary for a cogent epistemology. He said that it should not be atomistically divided into component parts for separate
argumentation then reassembled.
90.Defense
of the Faith, 393. Descartes' argument "I think, therefore I am,"
only proves that thinking is occurring. It does not prove the existence of
separate substances or the existence of personal substances, much less the
existence of Descartes himself as a personal substance. It does not prove (but
simply assumes), or demonstrate the proper use of, the law of contradiction;
thus, it would be equally valid to assert that thinking is not occurring, even
though it is. The argument does not establish the uniformity of nature, and so
the connection between thinking and personal thinking substance may be broken
tomorrow. Descartes' seemingly solid conclusion, then, is still unintelligible.
It is, as Van Til expressed it, "a rock in a bottomless ocean."
91. This
observation is relevant to answering the question of those who, having read or
heard a particular illustration of the transcendental project of showing Christianity
to be the precondition for intelligibility (say, an argument or debate
centering on logic, inductive reasoning, or moral absolutes), wonder why such a
presuppositional apologetic does not simply prove that the unbeliever must
incorporate (as isolated items) logic, induction, or absolutes into his
thinking and not necessarily concern himself with the entire Christian
worldview. While a specific transcendental argument cannot say everything at
once or deal with every detail of Christian theology simultaneously, it is
intelligible only within the entire Christian system, which it seeks to
prove by indirectly comparing whole worldviews. If the unbeliever wants to accept
the point of the specific illustration (say, logic), but not place it within
the wider theory, it will be meaningless and useless as a philosophical
outlook. (For example, "All I believe in is logic" already says more
than something about logic!) Presuppositional apologetics does not gradually
build up the Christian worldview one step at a time, because if that worldview
alone provides the context for intelligible reasoning, there cannot be another
worldview that provides a context for intelligibly reasoning one's way to the
exclusive Christian position!
p. 511:
Presuppositional
apologetics orients the transcendental argument to entire worldviews
that are in conflict with each other. This explains why it is, then, that
"the argument for the Scripture as the infallible revelation of God is, to
all intents and purposes, the same as the argument for the existence of
God." (92) Transcendental presuppositionalism does not attempt to prove
that some kind of god exists, apart from proving that it is the God who has
revealed Himself in Scripture; nor does it try to prove that Scripture is a
revelation from God, apart from proving that the God revealed in Scripture
exists. It is a package deal (cf. chap. 3.2 above), and Christianity must be
defended as a unit (cf. chap. 2.1 above):
As a rational creature he [the unbeliever] can understand
that one must either accept the whole of a system of truth or reject the
whole of it... He can understand the idea of [Scripture's] necessity, its
perspicuity, its sufficiency and its authority as being involved in the
Christian position as a whole.
But while understanding them as being involved in the
position of Christianity as a whole, it is precisely Christianity as a
whole, and therefore each of these doctrines as part of Christianity, that are
meaningless to him as long as he is not willing to drop his own assumptions of
autonomy and chance...
[T]he only possible way for the Christian to reason with the
non-believer is by way of presupposition. He must say to the unbeliever that
unless he will accept the presuppositions and with them the interpretations of
Christianity there is no coherence in human experience... [I]t will be
impossible to find meaning in anything. (93)
Van Til's
"holistic" approach to apologetical argument distinguishes his
transcendental method from what his idealist counterparts would have done or
approved:
The whole claim of Christian theism is in question in any
debate about any fact. Christian theism must be presented as that light in terms
of which any proposition about any fact receives meaning. Without the
presupposition of the truth of Christian theism no fact can be distinguished
from any other fact. To say this is but to apply the method
92. Defense
of the Faith, 126.
93. Ibid.,
166-67 (emphasis added).
p. 512:
of idealist logicians in a way that these idealist
logicians, because of their own anti-Christian theistic assumptions, cannot
apply it. (94)
Because of
the nature and content of the Christian's own fundamental presuppositions -
involving the authority of God and His revelation - even his conception and
method of transcendental argumentation will be a transformed interpretation or
understanding which distinguishes his outlook from that of would-be autonomous
man.
Here then
is how the presuppositional (transcendental) method of defending the faith
would proceed, once the preliminary discussions and clarifications have taken
place with the unbeliever - and the two outlooks now come head-to-head. (95)
The unbeliever says that he knows that miracles are impossible, that a
personal, almighty God does not exist, that ethical principles are not
normative across cultural boundaries, etc. Or the unbeliever says that the
believer cannot know that the Bible is God's word, or that Jehovah exists, or
that Christ was His Son, etc. The Christian apologist must seek to uncover what
this unbeliever's personal convictions are regarding relevant metaphysical and
epistemological matters: e.g., what is the nature of things that are real, how
does the world operate, where did it come from, what is man's place in the
world, what is man's nature, are there moral or epistemological norms that are
not chosen by the individual, what are the criteria of truth, what are the
proper methods of knowing, is certainty possible, etc.? Once the believer has a
fairly good grasp of the general kind of worldview assumed (or explicitly
advocated) by the unbeliever, it should be compared to the worldview of the
Christian. The Christian can show that the particular objections raised by the
unbeliever would, within the Christian outlook, not prove to be
legitimate objections or intellectual problems at all. Thus, who really 'knows'
what he is talking about, the Christian or the non-Christian? The cogency of
each side's theory and practice of knowing must be tested within the broader
worldviews of which
94. Ibid.,
132-33 (emphasis added).
95. It
should be clear that what follows is a highly compressed and artificially
programmatic summary of what the procedure aims to be. In actual conversations,
the order in which things are discussed, the relevant illustrations, the
irrelevant sidebars, personal quirks, and unpredictable mental associations
will all contribute to a specific dialogue that will likely differ from other
ones and wander in many different directions.
p. 513:
they are a
part. The apologist explains how rationality, communication, meaning, science,
morality, and man's redemption and renewal are quite understandable,
meaningful, coherent, or intelligible within the biblical worldview - within
the framework of thinking God's thoughts after Him. The apologist then subjects
the unbelievers' worldview to an internal critique to show that it is (1)
arbitrary, and/or (2) inconsistent with itself, and/or (3) lacking the
preconditions for the intelligibility of knowledge (language, logic, science,
morality, redemption, etc.). Since that is the case, the unbeliever cannot
'know' the things that he urges against Christianity - indeed, he could not
know anything at all and loses all claim to rationality. Thus, the Christian
has proved the rationality and necessity of His scripturally based worldview.
The
specific questions or philosophical issues with which an apologist chooses to
press the unbeliever, and the particular aspects of experience that he selects
for application of these issues, are wide, varied, and not prescribed in
advance by the transcendental program of proving Christianity and disproving
any version of autonomous unbelief. Take anything about which the unbeliever is
committed or concerned - anything that seems uncontroversial and agreed upon by
the unbeliever and believer alike - and from that point show that it would be
unintelligible, meaningless, or incoherent if the unbeliever's worldview, instead
of the believer's, were true. The illustrations are as wide as human experience
- from the curing of polio, to the composiiing of an opera, to the condemnation
of police brutality, to the balancing of your checkbook. The philosophical
issues about which Van Til wrote were extensive and varied, and we should make
use of his arguments to prove the believer's epistemology and discredit the
unbeliever's. For example, we read about the problem of making sense of (or the
possibility of) predication (96), reason (97), explanation (98), interpretation
(99), learning (100),
96. Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 229; Common Grace, 49; The Protestant
Doctrine of Scripture, In Defense of the Faith, vol. 1 (Philadelphia:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1967), ii.
97. "Nature
and Scripture," in The Infallible Word, ed. N. B. Stonehouse and
Paul Woolley (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1946), 301; Common
Grace, 9-10; Introduction to Systematic Theology, 163; Case for
Calvinism, 142; Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought, 30, 97.
98. Defense
of the Faith, 259.
99. Protestant
Doctrine of Scripture, ii.
100. Case
for Calvinism, 132; 141, 148-49.
p. 514
certainty
(101), universals (102), possibility (103), cause, substance, being and purpose
(104), counting (105), coherence, unity, and system of experience or in a
conception of a universe (106), logic (107), individuating of facts (108),
unchanging natures or laws in a chance universe (109), uniformity (110),
science (111), connecting logic and facts or predication to reality (112),
avoiding contradictions (113), avoiding the irrationalism or skepticism that
arises from the tension between knowing discursively and knowing systematically
(114), etc.
In short,
the transcendental critique of non-believing worldviews aims to show that,
given their presuppositions, there could be no knowledge in any field
whatsoever (115) - that it would be impossible to find meaning or
intelligibility in anything at all. (116) As an example of this kind of
criticism directed at worldly systems of philosophy or autonomous thinking (at
its best), the reader can review chapter 5.3.
Once again
it is important to recall that Van Til's presuppositional apologetic does not
argue that unbelievers in fact do not count, reason, learn, communicate, engage
in science, explain, seek purpose and order, etc. Because they psychologically
know God, they are both concerned about the issues listed above and are to some
extent successful in negotiating or applying them to understand the world and
their personal experiences. The issue is not what unbelievers can do
intellectually, but whether they can give an account of it
(epistemologically) within their worldview. Their autonomous worldview takes
man's interpretation of the world to be "original" - to provide the
primary ordering of particulars or the "rationalizing" of (that is,
making systematic sense of) brute facts. But when the would-be autonomous
101. Common
Grace, 50; Introduction to Systematic Theology, 46.
102. Common
Grace, 5-6; Introduction to Systematic Theology, 46.
103. Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 114-15.
104. Common
Grace, 49, Defense of the Faith, 393.
105. Defense
of the Faith, 294, 354.
106. Ibid..,
66, 167, 258, 354, 393. Survey of Christian Epistemology, 218.
107. Common
Grace, 28; Defense of the Faith, 311, 393; Introduction to
Systematic Theology, 11; Case for Calvinism, 129; Protestant
Doctrine of Scripture, 62.
108. Defense
of the Faith, 267, 300, 393.
109. Introduction
to Systematic Theology, 40.
110. Defense
of the Faith, 120, 393; Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought, 31.
111. Common
Grace, 50; Defense of the Faith, 194, 195, 266, 268, 283-84, 285,
354.
112. Defense
of the Faith, 131, 164-165; Introduction to Systematic Theology, 39,
60.
113. Common
Grace, 9.
114. Defense
of the Faith, 137-38.
115. Ibid.,
266.
116. Survey
of Christian Epistemology, 18; Defense of the Faith, 164, 167, 264.
p. 515
man is put
at the center of the knowing process, and his presuppositions are consistently
driven to their logical outcome, he ultimately slips into subjectivism and
skepticism. The only alternative - the Christian worldview - places the
creative and providential activity of the triune God "in back of" all
of man's experiences and intellectual efforts, and that solves the fundamental
problems of epistemology that leave the unbelieving critic nowhere to stand.
(117) Only Christianity can account for or make sense of the intellectual
accomplishments of the unbeliever. The critic of Christianity has been secretly
or unknowingly presupposing the truth of the faith even as he argues against
it; his own arguments would be, upon analysis, meaningless unless they were
wrong and Christian theism were true.
Van Til
memorably encapsulated the essence of the transcendental argument in
apologetics in the "Credo" which he wrote for his Festschrift.
In his proposal for a "consistently Christian methodology of
apologetics," Van Til's suggestion was that "we claim... that
Christianity alone is reasonable for men to hold. It is wholly irrational to
hold any other position than that of Christianity. Christianity alone does not
slay reason on the altar of 'chance'." Accordingly, said Van Til, we must
reason by presupposition. And the powerful essence of that presuppositional
argument is just this: "The only 'proof' of the Christian position is that
unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of 'proving' anything
at all." (118) What the Christian sets forth as the Bible's worldview - as
authoritatively revealed by God - is the indispensable foundation for proof
itself - for the intelligibility of reason and experience, for the ability to
make sense of knowing anything. At this point, the unbeliever's choices are
either to acknowledge the truth revealed by God's word (and repent of his sins,
including intellectual autonomy) or to reject rationality itself. He had
demanded that the Christian "give a reason" for his firm conviction
("hope") about Christ and His word (cf. 1 Peter 3:15), and he must
now either accept the Christian's reasoning or retreat from the task and
normativity of "giving reasons" (for rationality, intelligibility,
meaning, logic, science, morality, etc.). In either case, the apologetical
encounter has been successful for, and has ended in favor of, the Christian
position.
117. Defense
of the Faith, 116, 165; Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought, 89; Common
Grace, 64.
118.
"My Credo," in
p. 516
THE MEANING
OF "TRANSCENDENTAL" METHOD (119)
One more
point should be noted on the question of method, namely, that from a certain
point of view, the method of implication may also be called a transcendental
method. We have already indicated that the Christian method uses neither
the inductive nor the deductive method as understood by the opponents of
Christianity, but that it has elements of both induction and deduction in it,
if these terms are understood in a Christian sense. Now when these two elements
are combined, we have what is meant by a truly transcendental argument. A truly
transcendental argument takes any fact of experience which it wishes to
investigate, and tries to determine what the presuppositions of such a fact
must be, in order to make it what it is. An exclusively deductive argument
would take an axiom such as that every cause must have an effect, and reason in
a straight line from such an axiom, drawing all manner of conclusions about God
and man. A purely inductive argument would begin with any fact and seek in a
straight line for a cause of such an effect, and thus perhaps conclude that
this universe must have had a cause. Both of these methods have been used, as
we shall see, for the defense of Christianity. Yet neither of them could be
thoroughly Christian unless they already presupposed God. Any method, as
was pointed out above, that does not maintain that not a single fact cane be
known unless it be that God gives that fact meaning, is an anti-Christian
method. On the other hand, if God is recognized as the only and final
explanation of any and every fact, neither the inductive nor the deductive
method can any longer be used to the exclusion of the other.
That this
is the case can best be realized if we keep in mind that the God we contemplate
is an absolute God. Now the only argument for an absolute God that holds
water is a transcendental argument. A deductive argument as such leads only
from one spot in the universe to another spot in the universe. So also an
inductive argument as such can never lead beyond the universe. In either case
there is no more than an infinite regression. In both cases it is possible for
the smart little girl to ask, "If God made the universe, who made
God?" and no answer is forthcoming. This answer is, for instance, a
favorite reply of the atheist debater, Clarence Darrow. But if it be said to
such opponents of Christianity that, unless there were an absolute God their
own questions and doubts would have no meaning at all, there is no argument in
return. There lies the issue. It is the firm conviction of every epistemologically
119.
Excerpts from Survey of Christian Epistemology, 10-12, 201-2 (emphasis
partly added). This passage that defines Van Til's message comes from his
earliest syllabus; it was not a later development of his thought.
p. 517:
self-conscious
Christian that no
human being can utter a single syllable, whether in negation or affirmation,
unless it were for God's existence. (120) Thus the transcendental argument
seeks to discover what sort of foundations the house of human knowledge must
have, in order to be what it is. It does not seek to find whether the
house has a foundation, but it presupposes that it has one...
It should
be particularly noted, therefore, that only a system of philosophy that takes
the concept of an absolute God seriously can really be said to be employing a
transcendental method. A truly transcendental God and a transcendental
method go hand in hand. It follows then that if we have been correct in our
contention that Hegelian Idealism does not believe in a transcendental God, it
has not really used the transcendental method as it claims it has.
Now at this
juncture it may be well to insert a brief discussion of the place of Scripture
in all this. The opponent of Christianity will long ago have noticed that we
are frankly prejudiced, and that the whole position is "biblicistic."
On the other hand, some fundamentalists may have feared that we have been
trying to build up a sort of Christian philosophy without the Bible. Now we may
say that if such be the case, the opponent of Christianity has sensed the
matter correctly. The position we have briefly sought to outline is frankly
taken from the Bible. And this applies especially to the central concept of
the whole position, viz., the concept of an absolute God. Nowhere else in human
literature, we believe, is the concept of an absolute God presented. And this
fact is once more intimately related to the fact that nowhere else is there a
conception of sin, such as that presented in the Bible. According to the Bible,
sin has set man at enmity against God. Consequently it has been man's endeavor
to get away from the idea of God, that is, a truly absolute God. And the best
way to do this was to substitute the idea of a finite God. And the best way to
accomplish this subordinate purpose was to do it by making it appear as though
an absolute God were retained. Hence the great insistence on the part of those
who are really anti-Christian, that they are Christian.
It thus
appears that we must take the Bible, its conception of sin, its conception of
Christ, and its conception of God and all that is involved in these concepts
together, or take none of them. So also it makes very little difference
whether we begin with the notion of an absolute God or with the no-
120. Van Til
is not making the metaphysical point here (true though it may be) that if God
did not really exist, then human beings would not actually have linguistic
abilities. His point is an epistemological one: God must be believed (presupposed,
made part of one's conceptual scheme) in order to make intelligible the
possibility and the actuality of human communication.
p. 518
tion of
an absolute Bible. The one is derived from the other. They are together
involved in the Christian view of life. Hence we defend all or we defend none. Only one absolute
is possible, and only one absolute can speak to us. Hence it must always be the
same voice of the same absolute, even though he seems to speak to us at
different places. The Bible must be true because it alone speaks of an absolute
God. And equally true is it that we believe in an absolute God because the
Bible tells us of one. (121)
And this
brings up the point of circular reasoning. The charge is constantly made that
if matters stand thus with Christianity, it has written its own death warrant
as far as intelligent men are concerned. Who wishes to make such a simple
blunder in elementary logic, as to say that we believe something to be true
because it is written in the Bible? Our answer to this is briefly that we
prefer to reason in a circle to not reasoning at all. We hold it to be true
that circular reasoning is the only reasoning that is possible to finite man.
The method of implication as outlined above is circular reasoning. Or we may
call it spiral reasoning. We must go round and round a thing to see more of
its dimensions and to know more about it, in general, unless we are larger than
that which we are investigating. Unless we are larger than God we cannot reason
about him any other way, than by a transcendental or circular argument. The
refusal to admit the necessity of circular reasoning is itself an evident token
of opposition to Christianity. Reasoning in a vicious circle is the only
alternative to reasoning in a circle as discussed above. (122)...
In this
respect the process of knowledge is a growth into the truth. For this reason we
have spoken of the Christian theistic method as the method of implication
into the truth of God. It is reasoning in a spiral fashion rather than in a
linear fashion. Accordingly, we have said that we can use the old terms
deduction and induction if only we remember that they must be thought of
121. CVT: In
some of his recent publications - particularly in his works De Heilige Schrift, 1966-1967 -
Dr. G. C. Berkouwer warns orthodox Christians against having a formal view of
Scripture. He stresses the fact that the content of biblical teaching and the
idea of the Bible are involved in one another. It is this point that the
syllabus made in 1939.
122. The
"circularity" of a transcendental argument is not at all the same as
the fallacious "circularity" of an argument in which the conclusion
is a restatement (in one form or another) of one of its premises. Rather, it is
the circularity involved in a coherent theory (where all the parts are
consistent with or assume each other) and which is required when one reasons
about a precondition for reasoning. Because autonomous philosophy does not
provide the preconditions for rationality or reasoning, its "circles"
are destructive of human thought - i.e., "vicious" and futile endeavors.
(Because there is more than one kind of "circularity," Van Til
sometimes repudiated and sometimes tolerated the notion that his apologetics
was circular - which has undoubtedly been confusion to his readers and
students.)
p. 519
as elements
in this one process of implication into the truth of God. If we begin the
course of spiral reasoning at any point in the finite universe, as we must
because that is the proximate starting point of all reasoning, we can call the
method of implication into the truth of God a transcendental method.
That is, we must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any
object of knowledge in order that it may be intelligible to us. It is not
as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of
the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further
conclusions. It is certainly true that if God has any significance for any
object of knowledge at all, the relation of God to that object of knowledge
must be taken into consideration from the outset. It is this fact that the
transcendental method seeks to recognize.
The charges
made against this type of reasoning we must turn upon those who made them. It
will be said of this type of reasoning that it introduces the subjective
element of belief in God, which all men do not share. Of this we can only say
that all men should share that belief, and before the fall of man into sin man
did have that belief. Belief in God is the most human attitude conceivable. It
is abnormal not to believe in God. We must therefore hold that only the
Christian theist has real objectivity, while the others are introducing false
prejudices, or subjectivity.
The charge
is made that we engage in circular reasoning. Now if it be called circular
reasoning when we hold it necessary to presuppose the existence of God, we are
not ashamed of it because we are firmly convinced that all forms of reasoning
that leave God out of account will end in ruin. Yet we hold that our
reasoning cannot fairly be called circular reasoning, because we are not
reasoning about and seeking to explain facts by assuming the existence and
meaning of certain other facts on the same level of being with the facts we are
investigating, and then explaining these facts in turn by the facts with which
we began. We are presupposing God, not merely another fact of the
universe...
Even in
paradise it was God's verbal self-disclosure, and the disclosure of his will
for man's activity in relation to the created cosmos, that was indispensable
for man's ability to identify any fact and to relate any fact properly to any
other fact. Applying this to the Scripture, it is but natural that we should
accept the Scripture testimony about itself. If we did anything else we would
not be accepting Scripture as absolute. The only alternative then to brining in
a God who testifies of himself and upon whose testimony we are wholly
dependent, is not to bring in God at all. And not to bring in God at all spells
nothing but utter ruin for knowledge. In that case knowledge may be said to be
reduces to the pass of drawing circles in a void. Hence we must return the
p. 520
charge
of circular reasoning to those who made it. On the other hand, we are happy to accept the
charge of circular reasoning. Our reasoning frankly depends upon the revelation
of God, whose "reasoning" is within the internal-eternal circularity
of the three persons of the Trinity. It is only if we frankly depend for the
validity of our reasoning upon this internal circular reasoning in the triune
God that we can escape trying in vain to reason in circles in a vacuum of pure
contingency.
The charge
has been made that it is an a priori procedure to bring in God at the
beginning of the process of knowledge. This too is a charge that acts as a
boomerang. A priori reasoning is reasoning that does not start with the facts. Now
antitheism has arbitrarily taken for granted that God is not a fact, and that
if he is a fact that fact does not have any bearing upon the other facts.
This we must hold to be an a priori procedure. We hold that the so-called
"facts" are wholly unintelligible unless the supreme fact of God be
brought into relation with them. We are willing to start with any fact as a
proximate starting point, but refuse to admit before the investigation has
begun that there can be no such fact as God.
Summing up,
we may observe that all the various methods of investigation that have been
advanced may be used theistically or they may be used antitheistically,
according as God is taken into or left out of consideration at the outset...
[A]ntitheistic thinking was constantly taking for granted that its position was
correct. It did hits by taking for granted that the object and subject of
knowledge exist apart from God and can come into fruitful relation with one
another without any reference to God. Therewith antitheistic thinking reduced
God, if he was later to be taken into consideration at all, to a
quantitative addition to man.
A SAMPLE
(123)
The
argument must be the same in principle with all the various forms of an
antitheistic speculation...
Naturally, the
main point in dispute is whether our opponents can get along without God.
All of our opponents have said in effect that human categories are ultimate.
With respect to all of them we could then ask what happens if they seek to face
the more ultimate questions of philosophy on this basis...
All of
these and many other nuances of modern thought and scientific method have this
in common - that they naively take for granted that the
123.
Excerpts from "A Sample of Christian Theistic Argument," chap. 16 in Survey
of Christian Epistemology, 210, 211, 215, 216-217, 218 (emphasis partly
added).
p. 521
"facts"
are there as ultimates from which we must begin our research. The object and the subject of
knowledge are taken for granted without the question of reference to God. It is
assumed, therefore, that human categories are in themselves quite able to
interpret reality...
We must
therefore briefly seek to understand what the consequences are if one takes
this position to the bitter end. First we should notice, however, that there
are all too many who are not willing to accept the responsibility for their
epistemological attitude. (124)...
Agnosticism
of the type criticized is characteristic of all the movements in physics,
biology, psychology, and philosophy spoken of above. Not all of them are
usually spoken of as agnostics, because many of them claim to know about finite
things even if they disclaim knowledge of ultimate things. But it is itself a
sign of agnosticism not to classify as agnostics not only all who disclaim
knowledge about ultimate reality, but also all those who claim to have
knowledge about finite matters without having knowledge about God. The
assumption of those who say they are not agnostic about finite things, but only
about God, is that finite things can be known apart from God. From the Christian
theistic point of view, such as claim knowledge of finite things and disclaim
knowledge of God are as much agnostics as those who disclaim knowledge of both.
This is involved in our argument which showed that to attempt to know a finite
object apart from God involves one in self-contradiction upon one's own
assumptions...
[We]
begin our argument against all of them on essentially the same point, that is, that they have taken for
granted that the object and the subject of knowledge exist and can come into
relation with one another without taking God into consideration. We cannot
agree with the attitude taken by Charles Harris that, since there has been a
reaction against some of the more extreme forms of materialism, etc., there is
now no serious opponent to Christianity in the field of philosophy today. He
holds that because the contingency of the universe has become "an
accepted philosophical doctrine" there is not much else to fear (cf. his Pro
Fide, p. xviii). We hold that if it is true that the contingency of the
universe is an established philosophical doctrine, then philosophy is as much
opposed to Christianity as ever Materialism was, since it then leaves God's
plan out of consideration.
If God
is left out of the picture it is up to the human mind to furnish the unity that
must bind together the diversity of factual existence. It will not do to think
of laws existing somehow apart from the mind. And even if this were possible it would not help
matters any, because even these laws would
124. See the
readings above on epistemological loafers and agnosticism.
p. 522
be thought
of as independent of God and as just there somehow. In other words, the only
alternative to thinking of God as the ultimate source of the unity of human
experience as it is furnished by laws or universals is to think that the unity
rests in a void. Every object of knowledge must, therefore, be thought of as
being surrounded by ultimate irrationality. It is this that is involved in the
position A. E. Taylor represents when he constantly avers that there is a surd
in everything historical or temporal, that is, in all factual existence. On the
other hand, if the more subjective position be taken, it is the human mind that
furnishes the universal element of experience, and the human mind must itself
be thought of as swimming in a void.
In the
second place, it should be noticed that if the object and the subject must both
be thought of as somehow being in the void, it is inconceivable that there
should be any relation of any sort between them. Aristotle admitted to being
baffled at the question of the infima
species, i.e., the relation of the individual to the lowest universal.
There he found ultimate mystery. On the one hand you cannot say that the
individual is subsumed under the species entirely, lest there be nothing but
species, and the whole individual disappear. On the other hand, you cannot have
complete individuality without bringing the individual into relation with
others. Aristotle therefore admitted that, as far as he could see, the relation
of the individual and species, or the relation of the fact to law, remained a
mystery. And since the day of Aristotle there has not been any advance made on
this score, because modern philosophy has continued to build upon the same
assumption that Greek philosophy build upon, namely that all things are at
bottom one and return unto one. If there is to be any relation between the one
and the many, it must be, according to all non-theistic thought, a relation of
identity, and if identity is seen to lead to the destruction of knowledge, the
diversity that is introduced is thought of as being ultimate. In other
words, according to all non-theistic thinking, the facts and the laws that are
supposed to bind the facts together into unity are first thought of as existing
independently of one another and are afterward patched together. It is taken
for granted that the temporal is the ultimate source of diversity. Accordingly,
Reality is said to be essentially synthetic. The real starting point is then an
ultimate plurality. And an ultimate plurality without an equally ultimate
unity will forever remain a plurality.
It is this
that is especially apparent in all forms of pragmatic thought. There the
necessity of having any such ultimate unity is openly denied. And the only way
we can meet the contention is to show that by denying ultimate unity they have
also denied to themselves the possibility of having a proximate unity. There is
no guarantee that the human mind can in any sense know reality that is near
unless it knows reality that is far away. For all I know, the
p. 523
next fact
that I must adjust to a previous fact is a fatal automobile accident. How then
do I know that it is not the most pragmatically valuable thing for me to know
whether the fact of death does not immediately connect me with another fact,
namely, the judgment?
It is clear
that upon pragmatic basis, and for that matter upon antitheistic basis in
general, there can be no object-object relation, i.e., there can be no
philosophy of nature so that the sciences become impossible, and no philosophy
of history, so that the past cannot be brought into relation with the present
nor the future with the present. Then there can be no subject-object
relation, so that even if it were conceivable that there were such a thing as
nature and history, I would be doomed to ignorance of it. In the third
place, there can be no subject-subject relation, so that even if there were
such a thing as nature and history, and even if I knew about it, I could
never speak to anyone else about it. There would be Babylonian confusion...
Our
conclusion then must be that the various devotees of the open universe, who
take for granted that the human mind can furnish all the universals that the
facts require, must be regarded as having reduced human experience to an
absurdity.
REASONING
BY PRESUPPOSITION (125)
These things
being as they are it will be our first task in this chapter to show that a
consistently Christian method of apologetic argument, in agreement with its own
basic conception of the starting point, must be by presupposition. To argue by
presupposition is to indicate what are the epistemological and metaphysical
principles that underlie and control one's method. The Reformed apologist will
frankly admit that his own methodology presupposes the truth of Christian
theism. Basic to all the doctrines of Christian theism is that of the
self-contained God, or, if we wish, that of the ontological trinity. It is this
notion of the ontological trinity that ultimately controls a truly Christian
methodology. Based upon this notion of the ontological trinity and consistent
with it, is the concept of the counsel of God according to which all things in
the created world are regulated. (126)
125. Defense
of the Faith, 116-120, 134-35. The reading selection, bearing the same
title as used here, first appeared in Van Til's early and main syllabus, Apologetics
(pp. 61ff.), from which it was reproduced in the chapter on "The Problem
of Method" in what has become his best-known publication, The Defense
of the Faith. It may deservedly be looked upon as the essence of his
instruction on how to defend the truth-claims of Christianity.
126. It is
imperative to bear in mind that Van Til described the presuppositional method
as working from the outset with the distinctive doctrines of Christian
p. 524
Christian
methodology is therefore based upon presuppositions that are quite the opposite
of those of the non-Christian. It is claimed to be of the very essence of any
non-Christian form of methodology that it cannot be determined in advance to
what conclusions it must lead. To assert, as the Chris-
theism
(e.g., the Trinity, divine providence). Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed
out that Van Til’s transcendental method is concrete, not abstract or formal.
He never offered to discuss with the unbeliever merely the worldview of a god
of some undetermined nature and character; rather, he always put forward the
specific and full worldview of biblical Christianity. That is why the syllabus Apologetics
and the book The Defense of the Faith both begin with detailed
statements of Christian theology. These statements were not intended simply as
a review, warming up to apologetics; they were for Van Til a defining part of
the apologetical task. Accordingly, his presuppositional method could not be
used in defense of “any other religion,” as many critics have mistakenly
suggested.
In dealing with
the advocates of other religions, the Christian apologist should use the
presuppositional method in the same way that he would use it with atheists and
materialists. That is, he makes an internal examination of the worldview that
is offered by whatever religious devotee he is having the dialogue with. The
fact that the opposing religionist speaks formally of “God” (or “gods”) is not
a difficulty here, for he must define his specific concept of deity. His deity
is not the Christian god, for Scripture says, “Their rock is not our Rock”
(Deut. 32:31). Recall the devastating prophetic critique of the heathen’s
lifeless idols, which are (contradictorily) under the control of those who bow
down to them. The use of religious vocabulary does not change the applicability
of the indirect method of disproving non-Christian presuppositions.
Most of the
unstudied and superficial comments by people about comparative religion – for
instance, that “all religions are alike” or “you can have your pick of sacred
books” – can be easily contradicted by the apologist. Indeed, if anybody is
tempted to be the spokesman and defender of “just any” non-Christian religion
(so as to silence the Christian apologetic), it should be politely observed
that the vast majority of the world’s religions cannot even offer
epistemological competition to the Christian worldview. There are indeed other
sacred books, but they are not at all like the Bible. An internal analysis of
the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of non-Christian religions
shows that they teach, metaphysically, that there is no god, or no personal
god, or no god who is omniscient, sovereign, etc. Accordingly, from an
epistemological perspective, these sacred books are not and cannot be anything
like what the Bible claims for itself, namely, to be the personal communication
and infallible verbal revelation from the only living, completely sovereign,
and all-knowing Creator. The other religious books on their own presuppositions,
give no reason to accept them as true or normative. And as for their own
worldviews, these books as pieces of literature can have no epistemological or
ethical authority. What they offer (when you can make sense of it at all) is
simply one opinion against another.
The
remaining world religions or cults that might seem at first to offer something
in competition with Christianity (namely, a personal deity and a verbal
revelation) are usually poor imitations of Christianity (using “borrowed capital”)
or Christian heresies (departing from biblical teaching in a crucial way).
Ordinarily, the best tactic is to reason with the advocates of these groups
from Scripture, refuting their errors from the Scripture itself. This amounts
to an internal
p. 525:
tian
apologist is bout to do if he is not to deny the very thing he is seeking to
establish, that the conclusion of a true method is the truth of Christian
theism is, from the point of view of the non-Christian, the clearest evidence
of authoritarianism. In spite of this claim to neutrality on the part of the
non-Christian the Reformed apologist must point out that every method, the
supposedly neutral one no less than any other, presupposes either the truth or
the falsity of Christian theism.
The method
of reasoning by presupposition may be said to be indirect rather than direct.
The issue between believers and non-believers in Christian theism cannot be
settled by a direct appeal to “facts” or “laws” whose nature and significance
is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate. The question is rather as
to what is the final reference-point required to make the “facts” and “laws”
intelligible. (127) The question is as to what the “facts”
critique of
the opposing worldview. For example, Sun Myung Moon
tries to authorize certain of his teachings by simply appealing to the Bible,
but he has no justification for doing so, since he rejects other teachings of
the Bible and refuses to grant its claim to plenary authority. Unless he
accepts the Bible’s plenary authority, no simple appeal to what it says (that
is, without outside warrant) can authorize the point he is attempting to make.
There must be some outside warrant for it, and so the apologist will then want
to examine the credentials of this extrabiblical
authority.
In some
people’s minds, the Muslim faith presents the greatest challenge to
presuppositional apologetics because, it is imagined, Islam can counter each
move in the Christian’s argument. But this is a mistaken notion. For example,
Islam teaches unitarianism and fatalism, has
different moral concepts, and lacks redemption. It can be critiqued internally
on its own presuppositions. Take an obvious example. The Koran acknowledges the
words of Moses, David, and Jesus to be the words of prophets sent by Allah;
therefore, the Koran, on its own terms, is refuted because of its
contradictions with earlier revelation (cf. Deut. 13:1-5). Sophisticated
theologies offered by Muslim scholars interpret the Koran (cf. 42:11) as
teaching the transcendence (tanzih) of
unchanging Allah in such an extreme fashion that no human language (derived
from changing experience) can positively and appropriately describe Allah – in
which case the Koran rules out what it claims to be. The Islamic worldview
teaches that God is holy and just with respect to sin, but that (unlike the
Bible – see the words of Moses, David, and Jesus) there can indeed be
“salvation” where guilt remains unremitted by the
shedding of the blood of a substitute for the sinner. The legalism of Islam
(i.e., good works are weighed against bad) does not address this problem
because bad works remain on one’s record in the very sight of Allah (who
supposedly cannot tolerate sin, but must punish it). Compare my lectures on
Islam and the debate (at
127. Van
Til’s apologetic is often set forth and illustrated in terms of epistemological
and metaphysical issues, but a very simple and understandable example of it can
be given in the area of ethics. In my experience, the most popular argu-
p. 526:
and
"laws" really are. Are they what the non-Christian methodology
assumes that they are? Are they what the Christian theistic methodology
presupposes they are?
The answer
to this question cannot be finally settled by any direct discussion of
"facts." It must, in the last analysis, be settled indirectly. The
Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent,
assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument's sake, in order to
show him that on such a position the "facts" are not facts and the
"laws" are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place
himself upon the Christian position for argument's sake in order that he may be
shown that only upon such a basis do "facts" and "laws"
appear intelligible.
To admit
one's own presuppositions and to point out the presuppositions of others is
therefore to maintain that all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular
reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusion are always
involved in one another.
Let us say
that the Christian apologist has placed the position of Christian theism before
his opponent. Let us say further that he has pointed out that his own method of
investigation of reality presupposes the truth of his position. This will
appear to his friend whom he is seeking to win to an acceptance of the
Christian position as highly authoritarian and out of accord with the proper
use of human reason. What will the apologist do next? If he is a Roman Catholic
or an Arminian he will tone down the nature of Christianity
ment urged
against Christianity is "the problem of evil." Unbelievers declare
that the Christian worldview is logically inconsistent since it holds that God
is powerful enough to prevent evil, that God is good enough not to want evil,
and yet that evil exists. Suppose one asks, "How can you believe in a God
who permits child molestation to take place?" The believer and the
unbeliever apparently agree that molesting innocent children is morally
outrageous and objectively wrong. But Van Til would ask what "reference
point" (final standard, authority) is necessary to make this moral
judgment "intelligible." Surely no autonomous or unbelieving
presupposition or fundamental outlook will suffice, since each one, upon
analysis, reduces to subjectivism in ethics, in which case child molestation
could not be condemned as absolutely or objectively immoral, but simply taken
as generally not preferred. Notice also that the usual presentation of the
apparent contradiction within the Christian premises about God omit the equally
important premise that God always has a morally sufficient reason for the
suffering and evil that He foreordains. With the addition of that biblical
premise, there is no logical problem of evil left. Everyone struggles psychologically
to take God on His word here, to be sure, but that is different from there
being an intellectual incongruity within the Christian faith. Unbelievers will
not give up their psychological resistance to that premise until God offers His
rationale for evil to them for inspection and approval - which is subtle but
incontestable evidence that they beg the question, holding that God cannot be
proven to be the final authority until they are first acknowledged as
the final authority.
p. 527:
to some
extent in order to make it appear that the consistent application of his
friend's neutral method will lead to an acceptance of Christian theism after
all. But if he is a Calvinist this way is not open to him. He will point out
that the more consistently his friend applies his supposedly neutral method the
more certainly he will come to the conclusion that Christian theism is not
true. Roman Catholics and Arminians, appealing to the
"reason" of the natural man as the natural man himself interprets his
reason, namely as autonomous, are bound to use the direct method of approach to
the natural man, the method that assumes the essential correctness of a
non-Christian and non-theistic conception of reality.
The
Reformed apologist, on the other hand, appealing to that knowledge of the true
God in the natural man which the natural man suppresses by means of his
assumption of ultimacy, will also appeal to the
knowledge of the true method which the natural man knows but suppresses. The
natural man at bottom knows that he is the creature of God. He knows also that
he is responsible to God. He knows that he should live to the glory of God. He
knows that in all that he does he should stress that the field of reality which
he investigates has the stamp of God's ownership upon it. But he suppresses his
knowledge of himself as he truly is. He is the man with the iron mask. A true
method of apologetics must seek to tear off that iron mask.
The Roman
Catholic and the Arminian make no attempt to do so. They even flatter its
wearer about his fine appearance. In the introductions of their books on
apologetics Arminian as well as Roman Catholic apologists frequently seek to
set their "opponents" at ease by assuring them that their method, in
its field, is all that any Christian could desire. In contradistinction from
this, the Reformed apologist will point out again and again that the only
method that will lead to the truth in any field is that method which recognizes
the fact that man is a creature of God, that he must therefore seek to think
God's thoughts after him.
It is not
as though the Reformed apologist should not interest himself in the nature of
the non-Christian's method. On the contrary he should make a critical analysis
of it. He should, as it were, join his "friend" in the use of it. But
he should do so self-consciously with the purpose of showing that its most
consistent application not merely leads away from Christian theism but in
leading away from Christian theism leads to destruction of reason and science
as well. (128)
An
illustration may indicate more clearly what is meant. Suppose we think of a man
made of water in an infinitely extended and bottomless ocean of
128.
Emphasis added.
p. 528:
water.
Desire to get out of water, he makes a ladder of water. He sets this ladder
upon the water and against the water and then attempts to climb out of the
water. So hopeless and senseless a picture must be drawn of the natural man's
methodology based as it is upon the assumption that time or chance is ultimate.
On his assumption even the laws of logic which he employs are products of
chance. The rationality and purpose that he may be searching for are still
bound to be products of chance. So then the Christian apologist, whose position
requires him to hold that Christian theism is really true and as such must be
taken as the presupposition which alone makes the acquisition of knowledge in
any field intelligible, must join his "friend" in his hopeless
gyrations so as to point out to him that his efforts are always in vain.
It will
then appear that Christian theism, which was first rejected because of its
supposed authoritarian character, is the only position which gives human reason
a field for successful operation and a method of true progress in knowledge.
Two remarks
may here be made by way of meeting the most obvious objections that will be
raised to this method of the Reformed apologist. The first objection that
suggests itself may be expressed in the rhetorical question "Do you mean
to assert that non-Christians do not discover truth by the methods that they
employ?" The reply is that we mean nothing so absurd as that. The
implication of the method here advocated is simply that non-Christians are
never able and therefore never do employ their own methods consistently.
Says A. E.
Taylor in discussing the question of the uniformity of nature, "The
fundamental thought of modern science, at any rate until yesterday, was that
there is a universal reign of law throughout nature. Nature is rational in the
sense that it has everywhere a coherent pattern which we can progressively
detect by the steady application of our own intelligence to the scrutiny of
natural processes. Science has been built up all along on the basis of this
principle of the uniformity of nature, and the principle is one which science
itself has no means of demonstrating. No one could possibly prove its truth to
an opponent who seriously disputed it. For all attempts to produce 'evidence'
for the 'uniformity of nature' themselves presuppose the very principle they
are intended to prove. (129) Our argument as over against this would be that
the existence of the God of Christian theism and the conception of his counsel
as controlling all things in the universe is the only presupposition which
can account for the uniformity of nature which the scientist needs.
But the
best and only possible proof for the existence of such a God is that
129. CVT: Idem
[Does God Exist? (London: Macmillan, 1947)], p. 2.
p. 529:
his
existence is required for the uniformity of nature and for the coherence of all
things in the world. We cannot prove the existence of beams underneath
the floor if by proof we mean that they must be ascertainable in the way that
we can see the chairs and tables of the room. But the very idea of a floor as
the support of tables and chairs requires the idea of beams that are
underneath. But there would be no floor if no beams were underneath. (130)
Thus there
is absolutely certain proof for the existence of God and the truth of Christian
theism. Even non-Christians presuppose its truth while they verbally reject
it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account
for their own accomplishments… (131)
The true
Christian apologist has his principle of discontinuity; it is expressed in his
appeal to the mind of God as all-comprehensive in knowledge because
all-controlling in power. He holds his principle of discontinuity then, not at
the expense of all logical relationship between facts, but because of the
recognition of his creaturehood. His principle of
discontinuity is therefore the opposite of that of irrationalism without being
that of rationalism. The Christian also has his principle of continuity. It is
that of the self-contained God and his plan for history. His principle of
continuity is therefore the opposite of that of rationalism without being that
of irrationalism.
Conjoining
the Christian principle of continuity and the Christian principle of
discontinuity we obtain the Christian principle of reasoning by presupposition.
It is the actual existence of the God of Christian theism and the infallible
authority of the Scripture which speaks to sinners of this God that must be
taken as the presupposition of the intelligibility of any fact in the world.
This does
not imply that it will be possible to bring the whole debate about Christian
theism to full expression in every discussion of individual historical fact.
Nor does it imply that the debate about historical detail is unimportant. It
means that no Christian apologist can afford to forget the claim of his system
with respect to any particular fact. He must always maintain that the
"fact" under discussion with his opponent must be what Scripture says
it is, if it is to be intelligible as a fact at all… It is only as
manifestations of that system that they are what they are. If the apologist
does not present them as such he does not present them for what they are.
130. In
using this particular illustration, Van Til was envisioning home construction
as it was familiar to folks living on the East Coast. There are also houses
built without elevated foundations or basements. The analogy is thus limited,
but it still makes the point if the assumption about houses is granted for the
sake of getting the point. This kind of house requires beams under the floor,
and we readily accept that they exist, even though we do not observe them in
the way that we observe that there are tables and chairs in the room.
131.
Emphasis added.
Transcribed by Dawson Bethrick
E-mail: sortion@hotmail.com