Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism: The
Uniformity of Nature
The following article was the third of six installments of a response to questions posed by Christian apologist Dustin Segers to non-Christians, which I posted on my blog in April-May 2012. Apparently presuming that his questions were stumpers for non-Christians, I realized that many non-Christians fall for the presuppositionalists’ interrogative traps since they, like Christians themselves, often have woefully deficient levels of understanding when it comes to, among other things, epistemological issues like induction. So I decided to take up the task of addressing Segers’ questions myself. Segers’ questions, which can be found here, are as follows:
1. Truth - I asked, "What is truth in your wworldview? What's your definition of 'truth'?"
2. Logic - I asked, "If you believe that only matter exists, (a)
how do you account for the immaterial, universal, propositional, immaterial
laws of logic given your philosophical materialism apart from an appeal to God
and (b) how to you make sense out of our obligation to be rational?"
3. Science - "How do you answer the problem of induction from a
secular perspective?"
4. Morality - "How do you account for objective morality without
God?"
I presented my answers to these questions in a series of six installments on my blog, Incinerating Presuppositionalism. They can be accessed here:
1. Answering
Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism,
Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth – posted April 7, 2012
2. Answering
Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism,
Part II: The Nature of Logic – posted April 8, 2012
3a. Answering
Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism,
Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature – posted
April 12, 2012
3b. Answering
Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism,
Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction – posted
April 15, 2012
4a. Answering
Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism,
Part IVa: Objective Morality – posted May 12,
2012
4b. Answering
Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism,
Part IVb: Collectivism, Evil and Slavery – posted
May 19, 2012
In response to Segers’ question 3 regarding science, I decided to devote two separate installments addressing distinct but related matters. The first of these installments, Part IIIa, which is presented below, deals with the issue of the uniformity of nature specifically, since this is an area of inquiry on which discussions with presuppositionalists typically focus.
The second of these two installments addressing Segers’ question on science, Part IIIb, which is also available here, takes a closer look at induction as an epistemological process, specifically in light of the theory of concepts which Ayn Rand developed and presented in her book Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.
* * *
Let us now consider his third question:
3. Science - "How do you answer the problem
of induction from a secular perspective?"
Typically presuppositionalists
bundle the problem of induction with questions about the uniformity of nature,
and often give the impression of believing that satisfying those questions will
be sufficient in answering the problem of induction.
Of course, this is not the case. The uniformity of nature is a metaphysical
concern (since nature exists independent of consciousness), while the problem
of induction is primarily an epistemological matter (since induction is a form
of cognitive activity). But I’m happy to explore all of these issues, probably
well beyond Segers’ own comfort level.
Because Segers’ question raises issues in two
distinct general categories – namely metaphysics and epistemology – I will
break up my response to this question into two separate blog entries, the first
devoted to the uniformity of nature, the second to the problem of induction as
the Scottish philosopher David Hume informed it.
The Uniformity of Nature
In regard to the uniformity of nature, presuppositionalists
usually like to challenge non-believers to “account for” the uniformity of
nature in a manner that is consistent with their non-Christian worldview,
implying that such a feat is impossible. Regardless of
specifically how we might articulate a definition of uniformity as it applies
in this question (on this, see below), the first point to make note of in
response to this line of inquiry is the fact that the uniformity we observe in
nature is not a product of conscious activity, but is an inherent
fact of existence which obtains independent of any conscious activity. The
uniformity of nature is something we discover, first implicitly merely
by perceiving, and then formally by means of conceptualizing what we perceive.
It is not something we impose on nature by an act of will or wishing,
nor is it something that results from our cognition, our believing, our
denials, our wishing, our imagining, etc. Nature is thus inherently
uniform.
This means that the uniformity we discover in nature is not a product of
some prior activity of any kind, whether conscious or otherwise. To suppose
that the uniformity of nature is an effect of some prior cause
would commit the fallacy of the stolen concept, for it would need to presume
the uniformity of the nature of the agent allegedly responsible for causing
uniformity in nature. It would need to assume that causality as such is uniform
prior to nature being uniform, when causality itself is part of nature. Recognizing
that nature is inherently uniform avoids this fallacy and commits no
others. For instance, it does not beg the question, as presuppositionalists
will likely contend in rehearsed fashion, since it is not an attempt to prove
a conclusion by means of an inference which assumes the truth of that
conclusion. We will shortly see that “uniformity” denotes facts about existence
which are available to us as a comprehensive, inescapable integration of the
Objectivist axioms, whose truths are perceptually self-evident and thus do not
rest on inferences from prior facts. Indeed, there could be nothing more
fundamental than existence.
So what do we mean by the phrase, “the uniformity of nature”? I have explored
this matter already in my blog entry The
Uniformity of Nature, where I examine several presuppositionalist
conceptions of what this means, and contrast them with the objective view on
the matter. I quote from my discussion of what it means to say nature is
uniform:
Peikoff explains what is meant by the concept
‘nature’ as follows:
What is nature? Nature is existence—the
sum of that which is. It is usually called “nature” when we think of it as a
system of interconnected, interacting entities governed by law. So “nature”
really means the universe of entities acting and interacting in accordance with
their identities. (The
Philosophy of Objectivism, (1976) Lecture 2)
“Nature is existence,” says Peikoff. And he is right to say this. The uniformity
of nature, then, is existence being itself. As Rand
succinctly put it, “Existence is Identity” (Atlas Shrugged, Galt’s
Speech). Nature is uniform with itself, since to exist is for
something to be itself. If A exists, it must be A.
The uniformity of nature, then, is
essentially the applicability of the axiom of existence to all of reality and
the absolute (i.e., exceptionless) concurrence of
identity with existence. Both of these aspects of the uniformity of nature are
undeniable – that is, they cannot be denied without contradicting oneself.
Since reality is the realm of existence, the axiom of existence
necessarily applies to all of reality. Since reality is the realm of existence,
existence and reality are concurrent absolutely - i.e., without
exception.
Since to exist is to be something, if something
exists, it is itself, it has identity, it has a
nature. There’s nothing to gain by appealing to non-existence to “explain” the
uniformity of nature, since there is no “non-existence” to appeal to in the
first place. As Objectivism puts it, “existence exists – and only existence
exists” (Leonard Peikoff, “The Analytic-Synthetic
Dichotomy,” Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 109).
Contrast this view with that espoused by the Christian worldview. Christianity,
to the extent that it can be said to affirm the uniformity of nature, makes the
uniformity of nature out to be a product of conscious activity. Some act
of consciousness is said to be responsible for putting the uniformity we
observe into nature; without that conscious activity, nature would be an
unpredictable realm of random chaos.
Dustin Segers’ own fellow apologist, Sye Ten Bruggencate, has affirmed
this view explicitly, namely that the uniformity of nature is a product of
conscious activity. On the blog An
Atheist Viewpoint, I had asked Bruggencate the
following question:
Do you think the uniformity of nature is
caused by some form of conscious activity? Yes or no?
In response to this question, Bruggencate
offered a terse, affirming answer:
Yes
When apologists raise the uniformity of nature as
a debating point, it is important to get them to clarify from the outset
whether or not they think the uniformity we observe in nature is a product of conscious
action. It’s quite possible that apologists have not considered the matter from
this explicit perspective before, so they may be reluctant to give an answer
without hesitation or equivocation, especially if they sense the obvious
subjectivism of such a position. (Indeed, Bruggencate
resisted answering this question for quite a while before giving his
syllable-deficient response.)
The difference between the Objectivist view and the Christian view on the
uniformity of nature, then, is the difference between objectivity and
subjectivism. Objectivism affirms an explicitly objective view of the
uniformity of nature, making it unequivocally clear that the uniformity we
observe in nature is not a product of conscious activity, but in fact is an
inherent aspect of reality which obtains independent of any action of
consciousness. Opposed to this view is that represented by Christianity, which
explicitly bases the uniformity of nature on the conscious activity of some
knowing subject, albeit one which is accessible only by the imagination.
In other words, some subject of awareness is thought to hold
metaphysical primacy over nature such that nature will be uniform so long as
the subject wills it. Hence the Christian view of the uniformity of nature is a
form of subjectivism.
It is hard to see how presuppositionalists could
think that they might make apologetic gains by raising the uniformity of nature
as a debating point, unless they either never thought about their position
explicitly, or they hope their non-believing opponents would not raise the
question of whether or not nature’s uniformity obtains independent of conscious
activity. Curiously, while it is indisputable that the assumption that nature’s
uniformity is a product of some act of will is indeed lurking amongst the
underlying presuppositions of the apologist’s overall worldview, defenders of
the Christian worldview present no arguments to validate this assumption. But
we should not doubt for a second that this assumption is present in their position,
and that this view is expressed in the Christian bible.
In Pushing the Antithesis (p. 195), Greg Bahnsen
cites three verses from the New Testament to document the biblical view of the
uniformity of nature. They are: Ephesians 1:11, Colossians 1:16-17, and Hebrews
1:3. “These verses,” says Bahnsen,
“account for the uniformity of nature” (thus giving us an example of what
passes for an “account” among presuppositionalists).
Here they are in their full glory:
Ephesians 1:11: “in whom also we were made
a heritage, having been foreordained according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his will;”
Colossians 1:16-17: “[16] for in him were
all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and
things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all
things have been created through him, and unto him; [17] and he is before all
things, and in him all things hold together.”
Hebrews 1:3: “who being the effulgence of
his glory, and the very image of his substance, and upholding all things by the
word of his power, when he had made purification of sins, sat down on the right
hand of the Majesty on high;”
Bahnsen focuses on certain elements embedded within these
verses (while the verses from both Ephesians and Colossians are themselves
embedded in massive run-on sentences that would make the most laidback writing
teacher blush with embarrassment). These elements are basically phrases stated
in passing which assert the Christian god’s guiding hand behind the workings of
the universe, characterizing the Christian god as a micromanager busily toiling
over every detail of every aspect of the “created realm,” making sure all
outcomes conform to its ultimate desires. Thus the Christian god is likened to a cartoonist
creating a zany world of appearances and bizarre happenings, or a voyeuristic
computer programmer controlling enormously complex simulation software a la The
Matrix movie franchise.
The passages’ dependence on the reader’s imagination is thick throughout, since
of course no one can actually witness the Christian god “upholding” or
“sustaining” the uniformity which we do witness in nature. We have to imagine
it in order to think it, and so this imagining would have to come before one
could try to believe it. But either this does not bother
Christians, or they simply do not realize that their faith is seated firmly in
the fantasies of an active imagination.
The authors of these passages want to cover all bases, and therefore make sure
their god’s relationship to what believers confessionally
call “the created realm” is characterized in terms of a variety of
orientations, including temporal, proximal, purposive and internal relations.
For instance, according to the passage which Bahnsen
quotes from Colossians, the believer is to imagine that “all things have been
created through” the Christian god, “in” the Christian god, and also “unto” it;
that the Christian god’s “Son” is “before all things” and that “all things hold
together” in this being. Bahnsen likewise puts great
stock in the Ephesians passage, which holds that the Christian god (as
“Christ”) “worketh all things after the counsel of
his will.” The Hebrews verse makes similarly explicit overture to the primacy
of the will of the Christian god over the realm of facts, stating that its
abilities include “upholding all things by the word of his power.”
So there is biblical evidence after all that the Christian worldview characterizes
the uniformity of nature as, at the very least, a product of the Christian
god’s conscious activity.
It is at times unclear whether or not presuppositionalists
think we can discover their god’s “sustaining” activity in imposing uniformity
on nature through observing nature itself (so-called “general revelation”) or
specifically by appeal to “Scripture.” Brian Knapp, for instance, in his paper
titled “Induction and the Unbeliever,” makes the following point for presuppositional apologetics:
…consider the case where we accept the
Bible’s teaching on God as creator and sustainer, but choose to leave out God’s
desire to reveal himself to us through his creation. In this case, although the
universe has been created and sustained in a uniform manner, there would be no
reason to think that we could ever know this fact. It is only by presupposing
all that the Bible has to say about God, ourselves, the universe around us, and
how they all interrelate that we have a meaningful answer to the problem at hand.
(The Portable Presuppositionalist, p. 133)
This proposal leaves the matter rather ambiguous
whether or not the author thinks we can discover facts in the universe, apart
from the influence of “Scripture,” which point to its observed uniformity
originating in the activity of a supernatural consciousness. On the one hand,
Knapp refers to his god’s “desire to reveal himself to us through his creation”
– which implies he believes that we might be able to make such discoveries
about the uniformity of nature being a product of conscious activity by looking
at nature apart from the influence of biblical texts (since “his creation”
presumably refers to nature itself). On the other hand, what Knapp’s scenario
involves “leaving out” is this alleged “desire” on the part of his god “to
reveal” itself to human beings, and yet it is out of “the Bible’s teaching on
God as creator and sustainer” that Knapp’s proposal for consideration has us
“leave” that alleged desire “out.” In other words, where would one learn about this
“desire” allegedly belonging to the Christian god to reveal itself to human
thinkers, if not in the bible (“Scripture”) itself? Although ambiguous
statements like this are not uncommon, it does after mulling them around indeed
seem that even presuppositionalists themselves would
concede that it would not be possible to infer the existence of a supernatural
agent “sustaining” the uniformity of nature through some mental process apart
from the suggestions and influence of the Christian storybook.
In any case, since on the Christian view, nature is not inherently
uniform, it leaves us with the only possible supposition on the matter: according
to Christianity, nature is not actually uniform to begin with. On the Christian
view, the natural realm is essentially formless, identity-less, nature-less,
and consequently it requires some magic consciousness to come along and give it
form, identity, nature, essentially by wishing.
This conscious being is imagined as having the power to make its wishes
automatically become fact, and believers will not allow any supposition which
suggests that its wishful powers are constrained in any manner against this by
some external factor which limits its activity. The size, shape and nature of
the universe are the result of unbridled supernatural whim let loose on it.
But let’s step back a bit and widen our lens here. Note that Christians who raise
the question of the uniformity of nature imply that they believe nature really
is uniform, and go on to assert that “only” the Christian worldview can
“account for” this, namely by assuming that nature is not inherently uniform
and by asserting that their god consciously imposes uniformity on nature by
some mysterious power of will. When asked
whether or not he thinks the universe is “truly uniform,” for instance, Sye Ten Bruggencate answered with
an unqualified “Yes.” Of course, by affirming that the universe is “truly
uniform,” Bruggencate implies that it is absolutely
uniform, unless of course he rejects the view that truth is absolute. I’m glad
this isn’t my problem!
At any rate, that nature is initially presumed by the general populace to be
uniform in the first place, is vital to the presuppositionalist approach of challenging the
non-believer to account for the presuppositions of science, since non-believers
frequently appeal to science in defense of their atheism. The presuppositionalist seeks to execute a controlled
demolition of the very ground upon which non-believers build their worldview
and from which they criticize the religious view of the world. In this way they
are essentially out to destroy the non-believer’s foundations of thought,
regardless of what they may be (whether or not those foundations are true
is not a concern for the apologist; they are assumed to be false by virtue of
the non-believer’s rejection of Christianity, or if their truth is granted,
they are said to point to Christianity and are only being “borrowed” by the
non-Christian) in order to create a vacuum in the non-believer’s cognition into
which the apologist can insert his god-belief as the element that’s been
missing all along.
And indeed, presuppositionalists acknowledge the
dependence of science on the uniformity of nature. Greg Bahnsen,
for instance, tells us:
Science is absolutely dependent upon this uniformity
because without it we could not infer from past events what we can expect under
like circumstances in the future. Physical science absolutely requires the
ability to predict the future action of material entities. Scientific
experimentation, theorizing, and prediction would be impossible were nature
non-uniform. Scientific investigation is only possible in an orderly, rational,
coherent, unified system. (Pushing the Antithesis, p. 187)
Similarly, presuppositionalist
Brian Knapp writes:
Ask yourself this question: what must be
true in order for inductive reasoning to be a meaningful process? What is it
that is foundational to the ability to make generalizations about particular
observations, and then proceed as if those generalizations have any applicability
to that which is yet to be experienced?
There is at least one necessary
precondition: nature must be uniform. Nature must proceed to operate according
to the same laws it has operated according to in the past – laws which
determine the effects which arise from a given cause or set of causes. After
all, if there are no laws according to which the universe operates, then it is
not reasonable to expect that any cause/effect relationship I have observed in
the past will repeat itself in the future[5] since these relationship are
contingent upon these very laws. (“Induction and the Unbeliever,” The
Portable Presuppositionalist, pp. 121-122)
Presuppositionalists essentially argue that the uniformity
which we observe in nature is evidence of the Christian god. As Bahnsen goes on to explain:
The uniformity of nature is perfectly
compatible… with the Christian worldview. The absolute, all-creating, sovereignly-governing God reveals to us in Scripture that
we can count on regularities in the world. The Bible teaches us that the sun
will continue to measure time for us on the earth (Gen. 1:14-19; Eccl. 1:5;
Jer. 33:20), that seasons will come and go uniformly (Gen. 8:22; Ps. 74:17),
that planting and harvest cycles may be expected (Jer. 5:24; Mark 4:26-29), and
so forth. Because of this God-governed regularity in nature, the scientific
enterprise is possible and even fruitful. (Op. cit., pp. 194-195)
These sources plainly tell us that Christians
subscribe to the uniformity of nature, that science
necessarily depends on nature being uniform, and that only Christianity can
“account for” this. They seem to offer no word on whether or not they will
allow the view that the uniformity of nature to be discoverable simply by
looking at nature, or if they think one needs to consult the bible to know this
in the first place.
Ironically, there seems to be little uniformity among Christians on a more
fundamental matter, namely whether or not nature is uniform to begin with. The
sources cited in the foregoing have consistently affirmed that nature is in
fact uniform. One source affirmed that nature is truly uniform (implying
that it is therefore absolutely uniform; another emphasized science’s
“absolute dependence” on the uniformity of nature; another affirms that nature
being uniform is a “necessary precondition” for any inductive generalization;
and yet another baldly states that “the uniformity of nature is perfectly
compatible… with the Christian worldview.”
But internet apologist Steve Hays seems to disagree with the view that
Christianity holds that nature is uniform. By contrast, Hays states (referring
to Christians as a whole):
We don’t subscribe to the uniformity of
nature. (The problem
of induction)
Hays contrasts the uniformity of nature with “ordinary
providence,” which, he says, “allows for miracles.” For Hays, it’s not enough
merely to observe “natural regularities.” No, the Christian needs a
supernatural authority to guarantee them (allowing for the exception of
miracles, of course), for “that’s the kind of world which God made for us to
inhabit” – an allegation whose truth itself cannot be discovered by observing
reality. Of course, without the uniformity of nature, where does that leave
science? As we saw above, presuppositionalist guru
Greg Bahnsen himself affirmed that “[s]cience is absolutely dependent upon this uniformity because
without it we could not infer from past events what we can expect under like
circumstances in the future” (Pushing the Antithesis, p. 187). So the
more Christianity’s explicitly subjective conception of the universe and what
is commonly taken as uniformity in nature is endorsed, the more science is
shown the proverbial door.
Since the uniformity of nature is pushed aside in favor of “ordinary
providence” in order to “allow for miracles,” it should be noted that the
Christian doctrine of miracles only causes havoc with the view that nature is
uniform. Greg Bahnsen tell us that
Miracles, by definition, are rare
divine, particular interventions in nature that are appropriately called in
Scripture “signs” or “wonders” due to their overriding natural law. (Op. cit.,
p. 187n.1)
On the Christian view, then, since miracles are a
distinctive aspect of the Christian worldview (“miracles are at the heart of
the Christian position” – Cornelius Van Til, The
Defense of the Faith, p. 27; quoted in full here),
natural law can be “overridden,” namely by some act of consciousness (e.g.,
wishing, imagining, commanding, wanting, etc.). Some, like Hays, I suspect,
would probably even reject this characterization, since it implies that
uniformity is the norm, while they would maintain that “ordinary providence” is
the norm. But either way, on the Christian view, not only is nature not inherently
uniform, but any uniformity that we believe we observe can be turned on and off
at will by the ruling consciousness. This can only mean that nature is not reliably
uniform, it is not absolutely uniform, it is not truly uniform.
Indeed, if the regularities we seem to observe obtain over a period of time,
it’s really just by chance - from the human perspective anyway – that
the ruling consciousness has chosen not to intervene miraculously and interrupt
those regularities from persisting.
Of course, some would argue that miracles do not “by definition” involve
“overriding” or violating natural law (see for example Steve Hays’ blog Breaking the laws of nature). So I admit that it’s hard
to find consistency within the Christian position. It seems that, because of
various stubborn ambiguities within the bible itself and in formalized
playbooks, not to mention the underlying contradictory nature of the Christian
worldview itself, Christian apologists have a hard time squaring the positions
they affirm with one another. It seems this would not be the case if in fact
they were all being guided by some supernatural “spirit” which, in the words of
internet apologist Joshua Whipps (of the Choosing Hats crowd), is
the equivalent of having the author of the
book standing over your shoulder, and correcting your faulty understandings,
and continually adjusting your noetic “issues” as He
also works to sanctify you in obedience to that revealed Word. (Debate Transcript)
Perhaps Whipps, who
posts under the moniker “RazorsKiss,” is right when
he tells us that
Inconsistency is the sign of a failed
argument. (See his 30 Mar ’12 comment on this
blog entry.)
There is a point, however, at which both the
Christian understanding of the uniformity of nature and the doctrine of
miracles do find agreement, and that is in their presupposition of the primacy
of consciousness. Any uniformity which we observe in nature, even if it is only
“generally” uniform, and the miracles which the Christian storybook affirm as
actual historical events, are all the result of an act of consciousness which
has the power to conform existence to its whims. In this sense, Hays’ affirmed
view above seems the most internally consistent so far. This is consistent with
the
cartoon universe premise of theism: any regularity we see in a cartoon is
just as much a result of the cartoonist’s whims as are the absurdities which
contrast against those regularities.
Of course, just in saying that any of this is true, the Christian presuppositionally contradicts himself, for the very
concept of truth necessarily presupposes the primacy of existence, which
automatically refutes any expression of the primacy of consciousness. When one
says that something is true, he is typically saying that what he says is true
is not true simply because he wishes or wants it to be the case,
but rather because what he says presumably corresponds in an objective matter
to the facts he aims to identify. I have already demonstrated that Christian
theism violates the primacy of existence and have successfully argued that god-belief
is inherently subjective, given its dependence on the primacy of
consciousness.
Meanwhile, Christians offer no rational justification for their assumption that
the uniformity which we observe in nature is the product of conscious activity,
even though their worldview clearly requires this to be the case. Indeed, they
do not seem to recognize the stolen
concept inherent in supposing that the uniformity of nature is the product
of some prior cause.
So the concept of the uniformity of nature will only cause problems for the
Christian if it is examined objectively. Moreover, he will be unable to
find any inconsistency in the view that nature is inherently uniform (as
can be seen here). So
the Objectivist is on safe ground when it comes to the uniformity of nature,
while the Christian position is layered with internal inconsistencies,
contradictions to known facts, and outright absurdities. Thus the presuppositionalist’s aim to steer the debate to this
matter is welcomed.
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