Do Objectivists Try to
"Define God out of Existence"?
The following was
originally posted on my blog
in this
entry.
* * *
In the comments section of my blog The
Inherent Subjectivism of God-belief, David Parker made some interesting
comments which provide me an opportunity to make some important points.
David wrote:
I really don't have a problem saying that if the
Christian God exists, He does so with a subjective relationship to all of the
objects He created.
At least David seems to get the argument which I presented in my
blog. That’s good! Logically, then, David should have no problem with the
assessment that his theism conceives of the world subjectively, for this is a
direct outcome of theism. As Paul
Manata once conceded, “reality is subjective” because it’s “based on the
divine mind.” This statement invites problems of its own, of course, since it
can only suggest that the “divine mind” on which “reality” is “based” could
itself not be part of reality, which would mean that it’s not real.
Also, as I pointed out in the
same blog, there are three principal expressions of the primacy of
consciousness: the personal, the social and the cosmic (this latter category
would include the theistic notion of a invisible supernatural
über-consciousness). In the end, however, not only
are all three variants of the same metaphysical perspective, the two latter
variants (the social and the cosmic versions of the primacy of consciousness)
ultimately reduce to the former – the personal
version. That’s because the notion in question must originate somewhere, and we
always find that it originates with human individuals, such as those who claim
to have some means of knowledge other than reason by which they “know” what
they claim. So while theists may affirm the cosmic version of the primacy of
consciousness in the claims they make about their god, those claims are
ultimately based on the presupposition, in one form or another, that one’s own
consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over reality.
David wrote:
My problem is when Objectivists insist that what
is true of human consciousness must necessarily be true of divine
consciousness.
Just to be clear, this is not the Objectivist’s problem; it’s David’s
problem. Also, another point of clarification is necessary here. Objectivists
do not affirm the existence of “divine consciousness,” so they do not make the
claim that “what is true of human consciousness must necessarily be true of
divine consciousness.” Since the notion of “divine consciousness” represents a
total departure from the realm of existence (as I pointed out above, even Paul Manata’s quoted statement indicates this), the concepts
‘true’ and ‘false’ do not legitimately apply. In the fake environment of the
imagination, the believer can claim anything he wants is the case, for his
imagination, which he enacts volitionally, calls the shots in that environment.
For instance, in the case of theism, the theist can imagine a consciousness
which creates its objects ex nihilo, assigns them their natures, revises them,
causes them to act, etc., all at will. He can imagine a consciousness to whose
intentions reality conforms itself. For the Objectivist, what the theist
imagines is ultimately neither here nor there, since it’s all imaginary.
Objectivists typically are not going to say, for example, that the theist needs
to adhere to the primacy of existence in his imaginary scenarios.
When it comes to validating his god-belief claims, however, the theist himself
cannot get around the primacy of existence, which he invokes, knowingly or not,
any time he makes a truth claim. Truth necessarily presupposes the primacy of
existence, for to say that some state of affairs is true is implicitly to say
that it is the case whether anyone recognizes it or not, that it is the case
independent of anyone’s consciousness. To claim otherwise is to say that truth
has no objective basis. And to acknowledge the primacy of existence in one’s
own relationship to reality while affirming the existence a consciousness which
holds metaphysical primacy over reality, would only undercut any statement he
makes about reality, since he is positing the existence of another
consciousness, one presumably outside his own control, which could revise
reality at will and without advance notice. At best, he could only make
tentative assessments of reality, and these would only be as reliable as a game
of chance. Typically, however, theists posture their claims with far more
assuredness than their duplicitous metaphysical presuppositions could possibly
allow. Either way, however, the theist makes use of a principle (the primacy of
existence) while affirming the existence of something which allegedly operates
on a contradictory notion (the primacy of consciousness). He is in effect
borrowing from an objective orientation in order to affirm something imagined
to enjoy a subjective orientation, which results in a contradiction at the most
fundamental level of cognition. What justifies such contradiction? Blank out.
David quoted Ayn Rand:
… the basic metaphysical
issue that lies at the root of any system of philosophy [is] the primacy of
existence or the primacy of consciousness… The primacy of existence (of
reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists
independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they
are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological
corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that
which exists - and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The
rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primacy of consciousness -
the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the
product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The
epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by
looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it
[allegedly] receives from another, superior consciousness). Philosophy: Who
Needs It, (New York: Signet, 1984), pp. 23-34.
David then quoted Eric Johnson’s review
of chapter one of Leonard Peikoff’s book Objectivism: The
Philosophy of Ayn Rand:
Since the nature (identity) of consciousness is to
be aware of reality, existence is prior to, necessary for, and not subject to
the control of, consciousness. As a rephrasing of more basic axioms, the
principle could be said as "It is....whether you want it to be or not.". In essence, the point is that consciousness, in and
of itself (barring physical action) does not change existence.
David then stated:
Now we can both agree that with respect to humans,
there is strong evidence that our consciousness cannot alter the
identify of any of its objects without physical action.
Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence for this, and after studying
the issue for over 16 years, I have yet to see any evidence to the
contrary. I am wholly convinced that the primacy of existence is absolute, exceptionless, undefeatable. The
theist may say that’s fine for me, but supposes that there are justifiable
reasons for affirming the primacy of consciousness, even in the case of his
god. Unfortunately, the very idea of a position having “justifiable reasons”
itself assumes the primacy of existence, for it makes “an objective claim on
our credence, and not as a truth created by him who
utters it” (David Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, p. 34). In
essence, one would have to assume the truth of the primacy of existence in
order to deny it or affirm something which allegedly defies it. The result
would be a self-contradictory metaphysical viewpoint, a very poor basis for a
worldview, a theory of truth, an understanding of logic, a system of values,
etc.
Also, it should be pointed out that the primacy of existence does not apply
only to human consciousness. The primacy of existence applies in the case of
non-human animal consciousness as well. In fact, in every instance of
consciousness we find in nature, the primacy of existence obtains. When a cat,
a horse, a chipmunk or wolverine dies, for instance, thus no longer being
conscious of the world, the world does not vanish out of existence; it goes on.
Existence still exists. However, there’s nothing that will stop someone from imagining
that a consciousness “outside of nature” enjoys the opposite relationship, if
he’s so inclined. Unfortunately for such individuals, I have already shown how supernaturalism
finds its basis in imagination and is consequently inherently subjective as
well.
David continued:
But what evidence is there that this applies with
respect to a divine consciousness?
Either this question is utterly irrelevant, or it’s both question-begging
and fallaciously complex. First, if by “divine consciousness” one means what
Rand understood by this term – essentially something imaginary (“an isolation
of actual characteristics of man combined with the projection of impossible,
irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality” – Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 148) – then obviously the question of “what
evidence is there that this applies with respect to divine consciousness” would
be completely moot. If
On the other hand, if by “a divine consciousness” one has in mind something
that he believes actually exists – as theists claim to believe – then David’s
question is epistemically premature, for it assumes
the truth of what is in question, namely the claim that “a divine
consciousness” exists. In fact, David’s question seems to assume the existence
of “a divine consciousness” without any attempt to establish it. In earlier
discussions with David, he
has pointed to arguments intended to establish the existence of such a
thing (namely Alvin Plantinga’s Two
Dozen (Or So) Theistic Arguments which is a set of “lecture notes” that are
in places so rough that they are sometimes almost incoherent). Unfortunately,
none of these arguments deal with the issue of metaphysical primacy, so they
are fundamentally disadvantaged when it comes to Objectivist challenges to
theism. For instance, none of Plantinga’s arguments
make any attempt to reconcile the acceptance of two opposing (i.e.,
contradictory) metaphysical orientations, the objective (in the case of human
consciousness) and the subjective (in the case of “a divine consciousness”).
It’s quite possible, in fact, that theists may think there’s no need to
reconcile such contradictions, even though for the theist they occur at the
very foundation of his worldview. That’s probably because they haven’t given
this issue much if any thought.
At any rate, before we can ask “what evidence is there that [the primacy of
existence] applies with respect to a divine consciousness,” we must first ask:
what evidence is there for such a thing in the first place? For if it is not
possible to establish as an objective fact the existence of “a divine
consciousness” in the first place, then the question of what orientation said
consciousness has between itself as a subject and any objects of its awareness
would be, again, completely moot. Thus David’s question is fallaciously
complex, for it essentially requires us to assume that “a divine consciousness”
exists in order to gather evidences pertaining to what its conscious
orientation might possibly be.
Now, I know of no actually existing “divine consciousness.” I’ve heard claims
about such things throughout my life, and for a while (in my misguided youth) I
even tried to believe some of them. In the end, however, I made an explicit
decision to be honest, and in so doing I had to confront the fact that my
god-belief rested on the props of the imaginary through and through. I realized
that religion captivates the believer unwittingly by invading his imagination
and affecting his emotional life, thus seizing control his cognition. As a
result, I eventually came to realize that theistic apologists seem wholly
unable to explain how one can reliably distinguish between what they call “God”
and what may really only be imaginary. This is because, as believers, their
cognition has been hijacked by a series of mind-game devices which sabotage
their ability to make such distinctions consistently in the first place. At one
time this was my affliction, but the choice to be honest coupled with a
worldview which is firmly grounded in the primacy of existence showed me the
way back to reality. It’s no wonder to me why theists have such resentment for
Objectivism.
Sadly, even when it is shown to theists that their god-belief is inherently
subjective, they still insist that their imaginary deity exists all the same.
But notice the conundrum in which the theist finds himself here. To affirm the
existence of such a thing would performatively assume
the truth of the primacy of existence. In effect, he is saying that his god
exists whether or not anyone acknowledges its existence. I.e., he is saying
that it exists independent of anyone’s conscious intensions. Thus he makes use
of the primacy of existence. But then notice the nature of what he is claiming:
that there exists a consciousness which enjoys precisely the opposite
relationship with its objects as that which the theist’s own pronouncements performatively assume. He gives no indication of what could
possibly justify such a move, but it’s clear that, to be consistent, any
justification he could give would have to adhere to the primacy of existence,
since he has already acknowledged that the primacy of existence applies in the
case of his own conscious relationship to the world. Theists at this point
typically throw their arms up and say, “Well, I have no problem with God having
a subjective relationship to all the objects he’s created.” But that’s not an
argument, nor is it a justification. It’s simply an autobiographical admission
to intellectual default on the matter. He’s tacitly saying that, yes, there is
an irresolvable contradiction here, but finds it acceptable.
David asked:
Do Objectivists just assume this and move on?
Objectivists do not believe there is such a thing in reality as “a divine
consciousness” in the first place. So I doubt any of them would assume that the
primacy of existence applies to “a divine consciousness,” since there is no
such thing.
David then stated:
If so, then this still looks like defining God out
of existence to me. Especially when one argues that God's
existence is metaphysically impossible precisely because of violating said
axiom.
Well, since (as I pointed out above) Objectivists are not assuming that the
primacy of existence applies to “a divine consciousness” (they recognize that
theism is committed to the primacy of consciousness, which is why they reject
it), then the condition on which David’s conclusion here depends, does not
obtain. Objectivists do not “define God out of existence,” nor are they
“setting out” to do so. It’s not the case that Objectivists start out with the
assumption that there is a god and then try to gerrymander their terms so that
denial of its existence is plausible or justified. To accuse Objectivists of
“defining God out of existence” not only construes (uncharitably, I might add)
Objectivists as ungrateful housekeepers shooing a fly out of their home, it
also mischaracterizes Objectivist epistemology. Objectivists see no good reason
to suppose a god does exist, and they also see many reasons why the
notion of a god is contrary to objective reality (such as the
inherent subjectivism of theism, which I have soundly established and which
David seems to accept, given his initial statement above).
I suspect David’s charge also hinges on an unfamiliarity with the Objectivist
conception of possibility. While some worldviews adopt the
‘conceivability model’ of possibility (which essentially equates “possible”
with “imaginable”), Objectivism holds to the objective model of
possibility. (For details, see Peikoff, Objectivism:
The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 175-179.) Quite simply, on the
objective view, there is no justification for the claim that “a divine
consciousness” is metaphysically possible. It’s already been shown that
theism is inherently subjective, which means theism rules itself out
of any objective consideration. So it’s not an act of “defining God out
of existence,” but rather a consistently rational integration of the relevant
data, an impeccably logical conclusion, which tells us that “a divine
consciousness” is metaphysically impossible. Our conclusion is fully consistent
with the primacy of existence, which we know to be true (as David concedes,
“with respect to humans”), in both content (facts gleaned from reality) and
methodology (by an objective process).
Meanwhile, the theist is unable to produce any validation for affirming the
primacy of consciousness in his god-belief which is compatible with the primacy
of existence as the proper orientation of his own consciousness. Notice, for
instance, that David acknowledges the truth of the primacy of existence “with
respect to humans,” which would presumably include David himself. So if it’s
the case that the objects of David’s consciousness do not conform to his
conscious intensions, then we can reasonably suppose that truth does not
conform to David’s conscious intensions either (unless of course David is
willing to admit that, on his worldview, truth has no objective basis,
which would be impossible to reconcile with his admission that the primacy of
existence applies “with respect to humans”). Consequently, David’s
epistemology, if it is to produce reliable results, would itself have to adhere
to the primacy of existence every step of the way in all his thinking. For
instance, he would not be able reasonably to say his god-belief claims are true
because he wants them to be true any more than he could reasonably say
that reality conforms to his wishing. So how does he infer the existence of a
consciousness which holds metaphysical primacy over its objects? Or does he
infer it at all? This is unclear to me. When asked
to identify his starting point, David responded with the statement “The
Bible is the Word of God,” which could only mean that he assumes his god’s
existence from the very outset. Where David objects to Objectivists for
allegedly “defining God out of existence,” one could quite consider the attempt
to bundle one’s god-belief into his starting point as, to quote Justin
Hall, “a case of defining god into existence.” (Emphasis added)
An even greater irony which lurks behind David’s charge that Objectivists aim
to “define God out of existence,” has to do with the pervasiveness of the primacy
of existence in human cognition. Suppose for a moment that Objectivists do
try to “define God out of existence.” What would David have against this? Could
it be that it would violate the primacy of existence? Think about it: the
objection that one may be “defining God out of existence” charges the accused
with presuming that reality will conform to his conscious intensions.
Essentially, he’s saying that the accused doesn’t want to acknowledge the
existence of something and is consequently trying to “define it out of
existence” on an ad hoc basis, as if reality would somehow snap into
obedience and adjust itself accordingly. Now obviously, if one were to proceed
on such a basis, as if reality conformed to one’s consciousness, he would be
defying the primacy of existence. But what could someone who worships a
consciousness which defies the primacy of existence possibly have against
defiance of the primacy of existence?
For theists, the question boils down to: on what basis can we affirm a position
which, like theism, assumes the metaphysical primacy of consciousness? Can we
affirm this on the basis of the primacy of existence? While it is the case that
we need the primacy of existence to affirm any statement as true of reality,
the problem here is that the primacy of existence and the primacy of
consciousness are contradictory to each other. The presence of assumptions
granting metaphysical primacy to consciousness would cancel out any thoughts
attempting to ground themselves on the primacy of
existence. In attempting such a compromise, one would short-circuit his own
thinking by undercutting any claim to objectivity. So this wouldn’t work. Could
we affirm such a position on the basis of the primacy of consciousness? But we
already know that the primacy of existence applies in human cognition.
Unfortunately, the theist is stuck here. There is no escape.
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