The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence
The following essay was published on my blog
Incinerating Presuppositionalism
on Thursday, December 7, 2006. The original posting can be found here.
* * *
The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence
As I mentioned in my
previous post, I have much to say in response to many of the points that
Paul Manata raised in his 4 Nov. diatribe
against me. In this post, I focus on Paul's misunderstanding of the
relationship between the axioms and the primacy of existence principle.
A Failure to
Integrate
One of Paul's attempts to argue against Objectivism's affirmation of the
primacy of existence principle is that the axiom of existence is not sufficent to support it. He presents this argument early on
in the second section of his blog (point 5 under the
heading "The More Substantive"), and must think it's very effective
because he comes back to it over and over throughout the rest of his post.
He writes:
“Things exist” does not tell us that “things exist independent of any
consciousness.” There’s no logical rule by which that inference can be made.
Indeed, Piekoff [sic] tells us that “things exist”
does not tell us anything about the nature of the things that exist.”
Therefore, if “things exist” does not tell us ANYTHING about the nature of the
things that exist it cannot; therefore, tell us that
they are the kind of things that “exist independent of consciousness.” Same
goes with his claim that thiese “axioms” tell us that
“consciousness did not create reality.”
To those who are not very
familiar with Objectivism, Paul's inference here may seem pretty devastating in
that he seems to have found the exception to Objectivism's absolutism that
theism needs to squeeze its gangrenous way into a rational worldview. To the
untutored, it very well may appear that Paul has found Objectivism's Achilles'
heel.
However, contrary to his apologetic intentions, the argument that Paul offers
here does not refute anything that Objectivism teaches, or any criticism that I
have raised against theism. As an attempt to criticize Objectivism, it commits
the fallacy of context-dropping and serves as a prime example of what happens
when one fails to integrate. It must be remembered that the axiom of existence,
about which Paul is attempting to make his point, is only one of several
axioms, and that Objectivism does not affirm the axiom of existence in the
contextual vacuum that Paul’s concern here assumes. The axioms are our most
fundamental recognitions made explicit. However, Objectivism nowhere proposes
that the mind stops with any one of these recognitions, or that the
axioms serve as a substitute for further knowledge that we may acquire about
the world. On the contrary, they provide an anchor for knowledge, a foundation
upon which to build our knowledge, not an escape from knowledge.
Now it is important to keep in mind that the axiom of existence is not the only
axiom, that it is not a recognition that remains isolated from other
recognitions. The act of recognizing the fact that existence exists begins
a series of recognitions; it does not bring the mind to a halt. The recognition
that “things exist” does not by itself indicate the relationship between what
is perceived and the means by which it is perceived, because the mind that is
doing the recognizing hasn’t gotten there yet; the discovery of consciousness
is still to come. Once the mind recognizes both facts - that there are things and
that it is aware of those things - then there’s a relationship to be
grasped. This is the point that Paul’s argument fails to factor in, namely the
axiom of consciousness. There is also the axiom of identity, which is
implicit in both recognitions, that things exist and
that one is aware of things that exist; it tells us that there is a distinction
between what we perceive and the means by which we perceive it. Together the
axioms of existence, identity and consciousness set the stage that subsequent
knowledge requires by identifying the constants which apply throughout all
knowledge and providing the mind with an explicit recognition of the fact that
there is a fundamental distinction between what is perceived and the action
of perceiving it, between what is known and the process by which
it is known, between the object of cognition and the subject of
cognition. Throughout the history of philosophy, there are many persisting
errors which have resulted from a failure to grasp the nature of this
distinction and understand its implications for knowledge and epistemology.
Many still persist to this day, and the religious view of the world is
definitely one of the more obvious ones.
The Initial Recognition Inaugurates Cognition
In the above statement, Paul
alluded to a statement by Dr. Leonard Peikoff. Let’s
look at what he writes. He writes:
The axiom [of
existence] does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely
underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)
This statement comes at the end
of a primary point that Peikoff is establishing early
in his discussion of philosophy:
We start with
the irreducible fact and concept of existence – that which is. The first thing to
say about that which is is simply: it is. As
Parmenides in ancient
Peikoff begins
by addressing our need for a cognitive starting point: where do we begin?
Objectivism holds that the fact that existence exists – the fact that there are
things that exist – is irreducible, both metaphysically and conceptually. Theists who try to square their theism with Objectivist
principles by qualifying their creationism with the footnote that their god is
not supposed to have created itself, are in effect simply trying to assimilate
this fact into their worldview, even though their worldview nowhere comes to
grips with the issue of metaphysical primacy. However, they rightly sense that
the fact that existence exists is undeniable and absolute. But even if they try
to assimilate select Objectivist principles into their mystical concoctions,
theists are still typically reluctant to identify the Objectivist axioms as
their fundamental starting point. They want to have their cake, and they want to
eat it, too. They want the respectability and dignity of affirming absolute
reality, but they want the fantasy of their imaginations to be taken seriously
as well. This never works because there is a fundamental distinction between
reality and fantasy; the two will never be on the same par.
Paul’s argument here, however, is part of an effort to defang Objectivism’s
ability to criticize theism. His concern is not to come to grips with the
subject-object relationship and its implications for philosophy and knowledge,
but to save an uninhabitable shack that has already burned to the ground (as
well as a little face). He argues that, if the axiom of existence does not make
any statement about the nature of what exists, then
one cannot draw from this one axiom the conclusion that whatever does exist,
exists independent of consciousness. But no one is suggesting that such a
conclusion follows from this single axiom. (Indeed, where did he get the
concept ‘consciousness’ if this axiom has not been reached yet?) So far as I
know, he is not criticizing anything that has actually been endorsed. As I
pointed out above, the axiom of existence is only the first of several axioms,
it begins a series of recognitions, and it does not remain isolated in
some contextual vacuum; to grasp the relationship between what exists and the
means by which one is aware of it (consciousness), you need both concepts. But
Paul's argument ignores this need. No Objectivist has suggested that we affirm
the axiom of existence and then halt our knowledge-gathering there and try to
wring all kinds of conclusions from this single, isolated recognition.
In fact, Paul is way off when he complains not to have found a "logical
rule by which that inference can be made." That is, he wants to see a
formal proof of the primacy of existence principle. But if that's what he's
looking for, then he obviously hasn't been paying attention. The primacy of
existence is a fundamental precondition of proof. Proof is a cognitive
exercise, and so involves a subject and an object, and therefore requires both
to already be enjoined in the proper relationship with each other. The primacy
of existence is the proper relationship between subject and object that
rational operations assume and require, and is thus preconditional
to logical inference and formal proof.
But in spite of these facts, Paul still misconstrues what Peikoff
(and I) have been saying. Observe:
If we don’t
know ANYTHING (per Piekoff [sic] and Bethrick) about
the nature of the existents then we don’t know that their nature is such that
it is necessarily uncreated.
But we do know many
things about the nature of the existents we encounter, because we discover
things about them. Again, the mind does not stop with the axiom of existence,
nor does this axiom say that we never learn more about the objects of our
awareness than merely that they exist. Peikoff
is not alleging that “we don’t know ANYTHING... about the nature of the
existents” we encounter; he's just saying that our initial recognition of their
existence does not tell us all the details about the nature of what exists.
This discovery is subsequent to the initial recognition. There is nothing
inconsistent between the facts that we recognize that there are objects on the
one hand, and on the other that we discover data about those objects as we
investigate them. Again, Paul fails to integrate the various points belonging
to the position he’s trying to criticize. But it is interesting to note that
Paul's statement here indicates that he realizes that the Christian worldview
assumes the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, for he's obviously looking
for a way to side-step the primacy of existence. It's true - the primacy of
consciousness is the lifeline of Christianity.
The Axioms Work Together
Now consider: if a consciousness’s first act is to recognize that
things exists, it makes no more sense to suppose that this initial recognition
would provide it with total knowledge of the nature of the things it perceives
than it does to suppose that the act of being aware of those things brings them
into existence in the first place. That’s why Peikoff
states what I quoted above. However, a mind does not need to know all the
specific details about an object that it perceives in order for it to recognize
that it exists and that it exists independent of the process by which it
is aware of it. On the contrary, it would recognize that it exists
before continuing on to discover what it is, should it choose to
investigate further. Together the axioms of existence and identity
and consciousness underscore the independent existence of objects by
making the distinction between the objects of cognition and the processes of
cognition explicit. Hence there is a distinction, there is a relationship, and
since this relationship is involved in every act of consciousness (since
every act of consciousness involves a consciousness conscious of some object),
understanding the nature of that relationship, specifically the orientation
between subject and object, is vital to an understanding of knowledge (though
many philosophers throughout history have ignored it). Without this
understanding, we would have at best a haphazard, unsure footing providing a
hit-and-miss epistemology which would be ever prone to confusing fact with
sheer imagination. And that is precisely what religion provides; it fails to
deliver a rational epistemology because it confuses the relationship between
subject and object at the fundamental level of knowledge and elevates
imagination above reality, reason and man’s epistemological needs.
Now consider: for us to acquire any knowledge about the nature of any thing
that exists, that thing would at the very minimum have to exist. And for us to
acquire awareness of it, it would already have to exist. In other words,
its existence would have to precede our awareness of it for awareness to be
possible. How can you be aware of something that does not exist? Blank out.
Additionally, since cognition is a process by which data is gathered
from what we perceive (where what we perceive is the object), cognition does not add anything to the nature of an
object. We can think anything we want about an object, and it will remain what
it is. For instance, if I see a bottle that was manufactured in
The Primacy of
Existence as the Foundation to Knowledge
Notice how this principle is integral to the concepts 'true', 'false', 'error',
'correct', 'incorrect', etc. Because cognition requires some object(s), and the
data which informs cognition about an object must be gathered from the object
by some process performed by the subject, and because it is possible to misidentify
the nature of an object, we need a set of principles which guide the mind
through the process by which it identifies what exists. The primacy of
existence is the front line in the struggle for correct identification of
objects, and therefore the fundamental principle of knowledge. Since our
efforts to acquire knowledge of the world can result in error, we need a set of
principles to guide us toward error-free results. Obviously a principle which
states "reality is whatever one wishes it to be" will not suffice,
for reality does not conform to wishing. Why? Because
existence holds metaphysical primacy over conscious intentions. Should
not a theory of knowledge recognize why reality does not conform to wishing?
Objectivism holds that a theory of knowledge should do this. Other theories
hold what amounts to "Who cares? Such truths are so obvious they do not
interest us!" And those who have been paying attention have seen the
results.
Above I gave an example of how the primacy of existence principle provides the
foundation to truth and knowledge. The bottle in my example was in fact
manufactured in
Christianity
vs. the Primacy of Existence
Now, Christians tell me that they have awareness of a being which has a
conscious ability not only to alter facts in a way that I cannot, but also
create them out of nothing as well. It can do this, they claim, because its
consciousness - quite unlike my consciousness - has the power to conform
reality to its will. Essentially, they are claiming that this consciousness enjoys
the exact opposite relationship that my consciousness has in respect to its
objects. Where my consciousness can only perceive and identify the objects
which I discover and which exist independent of my consciousness, this being
that Christians tell me about essentially has the power to wish its objects
into existence from nothing - "ex nihilo"
in their words. Their god wished that the universe exists, and POOF! - it exists, just like that. It's a neat trick I'd love to
witness sometime.
Paul's concern is to protect his belief in such a being, and thus seems to
resist Objectivism precisely for making these distinctions explicit and
incorporating them into a system-wide, fundamental principle. Does Paul not
realize that there is a distinction between a thing that exists and the
cognitive process by which we acquire knowledge of that thing's nature? Does
Paul deny that there is such a distinction? Or, does he think it's not
philosophically important? In other words, does he think knowledge can still
have an objective basis if one ignores any distinction between the object of
knowledge and the processes by which that knowledge is obtained? On occasion,
he has suggested that such recognitions are not "interesting," as if
this were supposed to constitute an argument challenging their truth,
importance or fundamentality. But if knowledge is the product of a cognitive
process, and there is a fundamental, absolute distinction between the object of
knowledge and the cognitive process by which we acquire knowledge of it, then
how could this distinction be untrue, unimportant or non-fundamental? Paul does
not say. Instead, his protestations suggest that he wants to defy their
implications in order to protect something. What does he want to protect?
Indeed, he wants to protect the blurring of this distinction which is central
to his worldview from being exposed. This is one of the primary reasons why
Paul resents Objectivism: it spoils his fantasy.
Validating the
Primacy of Existence
So what does tell us that the primacy of existence is true? Objectivism’s
answer to this is that our conscious interaction with the objects of our
awareness tells us this on a constant basis; we merely need to attend to it if
we are going to grasp it. A simple experiment is sufficient to settle any
disputes on the matter. If the objects of consciousness depended on
consciousness, then one should be able to alter the objects of his awareness at
will. That is what the primacy of consciousness holds: that the objects of
consciousness depend on the functions of consciousness in order to exist, in
order to be what they are, in order to be anything at all. It holds that
consciousness has the final say on what exists and what is true. (Sound
familiar?) The objects of such a consciousness would conform to whatever that
consciousness desired, expected, or commanded of them. A simple experiment is
sufficient to show whether or not this is the case, and anyone can try it.
In this experiment, just find any object in your immediate awareness and focus
your attention on it. Any object will do. Right now I’m looking at an ordinary
paperclip that’s sitting on my desk. It is a single continuous wire bent round
three times into its pristine manufactured shape, about one and a half inches
long, steel-colored, and by all accounts a normal paperclip. This is the object
that I see. But now I begin to exercise my consciousness in regard to the
paperclip, to see what effect it will have on it. First I begin imagining the
wire of the paperclip to unfold itself, straightening itself
out. In my imagination I can "see" this happening, but the paperclip
sitting on my desk remains in the shape it had when I first looked at it. My
imagining had no effect on it. Now I make a wish: that the wire
of the paperclip straighten itself out. It remains motionless, still
folded into its paperclip shape. My wishing had no effect on it. (Perhaps I
didn't wish hard enough?) Now I command it: “I command thee to unfold thyself!”
I say in a loud booming voice. The paperclip stubbornly defies my command,
which has no effect on the paperclip whatsoever. Then I simply deny that the
paperclip is not simply a straight piece of wire, without any curves from end
to end. This too, has no effect. The paperclip remains just as it was when I
first looked at it. I can do this all day long, varying my imagination,
wishing, commands and other conscious functions. But what will remain constant
throughout? What remains constant is the relationship my consciousness has with
the paperclip: the primacy of existence. The object of my consciousness does
not conform to the dictates of my consciousness. This is inescapable, and
Objectivism holds that this inescapable, constant fact is philosophically
important, since it pertains to all instances of man’s consciousness, and
therefore also to his knowledge.
Similar experiments can be performed by anyone at any time. But if the primacy
of consciousness were true, we would not expect these results in this type of
experiment. We would not have found that consciousness is so ineffectual in
merely altering its objects. On the contrary, we would have found that the
objects would conform to our imagination, wishing, commands and other conscious
functions, if consciousness held metaphysical primacy over its objects. But the
objects of consciousness are not so easily pushed around after all. Reality has
its terms, and it is up to us either to accept them or live in denial,
protesting what we cannot change, imagining a fantasy world beyond it and
pretending that a super-dooper-double-whammy
consciousness somewhere out there or nowhere out there can change what we
cannot change. Meanwhile, reality remains what it is, independent of our
preferences, likes, dislikes, temper tantrums, etc.
Do theists offer any experimental evidence to confirm the opposite of the
primacy of existence? If not, what do they offer? "Arguments"?
Well, what is their starting point? What orientation between subject and object
do their premises assume? What orientation between subject and object do
their conclusions affirm? Do their premises and conclusions assume the
same orientation? It would not bode well for theism if their arguments'
premises and conclusions pointed to opposite metaphysical orientations between
subject and object. It should already be clear that, whatever their premises,
their conclusion (to whatever degree they offer arguments for it) that a god
exists and created the universe unmistakably points to the primacy of
consciousness. But they nowhere validate this assumption, and they nowhere show
how it can live side by side the primacy of existence principle, which they use
any time they make a truth claim (even if it is false). They don't because they
can't.
An Attempt to
Evade the Primacy of Existence
The theist, still recognizing the need to salvage the primacy of consciousness
in some way, may pull back at this point and suggest that, even though the
primacy of existence may be true in the case of human consciousness,
this is no indication of the relationship enjoyed by a divine consciousness
with respect to its objects. According to this approach, assuming that the
universal, absolute truth of the primacy of existence principle applies to all
forms of consciousness, even those which are not human, is simply a grand
over-generalization.
What this approach represents is a failure to recognize and integrate the
profound implications that the primacy of existence principle has for
epistemology. Like any human being, the theist initially formed his concept of
consciousness implicitly through his own conscious interaction with the world.
As pointed out above, Objectivism holds that our own interaction with the
objects of our consciousness constantly confirms the primacy of existence
principle. The actions of his own consciousness serve as the units which he
isolates and integrates to form the concept. They are the initial inputs which
give his understanding of consciousness its content.
So what inputs inform the theist's concept of consciousness beyond his own
firsthand experience such that he thinks it is meaningful to suppose that there
exists a consciousness possessing the exact opposite relationship that his
consciousness has with its own objects? What gives his concept of consciousness
such latitude? What units has he discovered and integrated into his concept of
consciousness which allows him to affirm two contradictory metaphysics? We know
already that the method by which he informs his concept of consciousness
must be consistent with the nature of his consciousness, for he
has no alternative to using his own consciousness in developing and securing
the knowledge he seeks to hold. So this rules out his own use of the primacy of
consciousness as a means of arriving at a point where he can reasonably affirm
the primacy of consciousness. For instance, since the primacy of existence
applies to his own conscious interaction with the world around him, he cannot
reasonably adopt a method of affirming the primacy of consciousness which
reduces to the assumption that reality conforms to his conscious operations.
Not only would this be fallaciously circular, it would short-circuit the nature
of his own consciousness and invalidate any conclusion he wants to draw. He
cannot, for instance, rationally say that the primacy of consciousness is valid
because he wants it to be valid, for his consciousness does not have the
power to alter reality; his wants and wishes are ineffectual. We already know
from experimental evidence that his consciousness simply does not have such
authority over reality. The facts of reality do not conform to his imagination,
wishing or commands, so if he wants to claim that the primacy of consciousness
orientation obtains in the form of consciousness other than his own, he will
need to show how this is the case by means of a methodology that is consistent
with his own consciousness' orientation to its objects. In essence, he needs to
use a primacy of existence methodology in order to show that the primacy of
consciousness is true. Such a procedure would amount to using a principle (thus
affirming its truth by using it) to prove what contradicts it, thereby denying
the truth of the principle which he used to arrive at his goal, which is:
self-contradiction as such.
Additionally, we have already seen how concepts of truth necessarily assume the
primacy of existence metaphysics. It would contradict the nature of our
consciousness to say that some state of affairs obtains merely because we want
it to. The bottle manufactured in
So again we should ask: what inputs does the theist factor into his conception
of consciousness that allows him to recognize (if only implicitly) the truth of
the primacy of existence on some occasions, and on other occasions affirm the
primacy of consciousness? All examples of consciousness that we have found so
far in nature are examples of consciousness possessing the same fundamental
orientation to the world that our consciousness has - i.e., the primacy of
existence. But theists are quick to call the consciousness of their deity
"supernatural," and thus caution that we should not expect to find
evidence of such a consciousness in nature. In other words, we're looking in
the wrong place. So, they tell us where not to look for their god. But
to give their claims any hope of credibility, they need to tell us where we should
look. Without this, their god-belief claims dangle helplessly in the chill void
of a conceptual vacuum.
Imagination:
The Source of Mystical "Knowledge"
Let us try another approach. Let us ask: where do they get this idea of a
supernatural consciousness to which reality conforms? Christians make no
attempt to hide the source where they get this idea. They get it from a storybook
- "the Bible" is what they calll it. And this storybook provides the
inputs which they factor into their understanding of consciousness which allows
them to affirm two contradictory metaphysical orientations between subject and
object. The storybook was inspired by the imagination of its ancient authors,
and today it inspires the imagination of its readers. But as we saw above,
there is a fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. We can
certainly imagine Jesus feeding the 5,000, or walking on the waters of the sea,
or raising Lazarus. And we can also imagine Dorothy in the land
of Oz,
In a primacy of existence universe, a man will not grow a third arm simply
because someone wanted him to. But in a primacy of consciousness universe,
whatever consciousness wants dictates whatever happens. Just as in a cartoon, a
man could grow a third arm just because the cartoonist wanted it to. And in the
cartoon universe of theism, if the ruling deity wants a man to grow a third
arm, what would stop this from happening? In such a universe, the ruling
consciousness’ wants and pleasures are the final court of appeal.
The Primacy of
Existence is Important to Knowledge
Now that it is clear that the primacy of existence principle is undeniably
true, let us look at a couple reasons why it is important.
One reason why the primacy of existence principle is important,
is that it serves as the mind’s most basic safeguard against error. It is not
sufficient to prevent all errors, but it is necessary to avoid any
error. If it is observed consistently throughout one’s reasoning, it will keep
him from making the most fundamental error, namely reversing the orientation
between himself as subject and the objects of his awareness. The primacy of
existence allows a mind to avoid such errors by making the distinction between the an object and the subject with its cognitive operations
explicit and by recognizing the proper relationship between them. Errors are
misidentifications of something. The very idea of error assumes that a mind is
not always right in its identifications. Any act of identifying something
requires a standard to give that act an objective basis. And the standard is the
object being identified, to which consciousness must conform in order to
identify it accurately.
By recognizing that the task of consciousness is to perceive and identify the
objects of awareness (rather than create or alter them at will), the primacy of
existence principle equips a mind with the fundamental context in which
concepts like ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘accurate’, ‘inaccurate’,
‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, etc., are rationally meaningful. It would not make
sense in a cartoon universe, for instance, to say that something is “wrong,”
for “wrong” presupposes an objective standard to which cognition must conform.
A consciousness to which the facts of reality conform could never be either
wrong or right. "Right" is when a consciousness accurately identifies
an object that exists independent of itself, and "wrong" is when it
misidentifies an object that exists independent of itself.
Another way which the primacy of existence is important is related to the one
above. This principle is important to man because it teaches him not to confuse
what he imagines with what is real. If there is a distinction between the
subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge, then there must be a
distinction between what a subject knows and the cognitive process by
which he knows it. And if this is the case, then there must be a
distinction between what actually exists in reality and what one merely
imagines. Mistaking what one imagines for reality would hardly be beneficial to
man's life, and it could easily prove fatal if he acts on such confusion. I can
imagine, for instance, that a T-shirt will keep me warm in the winter, but if I
walk out into a blizzard without appropriate clothing, I may very well be
overcome with hypothermia and die. Reality does not conform to my imaginations
(my imagining will not make a T-shirt sufficient to protect me from the cold in
a wintry blizzard), so I need to conform my choices and actions to this fact if
I want to live. So there is a practical as well as rational advantage to recognizing
and respecting the distinction between reality and imagination.
Even the theist recognizes the distinction between what he wants to say is real
and what he is willing to admit to be imaginary at some point. He will, for
instance, object when a rival theist’s imagination of deity conflicts with his
own. We see this inside Christianity all the time. One group of Christians will
develop their imagination of their deity in one direction, while another group
of Christians develop their imagination in another direction, each claiming the
same source for inspiration and authority. But when the two conflict,
each side accuses the other of “vain imaginations” which, if unchecked by the
“authorized” imagination, will lead to "heresy," i.e., the unapproved
imagination. So even theists will sooner or later admit that
there is a difference between reality and imagination when it suits their
position to do so. Unfortunately for them, it is too late at that point,
for they have already sacrificed the concept of objectivity on the altar of
faith in invisible magic beings.
Excuses and
Ridicule to Be Expected
When I ask for evidence to support their claims, Christians typically give me a
string of excuses. If I am to accept excuses as evidence for anything, I can
only accept them as evidence for the likely fact that they cannot provide
evidential support for their claims about this being they allegedly have
awareness of. When I point out the various problems that I see in their claims
- for instance, they have no objective sstaarting point (cf. Prov.
1:7), they affirm metaphysical subjectivism, they do not clearly identify the
means by which they are allegedly aware of their deity, they confuse the
imaginary with the real, they endorse faith over reason, etc. - Christians
scramble in a panic to turn the tables, find counter-examples, hoping to trap
me in some kind of quandary which usually turns out to be more casuistry on the
apologist's part. He is threatened by my certainty, and this is what he wants
to undermine more than anything: my confidence in my own mind.
Then come the name-calling, the insults, the
condescension. Like the 9 Powell bus, right on schedule. This is typically an
indication that the apologist really has no defense for his position at all,
and he's trying to cover it up with bluster and loud barking. Apologists get
frustrated when people do not accept their religious assertions on their say
so, for they know they have nothing else to back them up.
I can certainly imagine some of the things Christians tell me. But what I
imagine is not real. When I ask how I can distinguish between what they claim
and what they may be merely imagining, I get flack in return. This is another
indication of a problem. Why else would this be what they give me when I try to
learn more about their position?
I do not indulge in the name-calling and personal insults because I know what I
teach is true, and I enjoy teaching what I know. Do they want a dialogue? Then why the attitude, condescension and ridicule? Do they
think that they are all-knowing? If so, then why the impatience with those who
are so willing to acknowledge that they themselves are not all-knowing? If they
don't think they're all-knowing, then perhaps they're willing to admit that
there are things they still have to learn. If that's the case, why aren't they
more eager to learn and more grateful for the effort others put into helping
them learn? They claim to be thankful to a being which can help them without
effort, but unthankful to those who have no choice but to apply effort if they
choose to help them. Don't they to learn? don't they
want to know? Don't they want to understand?
by