A Reply to Anderson: On Realism, Conceptualism and the Objectivist
Theory of Concepts
In September 2006 I posted an essay on my
blog titled Frame's
Summary of Van Til's OMA.
In that entry I examined John Frame's published notes on the so-called
"One-Many Argument" for which his mentor, Cornelius Van Til,
is in some circles very well known. My analysis of this summary uncovered many
problem areas, such as the claim that we cannot identify particulars without
universals, that "universal terms exclude
particularities," that universals cannot be defined "except by means of particularities," etc.
These and other errors of understanding are corrected in my interaction with
Frame's rehearsal of Van Til's famed argument.
Some time after I had published this post, presuppositional
apologist James Anderson posted some critical remarks in response to what I had
written in the comments section of the same blog entry. It is not clear what
Anderson's goal was in posting these comments, for they do not directly
interact with my corrections of Frame's statements, and they also display some
confusion on Anderson's own part.
For instance, in his comments, Anderson
stated that my "critique apparently takes for granted a conceptualist
view of universals." He explained this by saying that my
introductory remark about Frame mistreating the issue of concepts,
even though Frame refers only to universals and not to concepts; the two terms
are not synonymous, even on a conceptualist position.
But this strikes me as a rather odd statement to make. Apparently Anderson
(i) recognizes from my analysis that on my view (the view which my critique
"takes for granted"), universals and concepts are synonymous (he states that "at
several points [my analysis] treat the terms 'universal' and 'concept' as
interchangeable"),
(ii) acknowledges that universals and concepts "are not synonymous, even on a
conceptualist position," but
(iii) says that my "critique
apparently takes for granted a conceptualist view of universals."
If it is the case, as Anderson has stated, that universals and concepts
"are not synonymous, even on a conceptualist position," and my analysis in fact
treats these two terms synonymously ("as interchangeable"), why does Anderson
suppose that my "critique apparently takes for granted a conceptualist view of
universals"? In explaining his remark that my critique of Frame "takes for
granted a conceptualist view of universals," Anderson himself points to a
significant difference between the view which my analysis assumes and the
conceptualist view of universals.
In response to these confused comments, I had pointed out to Anderson that
my critique in fact assumes the Objectivist theory of concepts rather than the conceptualist
view of universals. I pointed this out not expressly to disaffirm the view that
the Objectivist theory of concepts is a species of conceptualism, but to
emphasize the fact that my analysis is coming from a specific school of thought
on the matter, one which rejects realism as well as nominalism.
One of the reasons for this is that there are so many varieties of
conceptualism in the philosophical marketplace, some of which hazarding the
problems inherent in realism, and others the problems inherent in nominalism. To enlarge briefly on this point of dispute,
let's inform our terms:
Universal: The following summary is fairly standard:
The term 'universal' is related to the concepts of species, genus, and
class. It stands in contrast to the terms 'particular' and 'individual'. The
problem of universals arises when one asks about the status in reality, or the
ontological status, of universals. An intense debate over universals took place
during the Middle Ages... The terms Nominalsim..., Realism..., and Conceptualism..., were used in, and as a
result of, that debate. For the Realist the universal has some kind of reality
outside the mind. For the Conceptualist the universal has reality only within
the mind. For the Nominalist the universal is nothing
but a name, and has reality neither within nor outside the mind. In fact,
however, these distinctions exist along a continuous spectrum, and the
distinction is sometimes so fine between Nominals and
Conceptualist, or between Conceptualist and Moderate Realist, that the
distinctions are not very useful, nor is there anything approaching complete
agreement on the classification of various individual philosophers.... Socrates...
set the stage for the discussion by pressing his colleagues for the 'common
nature' or universal definition of any given set of things. A question as to
the status of the common nature and universal definition emerged from the
Socratic quest... Plato... held that such common natures or 'ideas' required their
own reality; and that they are in fact exemplars according to which individuals
or instances in the world are created. In the language of the medieval dispute,
Plato is a realist. He believed in the extramental
reality of universals. Further, since the Ideas or universals depend on nothing
in the world, having their own eternal realm, he is an absolute
realist, and his view is one of Absolute Realism... It was a Christianized
version of the Neoplatonic alternative which St.
Augustine... employed in supporting the Absolute Realism of Plato. He gave the
eternal ideas and eternal home by placing them in the mind of God. (Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion,
pp. 795-796)
Realism: This is the view "that universals
have a reality of their own, an extra-mental existence. Positions are often
marked out, running from moderate to absolute Realism. The more definite,
fixed, and eternal the status of the universals, the more absolute is the
Realism." (Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy
and Religion, p. 637) Plato is typically cited as the original "absolute
Realist" in the sense mentioned here.
Nominalism: Nominalism represents the
minimal position with respect to the problem of Universals... The posiiton is that universals are not real entities either in
the world or in the mind, but names which refer to groups or classes of
individuals things. The position of Nominalism is
difficult to distinguish from some forms of Conceptualism..." (Reese, p. 525)
Conceptualism: "the position with respect to universals... that they exist as entities in the
mind but have no extra-mental existence. The position stands between the
extremes of Nominalism... and Realism... The position of
Conceptualism is extremely difficult to distinguish from some versions of Nominalism on the one hand, and from moderate Realism on
the other. Any philosopher listed as a Conceptualist might be assigned and
probably has been assigned elsewhere either to Nominalism
or Realism." (Ibid., p. 131)
Objectivism: Unlike the herd of philosophers before her, Ayn
Rand understood the problem of universals as an epistemological concern rather than a metaphysical controversy which pre-occupied medieval thinkers. Rand
dedicated an entire book to the issue, Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology, consisting
of a series of notes which she had published in The Objectivist between July 1966 and February 1967. In her book,
these articles appear as separate chapters and Rand suggested that they "be
regarded as a preview of my future book on Objectivism" (p. 1), which she never
ended up producing. Specifically, Rand saw "the problem of universals" as
actually an "issue of concepts," which she considered to be "philosophy's
central issue," and therefore extremely important:
Since man's knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity
of man's knowledge depends on the validity of concepts. But concepts are
abstractions or universals, and everything that man perceives is particular,
concrete. What is the relationship between abstractions and concretes? To what
precisely do concepts refer in reality? Do they refer to something real,
something that exists - or are they merely inventions of man's mind, arbitrary
constructs or loose approximations that cannot claim to represent knowledge? (Ibid.)
Rand contrasted the theory she was about to unveil with the following four general
positions on thought on "the problem of universals" as she understood them:
1. The "extreme realists" or Platonists, who hold that abstractions exist as
real entities or archetypes in another dimension of reality and that the
concretes we perceive are merely their imperfect reflections, but the concretes
evoke the abstractions in our mind. (According to Plato, they do so by evoking
the memory of the archetypes which we had known, before birth, in that other
dimension.)
2. The "moderate realists," whose ancestor (unfortunately) is Aristotle, who
hold that abstractions exist in reality, but they exist only in concretes, in the form of
metaphysical essences, and that our
concepts refer to these essences.
3. The "nominalists," who hold that all our ideas
are only images of concretes, and that abstractions
are merely "names" which we give to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the basis
of vague resemblances.
4. The "conceptualists," who share the nominalists'
view that abstractions have no actual basis in
reality, but who hold that concepts exist in our minds as some sort of ideas,
not as images. (Ibid., p. 2)
I can certainly understand why some might think, at least on the basis of
superficial similarities, that Rand's theory of concepts is a species of
conceptualism. It may or may not be, depending on the specifics of what
"conceptualism" is understood to be teaching. As Reese makes clear above,
conceptualism is difficult to distinguish from certain versions of realism and nominalism, and Rand's theory of concepts is certainly
neither of these. Interestingly, Peter St. Andre, in an essay titled Conceptualism in Abelard and
Rand, argues that Rand's theory of concept has many similarities with
Abelard's view, which has historically been categorized as conceptualist, affirming
that "Rand's
views on the problem of universals are properly classified as a form of
conceptualism," and that "Rand's characterization of the conceptualists does
not do justice to their views about the basis of abstractions in reality,"
specifically that "her characterization of conceptualism as a form of nominalism does not do justice to at least one
conceptualist thinker, whose views seem quite congruent with her own." In
regard to this last charge against Rand, I have seen no evidence to the effect
that Rand had any familiarity with Abelard's position on "the problem of
universals." So when she states, as she does in the Foreword of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology,
that conceptualists "share the nominalists' view that
abstractions have no actual basis in reality," she might very well have been
reacting to other philosophers, classed as far as Rand knew as conceptualists,
who held such views. Since the conceptualist school of thought seems to be a
mixed bag, including such names as John of Salisbury, Locke, Berkeley, Reid,
Kant, Mill and Quine (cf. Reese, pp. 131-132), it's
quite possible that Rand had one of these in mind.
So here we have some background information which I hope will help us in
sorting out some of Anderson's points.
Acknowledging his own unfamiliarity
with Objectivism and his awareness of the fact "that the Objectivist theory of
concepts is not the same as the conceptualist view of universals," Anderson
insisted that my "critique of Frame assumes a conceptualist view of
universals, for the reasons I indicated." But the reasons which he indicated
themselves pointed to my practice, namely the treatment of universals as synonymous with concepts, which is foreign to conceptualism
("the two terms are not synonymous, even on a conceptualist position"). If it is the case that concepts and universals
"are not synonymous, even on a conceptualist position," then why suppose that
my view, which essentially equates concepts and universals, is conceptualist? Although
this seems to me to be a trivial matter of classifying my position within
preset categories which likely carry their own connotative baggage within the
academic community, Anderson takes this association which he supposes between
the Objectivist theory of concepts and the conceptualist view of universals as
an opportunity to attribute to the Objectivist position a defect which he
apparently believes plagues the conceptualist view.
Observe Anderson's following statement:
In your view, I take it, universals are identical (or reducible) to
concepts; specifically, human concepts. (We don't want any
"invisible magical being" to get a foot in the door, right?) So the
fact that the ball is round, that it possesses the property of roundness,
is ultimately grounded in the application of our concept of roundness to
the ball. Insofar as there are such things as properties, they are not
mind-independent; if they exist at all, then they are purely conceptual.
A couple points here are needed, one to clarify my position, the other to
make a drastically needed correction.
First, on my view, the terms 'universal', 'concept' and 'abstraction'
essentially refer to the same thing: "a mental integration of two or more units
which are isolated according to a specific characteristic(s) and united by a
specific definition" (Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 10). On my view,
"universals" are not extra-mental objects co-existing with or pre-existing the concrete
objects which we perceive in the world. Rather, they are the form in which we
identify and integrate what we perceive (they are also the form in which we
integrate previously formed abstractions to form higher abstractions). In his
symposium on "Universals," Dr. David Kelley, an Objectivist philosopher, makes
the comment that the historical quandary commonly known as "the problem of
universals" really should have been called "the problem of abstractions," since
the philosophically relevant problem is not so much their "ontological status"
(as many philosophers have believed), but how they are formed by the human
mind. To reject this analysis is to multiply one's philosophical problems: not
only does he have the original "problem of universals," he now also has the
problem of abstractions, which Kelley addresses (and which Rand's theory of
concepts solves). On such a view, "universals" represent a third category, one
which supposedly exists in addition to the subject of consciousness and the
objects which he perceives. On this view, there are (1) the objects which we
perceive in the world, which are concrete particulars, (2) the knowing subject
which perceives them, and (3) the "universal," which exists somewhere "out
there," but which is inaccessible to the senses, and apparently available to
man's mind through some mysterious capacity, such as anamnesis (for Plato,
"reminiscence" or "loss of forgetfulness"), or by means of divine afflatus. Objectivism
avoids these additional, unnecessary problems by recognizing that universality
is a property of concepts (as I
explain in my blog Demystifying
Universality), and that the problem of universals is therefore actually an
epistemological issue rather than a metaphysical problem.
In relation to these points, Anderson did ask me to "make clear [my] view
on the ontological status of universals." This is answered in Rand's definition
of 'concept' which I provided above. That definition is: "a mental integration
of two or more units which are isolated according to a specific
characteristic(s) and united by a specific definition." In other words,
concepts (or "universals") have the ontological status of being mental. That is, they are an operation
of the human mind. (I would say that they are the operation of any mind which
has achieved the conceptual level of
consciousness, but I know only of human beings which have done this. In
anticipation of the objection that the Christian god has its knowledge in
conceptual form, I have already weighed in on this objection with my essay Would an Omniscient Mind Have Knowledge in Conceptual Form?)
Specifically (and this is why Objectivism sees "the problem of universals" as
in fact an epistemological concern
rather than a metaphysical problem),
this has to do with how the human mind economizes its retention of the objects
it has perceived and allows newly perceived objects to be treated as units of
categories already formed. As for the "ontological status" of universals, or
concepts, or abstractions (whichever term one might prefer), they belong to the
status of conscious activity. And
since one of Objectivism's primary axioms is the axiom of consciousness, this
poses no difficulty for the Objectivist worldview.
Now for the drastically needed correction to Anderson's remarks above, note
specifically the following statement of his:
So the fact that the ball is round, that it possesses the property of roundness,
is ultimately grounded in the application of our concept of roundness to
the ball. Insofar as there are such things as properties, they are not
mind-independent; if they exist at all, then they are purely conceptual.
This statement is supposedly intended to
serve as an interpretation of my position, or its logically implied outcome. If
so, it is entirely incorrect. Objectivism is relentless in its adherence to the
primacy of existence metaphysics, i.e., the view that the objects of
consciousness exist and have their nature independent of the activity of
consciousness by which it has awareness of those objects. Objectivism's theory
of concepts is fully compliant and wholly consistent with this metaphysical
recognition. Thus, contrary to Anderson's statement here, the fact that a ball "is round" (i.e., that
it is what it is, including the fact that it has a specific shape) obtains independent of any mental activity
(including the activity by which we integrate the ball as a unit in the concept
'ball'). The fact that the ball is
round is not in any way "grounded in
the application of our concept of roundness
to the ball." Quite the opposite: the fact
that the ball is round (i.e., that it has a certain shape) allows us integrate
it into the concept 'round' (assuming of course that we have already formed
this concept from previously encountered units). Let me emphasize: the shape of
the object (the ball) does not depend
on our integrating it into any specific category; if we had no awareness of its
existence, it would still be what it is (including the fact that it would still
have the shape that it has), and even if we misintegrated
it (e.g., if we tried to integrate it into the concept 'square' or 'building'
or 'movie actor'), this activity would not alter
the ball in any way; its shape would continue to be what it is in spite of such
mistakes. The primacy of existence not only prevails, but also guides our
conceptualization.
Again let me stress: the Objectivist view of
concepts (or "universals") in no way
assumes or requires that the nature
of an object is dependent upon conscious activity. The ball, for example, is
not constituted by concepts, or by anything else which the mind produces. That
Anderson supposes this is what my view holds does not even follow from what he
himself stated, namely that on my view "universals are
identical (or reducible) to concepts; specifically, human concepts." If
universals are identical to concepts, and concepts in this case are understood
to be what Objectivism holds them to be (i.e., mental integrations formed
ultimately on the basis of what we perceive), then there is no reason to
suppose that the attributes which make up the ball are in any way dependent
upon any conscious activity. Why? Because concepts (or "universals") are formed
on the basis of perceptual awareness of the characteristics which objects
possess independently of conscious activity. Equating universals with concepts, then, where
concepts are understood as the Objectivist theory of concepts defines them, in
no way implies the mind-dependence which Anderson's interpretation affirms.
Much of this confusion on Anderson's part can be traced back to his
ignorance of the Objectivist theory of concepts. I tried to point this out to
him, noting that Van Til, Frame and other academics
tend to "discount the active role which the human mind takes on in forming
concepts from what they perceive." In response to this, Anderson made the
quizzical comment that the Objectivist "theory of concept formation is
neither here nor there,"
which strikes me as incomprehensibly odd. Apparently to clarify this comment,
Anderson explained that his "criticism concerns [my]
position on the nature of universals, not [my] position on the origin of
concepts." But if universals are
concepts, as my position holds (and as Anderson's own previous comments
acknowledged), then it is hard to see why the theory explaining how concepts
are formed ("the origin of concepts") assumed in my analysis could be "neither
here nor there" in all this. If the theory of concept-formation which my
analysis assumes, explains why I treat the terms 'universal' and 'concept'
interchangeably, as I contend that it does, then it is certainly germane to the
position from which I have launched my critique of Frame's exposition of Van Til's argument. Anderson seems eager to ignore all this.
Running roughshod on his own hastiness in trying to interpret my position as
affirming views which are at odds with each other, Anderson made the following
statement:
The problem, however, is that your conceptualism implies that reality is
dependent on human consciousness. Facts, such as the fact that the ball is
round, are ultimately the product of human thought. If there were no human consciousness,
then strictly speaking the ball would not be round -- indeed, it would possess
no properties at all (since there would be no concepts applied to it). On your
view, then, the way the world really is turns out to be a product of our
minds.
This is essentially an elaboration of the
very mistaken view which I corrected above. Apparently drawing from his own
understanding of conceptualism (which he has equated with my position),
Anderson assumes that my understanding of concepts makes the objects of
perception somehow dependent upon the activity of the knowing subject. I can
only suppose from this that Anderson is profoundly unfamiliar with the
Objectivist literature on the subject (which he in fact admits). Indeed, he
nowhere quotes any statements from either this literature or from my own
writings which substantiate the view which he attributes to me.
What seems to have happened here, is that Anderson
is drawing from his own understanding of what conceptualism teaches (and that
could be pretty much anything, since as we saw above many schools of thought on
"the problem of universals" may be classed as "conceptualist"), and - assuming
that my position is identical with some form of conceptualism with which
Anderson himself is familiar (an assumption which, as we saw above, is not
compatible with several of Anderson's own statements) - supposes that my view
suffers from the same subjectivist tendencies which he has observed in the
positions with which he is familiar (which are not in fact identical to the
Objectivist account which my analysis assumes).
Again, to correct Anderson on the points he
states above, the Objectivist theory of concepts (which my analysis of Frame's
exposition of Van Til's "One-Many Argument" assumes),
in no way "implies that reality is dependent on human consciousness." To make
this charge, Anderson would have to be fundamentally unfamiliar with
Objectivism in general, and with the Objectivist theory of concepts in
particular. I suppose that this is the case, and his own admission ("No doubt I have a lot to learn about Objectivism, but I am aware that the
Objectivist theory of concepts is not the same as the conceptualist view of
universals") only confirms this.
Anderson holds that "conceptualism implies
that reality is dependent on human consciousness," but he attributes this view
to my position. Does Anderson show that my position leads to such a view? No,
he does not. Specifically, does he show that the formation of universals from
perceptual input by means of a volitional mental process (a process of
selective focus) leads to such a view? No, he does not. Does Anderson show that
the Objectivist account of concepts leads to the view "that reality is
dependent on human consciousness"? No, he does not. Does he show that any statement
I have made in my analysis of Frame's exposition of Van Til's
"One-Many Argument" implies or reduces to the view that "reality is dependent
on human consciousness"? No, he does not. Not in any way does he link this
charge to statements which I have made, or with any position which I have
affirmed.
What Anderson has apparently done is
fallaciously link my position with the view that "reality is dependent on human
consciousness" by exploiting the hazy notion of "conceptualism" as a pivotal
toggle. His view is that my position is equivalent to a particularly offending
version of conceptualism (even though significant statements of his own deny
this, as we saw above), that this form of "conceptualism implies that reality
is dependent on human consciousness." Unfortunately, Anderson's charge is made
without any intelligent analysis of the position which he is so characterizing,
namely the Objectivist theory of concept-formation, a factor which he says is
"neither here nor there" in spite of its integral relevance to my position.
It is at this point that Anderson seeks to
enlarge his objection to my position by equivocating on the notion of
"properties." Essentially Anderson will use the term "properties" in two
distinct senses, senses which are germane to the dispute which he has generated
with his charges of subjectivism. In terms of essentials, the equivocation
which Anderson employs in misrepresenting my position reduces to a blurring of
the subject-object relationship, which is not surprising given Anderson's
theistic commitments (see my essay The Inherent
Subjectivism of Theism).
Consider the following statement which Anderson
makes:
If properties (which are paradigmatic universals) are merely human
concepts, then the truth of propositions such as the ball is round
ultimately depends on human conceptualisation.
Notice how unclear this is. The question for
Anderson here is what he means by "properties." Does this term denote the particular attributes which we perceive
in objects, or does it denote the concepts
by which we identify and integrate them? I find it necessary to ask for this
clarification since Anderson's point falls victim to blurring this distinction,
which I suspect is what leads him to the subjectivism he charges against my
position.
Let's explore this a bit.
If by "properties" Anderson means the former
- namely the particular attributes
which we discover in the individual objects which we perceive - then obviously
properties so understood are not
concepts (human or otherwise), but are existents which exist independent of
human cognition. In such a case, they are particular, meaning they exist in
specific measurements (e.g., the ball is two inches around or eight inches
around, etc.). Consequently they are not "universals," since they are
particular and exist in specific measure. Obviously in such a case, since they
exist independent of human cognition, the fact that the ball is round does not
ultimately depend on any human cognitive activity, since on the Objectivist
view (given its recognition of the primacy of existence), existence exists
independent of consciousness. By extension this fact applies to the attributes
which make up the objects which we perceive (e.g., the shape of a ball).
On the other hand, if by "properties"
Anderson means the latter - namely the concepts
by which we identify and integrate the particular
attributes which we discover in the objects we perceive - then yes, these
are concepts ("human" concepts if Anderson prefers), but it still would not
follow from this that "the truth of propositions such as the ball is round ultimately depends on human conceptualisation."
It is by means of conceptualization that we identify and integrate the fact that the ball is round, and it is
ultimately on the fact that the ball
is round that the truth of the statement the
ball is round depends, since according to Objectivism truth ultimately
depends on facts, not on conscious
activity.
In neither case does human cognitive activity
make the ball what it is, nor is it responsible for the nature which the ball
possesses. It should be clear, then, that the Objectivist account of concepts
is fully consistent with the primacy of existence here, in spite of Anderson's
comment that my view of universals is inconsistent with my "commitment to
metaphysical realism" (by which I suppose he meant my system's adherence to the
primacy of existence), suggesting that on my view "the features we perceive in
the external world... are not mind-independent after all." But how he attributes
such a view to my position is not at all clear, especially if his inference to
such a conclusion relies ultimately on equivocating on the understanding of
'properties' as I suspect he has done. My above points are intended to clarify
the meaning of 'properties' as it is used in interpreting my position and to
correct what I believe is a mistake on Anderson's part. I believe this error
can be traced back to Anderson's lack of familiarity with the objective theory
of concepts, for it is precisely here where his construal of my position
equivocates.
It should also be noted that, contrary to
Anderson's insistence, the Objectivist theory does not commit one "to the
existence of unperceivable entities" in the sense of "universals" as the
realist school conceives of them, i.e., some immaterial "form" or "idea" or
other thing which exists outside the mind. In the Objectivist account, there
exist only the particular objects which we perceive (they are not universal),
and the individual who perceives them (he is not universal). Thus there are
only two participants in the subject-object relationship which is the
precondition to conceptual cognition, namely the subject and the object. There
is no "third member" here, which cannot be perceived but which exists "out
there" somewhere, somehow, no how, etc. Moreover, since conceptualization is a
mental operation performed by the subject on the basis of perceptual input,
universality is properly understood as an aspect of conceptual awareness,
specifically the open-endedness of a concept's scope of reference.
All of this is lost on Anderson, who somehow
makes his way to the understanding that, according to my worldview, "'reality'
is a product of human consciousness, since the features exemplified by objects
'out there' do not inhere in the objects themselves but exist only in our
minds." But where does my position affirm or imply such a view? He has not
shown that this is at all what my view endorses or entails. It is only by
equivocating on key terms (such as "properties" as we saw above) that Anderson
can do this. But at this point he is no longer interacting with my position,
but rather with a misrepresentation of it. I agree with Anderson that, given
such a view (namely that "'reality' is a product of... consciousness"), "it makes
little sense to speak of an 'external world'," but again this is not a problem
for Objectivism, since it in no way affirms or implies such a view.
To try to tease out my position on the
matter, Anderson did ask me to consider a question of his:
Ask yourself this
simple question: In your view, is the ball round because (a) it exemplifies the
property of roundness independent of
any mental activity on our part or (b) because we apply the concept of roundness to it? If you opt for (a), then you're really a closet realist (about universals).
If you opt for (b), then you face a conflict with your Objectivist commitment
to metaphysical realism. (If you reject both (a) and (b) then, as I said before,
it would move things forward if you could state your alternative and relate it
to your prior use of the terms 'universal' and 'concept'.)
I actually don't think either alternative
here does justice to the Objectivist account. On the Objectivist account, the
ball exists and is what it is independent of any conscious activity. This is
the primacy of existence. This may seem to affirm (a) above, but its construal
of objects "exemplifying properties" makes me suspicious, given the historical
association of realism with the primacy of consciousness and the equivocation
on "properties" on which Anderson's earlier point traded. In regard to (a),
what specifically is "the property of roundness"?
Is it itself a feature existing independent of anyone's mental activity? If it
is an example of what the realist school means by "universal" (something which
has "an extra-mental existence"), then apparently it is
something which supposedly exists independent of anyone's mental activity in addition to the particular concretes
which we perceive in the world. In other words, it is, as I have suggested
above, a "third
member," or perhaps a late-comer, to the subject-object relationship, whose
existence has not been established, even by Anderson. If this is what Anderson means
by "the property of roundness," then
I would reject his option (a) just as quickly as I reject option (b) in
preference for the Objectivist account which I have described.
Speaking more to the point, I know that
whatever features the ball I perceive has, they are not universal, but rather particular:
they exist in specific measurements. The ball is (say) two inches in diameter,
weighs four ounces, is dark red, has distinguishing wear marks, etc. There is nothing about this particular ball
which is "universal." Furthermore, given the primacy of existence, the ball is
all these things independent of conscious
activity; it could sit on a shelf unnoticed for decades, and still be what
it is, having the characteristics it has, characteristics which are specific,
particular, non-universal. If Anderson thinks the ball
has some universal quality, he has not identified it. Its "roundness," as I
have pointed out, certainly is not universal, since it is particular, existing
in specific measure. That is not universal.
Of course, this does not preclude our ability
to form the concept 'round' based on what we perceive in this and other balls.
The concept 'round' is universal in that it is open-ended, allowing us to
integrate additional units without implying numerical limits. But this goes
back to the Objectivist theory of concepts. There is a crucial distinction
between the particular ball which I perceive (it is particular, its attributes
exist in specific measurements, etc.), and the concept 'ball' (or the concept 'round') by which I identify and
integrate the particular ball and other particulars which I perceive. The
concept 'ball' is universal in that
its range of reference is open-ended,
allowing me to subsume every particular ball which I perceive as well as every
particular ball which I do not perceive, into a single mental unit. Since the
ball exists independent of the concept 'ball', I would not say that any
particular ball is an "exemplification" of "ballness"
or "roundness" or some other ambiguously construed quality. The ball simply is,
it is itself, and it is what it is independent of conscious activity.
Anderson then made the following statement:
Ironically enough, your theory of concept formation (insofar as I can disern it from what you've written here) seems to
presuppose realism about universals, because you speak of concept formation as
a process of abstraction. Abstraction grounded in what exactly?
From what is our concept of roundness abstracted? A
series of concrete particulars (balls, etc.) that exemplify, prior to our
perception of them, a common property (roundness)? If that's the case,
then you're a realist after all. I simply invite you to come out of the closet;
there's no shame in it. :) But as I noted earlier, a realist view of universals
(properties, relations, etc.) commits you to the existence of unperceivable
entities, despite your apparent distaste for the idea.
Of course, Anderson's questions here are
addressed in Rand's Introduction to
Objectivist Epistemology. Had Anderson familiarity with this literature, I
doubt he would be asking these questions. But yes, concept-formation involves a
process of abstraction (it also involves integration and definition). Anderson
asks "abstraction grounded in what
exactly?" Abstraction is grounded ultimately in our perceptual awareness of
objects. As the working definition of 'concept' indicates, these objects serve
as the initial units which "are isolated according to a specific
characteristic(s) and united by a specific definition" (ITOE, p. 10). The
objects possess the specific
characteristic(s) which are isolated; whether or not they "exemplify... a common
property," again depends on what specifically this is supposed to denote. If
every particular object serving as the units from which the concept 'ball' is
abstracted possess specific
characteristics (that is, their attributes exist in specific measurements), then there is no universal "property"
existing "out there" which the particular objects "exemplify." What we call "universal"
is actually the concept which is
formed by omitting or "despecifying" the specific
measurements we perceive in order to include
objects possessing attributes in differing specific measurements.
Objectivism avoids the view that the
particulars we perceive "exemplify" a universal "property," because such
terminology tends toward the intrinsic view of universals, which construes
particular objects (i.e., those concretes which exist and possess specific
attributes existing in finite measure) as "expressions" or "reflections" of
some otherworldly "Form," such that the concrete particulars "exemplify" a
"universal property" (where "property" here is clearly not particular, not
existing in specific measure). Such an account suggests that "universals" exist
independent of (and even prior to) the world of objects which we perceive, and
it is in this way that such accounts invite the primacy of consciousness
metaphysics. Why? Because it ultimately requires a consciousness - typically
considered supernatural - to "account for" the "universals" of which the concrete
particulars which we perceive in the world are merely "exemplifications." Objectivism
avoids such philosophical hazards by adopting a theory of concepts which,
contrary to Anderson's poor understanding, is wholly consistent with the
primacy of existence metaphysics.
So am I a realist who should "come out of the
closet"? Am I trying to hide the realist tendencies of my position? Not at all.
There are no realist tendencies in my
position to hide in the first place. However, a better understanding of my position
is required to appreciate this.
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